

AD-A094 491


DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC  
DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 2ND QUARTER--ETC(U)  
FEB 75 H D SMITH, M LAMONT, W E LEGRO

F/6 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 OF 3  
AD  
A094491



Defense Attache Office-Saigon  
(RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY75/2)  
1 Oct 74 - 31 Dec 74

This document has been approved  
for public release and sale; its  
distribution is unlimited.

29 JAN 1981

78075 11

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM



# DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON

DTIC  
SELECTED  
S

This document has been  
for public release and  
distribution is unlimited.



COL W. E. LEGRO

RVNAF  
QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT  
2nd QTR FY 75

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~  
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DAO QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

6. Increase Attendance: 2nd Qtr to  
RWAF  
FY 75.

Approved by	
Reviewed by	
Comments	
Attch on file	
Dist	
A	

78075 11

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

29 JAN 1981

Classified by DATT/Saigon  
Exempt from General Declassi-  
fication Schedule of Executive  
Order 11652, Exemption Cate-  
gory 2, declassify on 31  
December N/A.

Cy 15 of 140

AOSOP-OR Control No S-145-75

~~SECRET NOFORN DISSEM~~  
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

10/1/75



**SECRET**  
**DECLASSIFIED**

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE  
FPO San Francisco 96620

AOSOP-OR

1 February 1975

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal -- RVNAF Quarterly Assessment

Commander  
U.S. Support Activities Group  
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB  
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with JGS  
Secret message, 072105Z March 1973, subject: Continuing SEA  
Reports (U).

*Maximilian Lamont*

1 Incl  
as

MAXIMILIAN LAMONT  
Colonel, USAF  
Executive Officer

78075 11

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG

29 JAN 1981

Regraded Unclassified

When separated from

classified inclosure.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

## UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION LIST

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, SAIGON	1
EMBASSY STAFF, SAIGON	3
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 1	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 2	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 3	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 4	1
OJCS/J-1	1
OJCS/J-3	3
OJCS/J-4	3
OJCS/J-5	3
OJCS/J-6	1
DIA/DI-6	3
CSA	5
CNO	5
CSAF	5
CMC	5
DCA	1
NSA	3
[CIA]	1
ISA	1
CINCPAC/J87	1
CINCPAC/J-3	5
CINCPACAF/XO	1
13AF/INVA	1
CINCPACFLT/J-3	1
AMEMB/JEC PARIS	1
CINCUSARPAC/DCINT	1
CDR USAICS/FT HUACHUCA AZ	1
HQ PACAF	1
DEFENSE ATTACHE, SAIGON	1
DEPUTY DEFENSE ATTACHE, SAIGON	1
DEPUTY FOR LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION	1
OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIVISION	30
AIR FORCE DIVISION	3
NAVY DIVISION	1
ARMY DIVISION	5
SUPPORT DIVISION	1
COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS DIVISION	1
ATTACHE ELEMENT	1
DEFENSE AUDIT OFFICE	1
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR	1
DIRECTOR OF CONSTRUCTION	1
HISTORIAN	15
COMPTROLLER	1
SAAFO	1
FPJMT	1
SECURITY ASSISTANCE DIVISION	1
COMUSSAG	12

---

 140

UNCLASSIFIED

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## DEFENSE ATTACHE'S

### FOREWORD and ASSESSMENT

During the past quarter, RVNAF continued to defend their nation while operating under the constraints made mandatory by reduced FY 75 funding. The JGS issued several directives which addressed, among other subjects, ammunition conservation, POL conservation and recovery of end items. Reaction to those directives varied by Military Region but by late October/early November it was apparent that a massive conservation program was in progress.

Concurrently, the NVA stepped up their input of materiel into the South, providing more evidence of increased action in the near future. Documents captured in early November spelled out in detail how the NVA proposed to escalate an already high level of activity and outlined the objectives of the impending escalation. In December, the NVA opened up with great intensity in the Delta, surpassing by far any previously recorded activity since the so-called cease-fire.

RVNAF reacted magnificently. While RVNAF is not yet facing a countrywide offensive, the NVA is clearly determined to make substantial gains in all areas within SVN. While it did not occur during the quarter to which this assessment is devoted, the fall of Phuoc Long Province after a concerted combined arms effort on the part of the NVA--an effort which pulled no punches and spared no resources--certainly presaged the future. RVNAF's reaction with greatly increased air support and the reaction of the relatively small number of ARVN ground personnel caused the NVA to pay a heavy toll for their gain.

When the MR-3 Commander called for additional materiel resources, they were provided. VNAF flew sorties out of MR's 2 and 4, as well as MR-3.

This pattern will continue, since it must. But when you examine resource expenditures, you will note that once again they have not been exorbitant nor do they match in any manner the resource expenditures which might have been expected some few months back. This, in my judgment, is a plus for RVNAF and for the JGS.

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

Where the constraint continues to be felt is in initiatives and counteroffensives which RVNAF would have executed in the days of less constrained resources. While it is clearly evident that RVNAF is not going to stand by and be beaten through overly prudent resource constraints, there exists within the minds of all the sober fact that what is expended today may not be replaced in the foreseeable future. Until there is some evidence that the United States will continue to support the fighting forces of SVN with sufficient wherewithall to defeat the enemy in combat, the spectre of that yet undetermined day in the future when stock levels will no longer support a protracted battle continues to loom in the minds of the RVNAF.

And yet the morale of RVNAF has not significantly deteriorated. They are still in there pitching and are determined that they will somehow emerge as victors. In my last assessment, I stated that we did not yet perceive the price which our reduced support program would exact. The picture is somewhat less cloudy at this writing. The price as of now is being paid by less RVNAF aggressiveness, fewer RVNAF initiatives and the emergence of a NVA offensive which, in the Communists' own estimate, is made possible in large measure because of the reduction of US support to RVNAF.



H. D. SMITH  
Major General, USA  
Defense Attache

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

**UNCLASSIFIED**

→ contents:  
Threat assessment  
Forward situation  
RVNAF Force capability  
RVNAF Force structure  
Vietnamese Army (ARVN)

5. Maintenance	5-33
6. Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL)	5-36
7. Port Operations	5-36
8. RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency Program	5-37
9. Dependent Shelter Program	5-37
10. ARVN Lines of Communication (LOC) Program	5-38
11. Special Category Army with Air Force (SCARWAF)	5-39
12. Retrograde Program	5-39
13. ARVN Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Program	5-39
14. Procurement	5-39
15. Summary	5-40

**CHAPTER 6 - VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)**

1. Introduction	6-1
2. Authorized Strength and Assigned	6-1
3. VNAF Force Deployment	6-1
4. VNAF Aircraft Inventory	6-10
5. Major Equipment Status	6-10
6. Operations	6-20
7. Logistics	6-21
8. Civil Engineering	6-28
9. Conclusions	6-29

**CHAPTER 7 - VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)**

1. Personnel	7-1
2. Personnel Readiness	7-1
3. Equipment Status of Ships and Craft	7-2
4. Logistics	7-7
5. Supply	7-9
6. Operations	7-11
7. Shortfalls	7-13
8. Conclusions	7-15

**CHAPTER 8 - VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)**

1. Personnel Strength	8-1
2. Personnel Readiness	8-1
3. Logistic Readiness	8-2
4. Operations	8-3
5. Conclusions	8-4

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER 9 - TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) 9-1
2. Regional Forces (RF) 9-2
3. Popular Forces (PF) 9-7
4. Logistic Support 9-7

## CHAPTER 10 - RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CAPABILITY

1. C-E Self-Sufficiency 10-1
2. Communication Management Agency (CMA) 10-2
3. Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS) 10-3
4. Selected C-E Evaluations 10-5
5. Logistics 10-7
6. Conclusions 10-16
7. Summary 10-20

## CHAPTER 11 - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCE TRAINING

1. Offshore Training 11-1
2. In-Country Training 11-3
3. In-Country English Language Training Program (ELTP) 11-12
4. Contract Training 11-14

## CHAPTER 12 - RVNAF PLANS PROGRAMS AND MORALE

1. Introduction 12-1
2. Lines of Communication 12-1
3. Military Construction 12-2
4. RVNAF Retirement Plan CY 74 12-3
5. RVNAF Morale 12-8
6. RVNAF Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) 12-10
7. Chieu Hoi Program 12-10
8. Terrorism 12-10
9. Refugee Program 12-10

## CHAPTER 13 - JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Chain of Command 13-1
2. Role of the Military Region/Corps Commander 13-1
3. The Organization and Functions of MRs, Provinces, Sectors, Districts/Subsectors and Village/Subsectors 13-8

## CHAPTER 14 - DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

# UNCLASSIFIED

## INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
AB&T	Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc.
ABN	Airborne
A/C	Aircraft
ACC	Army Calibration Center
ACS	Armored Cavalry Squadron
AD	Air Defense
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AIMI	Aviation Intensively Managed Items
ALC	Area Logistic Command
AMC/PAC	Army Materiel Command/Pacific Area Command
AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Air Photo Center/Armored Personnel Carrier
APO	Army Post Office
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARTY	Artillery

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

ARVN	Army, Republic of Vietnam
ASC	Army Supply Center
ASGN	Assigned
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASST	Assistant(s)
ATC	Air Training Command
ATLC	Air Technical Logistics Command
AUTH	Authorized
AVAL	Available
BCE	Base Civil Engineer
BDE	Brigade
BN	Battalion
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill(s) of Material
BR	Branch
BTRY	Battery
CAS	Casualty(ies)
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CG	Commanding General
CHD	Cable Head
CI	Counterintelligence
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CIV	Civilian
CLC	Central Logistics Command

V  
UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMD	Capital Military District
CO	Company/Commanding Officer
CONUS	Continental United States
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CP	Command Post(s)
C&P	Care and Preservation
CRS	Coastal Radar Site
CSDC	Central Security and Development Council
CTC	Central Training Command
CTX	Contacts
CY	Calendar Year
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DATT	Defense Attache
DAV	Defense Assistance, Vietnam
DC	Damage Control
DEAR	Daily Enemy Activity Report
DIFM	Due in for Maintenance
DIV	Division
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Code
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

DOI	Director of Intelligence
DSG	Direct Support Group(s)
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
EBD	Engineer Base Depot
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company International
EIUI	End Item Use Inspection(s)
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Men
EN	Enemy
EOQ	Equipment Order Quantity
FAST	Field Assistance Support Team
FEC	Federal Electric Corporation
FLN	Flown
FM/TM	Field Manuals/Technical Manuals
FRD	Friendly
FSB	Fire Support Base
FTG	Fleet Training Group
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GFP	Government Furnished Property
GP	Group(s)
GR	Government Representative

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

GVN	Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
HAZCON	Hazardous Condition
HJMA	Highland Junior Military Academy
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBM	International Business Machines Corp.
ICP	In-Country Procurement
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
INF	Infantry
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
JEM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JGS	Joint General Staff
JMA	Junior Military Academy
JSMB	Joint Services Management Branch
KIA	Killed in Action
K/D	Killed and Detained
KM	Kilometer
K/W	Killed and Wounded
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel
LDP	Logistics Development Plan
LN	Local National(s)
LOC	Line(s) of Communication

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

LOG	Logistic(s)
LSB	Logistics Support Base
LSI	Lear Siegler, Inc.
LTL	Interprovincial Road
MAJ	Major
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MG	Major General
MHE	Material Handling Equipment
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MID	Millitary Intelligence Detachment
MILCON	Military Construction
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MIN	Minor
MM	Millimeter
MMC	Medium Maintenance Center(s)
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOTU	Mobile Ordnance Training Unit
MR	Military Region(s)
MRO	Material Release Order

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

MSS	Military Security Service
MTC	Marine Training Center
MTT	Mobile Training Team(s)
NCNRC	National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge
NDB	Nondirectional Beacon
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NLDV	Negotiated Level Dollar Value
NORM	Not Operationally Ready Maintenance
NORS	Not Operationally Ready Supply
NTC	National Training Center(s)
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
OB	Order of Battle
OCE	Office of Civil Engineer
OFF	Officer
OFC	Office
OH	On Hand
OIC	Officer-in-Charge
OJT	On-The-Job Training
OPCON	Operational Control
OPN	Operation

x

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPTAR	Operating Target
OR	Operational Readiness
PA&E	Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc.
PCE	Page Communications Engineers, Inc.
PDO	Property Disposal Officer
PF	Popular Force(s)
PLT	Platoon(s)
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PSDF	Peoples' Self-Defense Force(s)
PW	Prisoner of War
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
QL	National Highway
QM	Quartermaster
RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Automated Materiel Management System
RAD	River Assault Division
RAID	River Assault Interdiction Division
RCO	Representative Contracting Officer
RDV	Requisition Dollar Value

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAC	Tactical
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TC	Training Center
TF	Territorial Force(s)
TMDE	Test Measuring and Diagnostic Equipment
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-Guided (Missile)
TSC	Tandem Switching Center
UNS	Unserviceable
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong
VENT	Vietnamese Equipment Management Team
VHA	Vietnamese Highway Agency
VHF	Very High Frequency
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAFELS	Vietnamese Air Force English Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNA	Vietnamese Naval Academy
VNNDPC	Vietnamese Navy Data Processing Center
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Shipyard
VTa	Vietnamese Telecommunications Authority
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WIA	Wounded in Action
WLV	Floating Radar Site
YR	Floating Repair

# UNCLASSIFIED



# SECRET

## CHAPTER 1

### THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (S) INTRODUCTION. The past quarter witnessed some of the most intense fighting since the Ceasefire as VC/NVA forces initiated the first phase of their 1975 dry season campaign. Activity was light throughout October and November with the exception of major, but localized, combat in southeastern Thua Thien Province and central Quang Nam Province. As fighting gradually subsided in those two areas late in the quarter, however, Communist forces in MR-3 and MR-4 launched major region-wide attacks on vulnerable GVN positions. A total of seven GVN district towns have thus far been lost and indications point to a significantly heightened scale of combat in 1975, which is expected to assume country-wide proportions. Logistic support of NVA units in the South continued at a high level and continued infiltration of significant numbers of combat personnel from North Vietnam to support the campaign in the South appeared likely. Significant Communist military gains during the quarter were confined to important terrain southeast of Hue and outlying areas in MR-3 and MR-4. Overall, however, the military momentum favoring the Communists increased as RVNAF was simultaneously forced to implement severe austerity measures in the face of major military aid cutbacks. As the quarter ended, the NVA was obviously gearing for a crucial phase of military operations designed to exploit its advantages and advance the Communist "revolution" a major step forward in 1975.

2. (S) NORTH VIETNAM.

a. Political.

(1) From Hanoi, the hardline propaganda campaign mounted in mid-August continued throughout the quarter with a primary Communist demand being the overthrow of the Thieu government as a precondition to negotiations. In early October, the Communists invited "all political forces, regardless of their political and religious characters, and all individuals, regardless of their background," to join together in a concerted effort to overthrow Thieu and establish an administration that will "seriously" implement the Paris Agreement. The Communists indicated that they are ready to negotiate with such an administration. This so-called "PRG statement" on 8 October 1974

# SECRET

is Hanoi's most dramatic effort to date to capitalize on political unrest in the South and ties the Communists to an unequivocal demand that President Thieu be deposed before the South Vietnam "problem" can be solved through negotiations.

(2) The hardline propaganda was also reflected in basic Communist guidance which emphasized the necessity for President Thieu's removal as a precondition for negotiations that would lead to establishment of a National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC). The primary emphasis was placed upon military pressure to force the GVN to "properly implement" the Paris Accords; in reality to obtain major political concessions which would ultimately emasculate the GVN and lead to a Communist take-over. Communist guidance emphasized, however, that even if significant political concessions by the GVN were forthcoming, fighting would continue until complete victory was achieved.

## b. Strategic Reserve.

(1) In military developments in North Vietnam, Hanoi added another division to its strategic reserve forces in NVN -- the 338th -- which was converted from a training to a combat unit. There are now seven combat reserve divisions in the North with a deployable strength of approximately 60,000 troops:

<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Est. Deployment Strength</u>
308	8,500
308B	8,500
312	8,500
316	8,500
320B	8,500
338	8,500
341	<u>8,500</u>
Total	59,500

(2) The 968th Division (minus 1 regiment), with 5,000 troops in south Laos, is an additional combat division which could be used to reinforce Communist units in South Vietnam.

# SECRET

# SECRET

The division's 9th Regiment infiltrated to the B-3 Front in early 1974.

## c. Logistics.

(1) During the past quarter, the NVA continued to move large quantities of supplies southward in the NVN panhandle and into South Vietnam. Over 130,000 tons were moved south in the NVN panhandle during the last quarter, compared to over 110,000 tons moved during the last quarter of 1973. Shipments into South Vietnam during the last quarter were at least 75,000 tons, three times that noted during the last quarter of 1973.

(2) The continued logistics flow further enhances the Communists' capability to conduct sustained military operations in the South.

d. Infiltration. During the last quarter, approximately 9,100 NVA personnel arrived in South Vietnam. Mid-November 1974 marked the start of the Communists' 1974-75 dry season infiltration campaign. At that time, the NVA resumed dispatching regular combat replacement groups to the B-3 Front and COSVN after a six month hiatus to those areas. Total NVA infiltration during 1974 was approximately 100,000.

## 3. (S) SOUTH VIETNAM.

### a. MR-1.

(1) The level of Communist military activity during the quarter decreased substantially from that of the previous quarter as the onset of the rainy season, coupled with high losses suffered in the summer campaign, inhibited large-scale Communist initiatives. The dominant action focused on Mo Tau Mountain and nearby terrain south and southeast of Hue as Communist forces sustained a major campaign that began in late August to assert control over strategic highground. Major activity also focused on Hill 1062, northeast of Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province, which dominates the lowland approach toward Danang. In Quang Ngai Province, well-entrenched Communist local forces enjoyed considerable success in repulsing RVNAF efforts to reverse previous Communist gains in the northeastern part of the province.

# SECRET

(2) In southeastern Thua Thien Province, Communist forces under control of the NVA 324B Division established control over commanding high ground southeast of Hue during September and, for a period, threatened QL-1 in Phu Loc District, the only land link between Hue and Danang. Fighting subsequently centered on two major terrain features, Mo Tau Mountain (YD8504) and Bong Mountain (YD9202). After several abortive attempts, the ARVN 1st Division, with heavy artillery and air support, on 11 December regained control of Mo Tau, from which NVA artillery had maintained continuous pressure on Phu Bai Airfield, forcing its closure. NVA forces, however, retained control of Bong Mountain and continued to conduct probing actions against Mo Tau, preparatory to future attempts to regain control of the mountain. During the campaign, the NVA rotated the 6th and 803rd Regiments at Mo Tau and the 271st and 812th Regiments at Bong Mountain. These forces were supported by the 5th Regiment and 78th Artillery Regiment whose 85MM guns had forced the closure of Phu Bai. The result was a net loss to the GVN as NVA forces asserted and retained control of most of the dominant high ground which provides forward springboards for anticipated future attacks into the lowlands southeast of Hue. The major immediate threat to Phu Bai, however, was eliminated.

(3) Following the intense NVA summer campaign in Quang Nam Province, major activity centered throughout much of the quarter on Hill 1062, northeast of Thuong Duc, while periodic flare-ups occurred near Duc Duc. RVNAF Airborne Division forces steadily pushed toward Thuong Duc, gaining control of Hill 1062 on 2 October. Further progress was denied by the NVA 304th Division which then counterattacked, regaining Hill 1062 on 31 October. Airborne forces, following intense artillery strikes, once again occupied Hill 1062 on 8 November. Action thereafter consisted of almost daily NVA attacks by fire on Airborne positions, but Airborne control of the Hill was not seriously contested. Then, in a surprise move, Airborne forces were withdrawn from Hill 1062 to a defensive line approximately two kilometers to the east as part of a plan to reconstitute a viable reserve for MR-1 and to reduce the vulnerability of Airborne forces whose northern and southern flanks were considered dangerously exposed. The NVA thus gained by default a prominent terrain feature which could prove vital in future combat. Both the NVA 304th Division and the Airborne

# SECRET

# SECRET

forces were heavily attrited by the continuous fighting. The 304th, by the end of December, was in a rest and refitting stage, preparing for probable renewed attacks when the weather breaks.

(4) In other activity in Quang Nam Province, NVA 2nd Division elements mounted only sporadic ground attacks and ABF's near Duc Duc, with the situation remaining essentially unaltered. The 2nd Division devoted most of the quarter to refitting after the costly summer campaign, preparing for attacks apparently to be focused on the Que Son Valley and northeastern Quang Tin Province. Quang Tin Province remained quiet although concern arose over vulnerable GVN enclaves at Hau Duc and Tien Phuoc. RVNAF reaction, however, apparently spoiled anticipated Communist initiatives.

(5) Activity in Quang Ngai Province remained high throughout the quarter. Primary attention was focused on eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts in the northeast portion of the province, where ARVN 2nd Division and regional forces attempted to dislodge entrenched Communist local forces. RVNAF met with little success, however, as several battalions were dispersed. To the South, NVA 52nd Brigade forces successfully resisted ARVN efforts to expand its buffer zone south of Nghia Hanh District Town. A prisoner reported that the 52nd, apparently near fulfillment of plans to expand to divisional status, would launch a large-scale campaign in early 1975 against the critical populous lowlands of Mo Duc, Duc Pho and Nghia Hanh Districts.

(6) NVA command and control adjustments during the quarter included the resubordination of the 29th Regiment in Quang Nam Province to the 304th Division. The 9th Regiment, formerly subordinate to the 304th, moved from central Quang Tri Province to an area southwest of Hue and apparently assumed independent status. The 36th Independent Regiment, which infiltrated to Quang Nam Province during the summer, was resubordinated to the NVA 2nd Division, replacing the 38th Regiment which became independent.

(7) The overall result of combat during the quarter was a limited gain for the NVA. Communist forces improved their tactical position in southeastern Thua Thien Province, which will facilitate future efforts to interdict land access to Hue. In Quang Nam Province, NVA control of Hill 1062 provides a

# SECRET

# SECRET

favorable position from which to launch attacks toward Da nang. Finally, in Quang Ngai Province, the balance sheet reflected, at a minimum, Communist retention of gains accrued since mid-year, with little evidence that RVNAF could soon arrest the gradual decline in security attendant to those gains.

(8) The Communist order of battle in MR-1:

Divisions	6 (4 Infantry, 2 Air Defense)
Brigades	1
Regiments	48 (19 Infantry, 6 Artillery, 3 Armor, 20 Air Defense)
Combat Troops	85- 95,000
Admin Service	34- 38,000
Guerrillas	3- 5,000
Total Personnel	122-138,000
Armor	360-415
Artillery	145-215

b. MR-2.

(1) In MR-2 during the last quarter of 1974, the most significant developments were the ability of RVNAF to gain and maintain the initiative against Communist forces and GVN acquisition and exploitation of intelligence on Communist intentions. These developments were primarily evidenced in the coastal provinces, notably Binh Dinh.

(2) In Binh Dinh Province, GVN forces continued the operational momentum gained in their counteroffensive against the Communists in August and September. As 3rd NVA Division elements were attempting to refit following the Communist summer campaign, the 41st ARVN Regiment and 4th Ranger Group began a push into the southern An Lao Valley. The 141st NVA Regiment offered only sporadic and ineffective opposition to the incursion and took heavy losses. The six-week ARVN

# SECRET

# SECRET

operation also forced the NVA to reinforce the 141st and to pull other forces back from forward positions elsewhere, thus alleviating the Communist threat to Bong Son Town and northern Phu My District. RVNAF renewed the offensive in late December by sending the 40th and 42nd Regiments back into the An Lao to retake Hills 82 and 174. Again, the 141st Regiment took heavy losses in personnel and was forced to withdraw from strategic terrain.

(3) Elsewhere in Binh Dinh Province, local forces completed rebuilding from losses incurred during the summer campaign and in November began to step up harassing attacks along QL-1 and QL-19. In early December, local force elements initiated the second phase of the winter/spring campaign with increased low level attacks. By mid to late December, however, heavy rains and effective territorial force reaction stalled the Communist campaign.

(4) In the central highlands, Communist military activity remained at generally low levels throughout the period. Communist forces overran Chuong Nghia Outpost on 3 October, to eliminate the last remaining GVN outpost in Kontum Province. In November, 10th and 320th NVA Division elements initiated a series of low level probing and harassing attacks north of Kontum City and west and southwest of Pleiku City, respectively. Through aggressive Ranger patrolling around Kontum City and 23rd ARVN Division spoiling operations in Thanh An District southwest of Pleiku City, RVNAF again regained the initiative.

(5) In the southern provinces, Communist MR-6 local forces initiated a brief highpoint in December. Principal targets were LOC's and GVN resettlement projects in Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc and Binh Thuan Provinces. By late December, territorial forces had effectively countered the threat in these areas.

(6) Overall, aggressive RVNAF preemptive and counter operations blunted any major NVA designs during the quarter. Indications of future Communist plans were inconclusive, but general guidance issued by Communist planners suggests that significant military initiatives, probably focusing on the highlands and northern coastal provinces, would occur in the early months of 1975.

# SECRET

# SECRET

(7) The Communist order of battle in MR-2:

Divisions	3
Regiments	19 (12 Infantry, 2 Artillery, 1 Armor, 4 Air Defense)
Combat Troops	35-40,000
Admin Service	15-20,000
Guerrilla	5-10,000
Total Personnel	55-70,000
Armor	115-135
Artillery	60- 75

c. MR-3.

(1) In MR-3, the NVA carried forward a major reorganization of its command and control structure involving the reorganization of main force units, formation of the 301st Corps and redesignation of the Communist military regions.

(2) A major feature of the reorganization involved the subordination of artillery, sapper, AAA, and possibly some armor units directly to divisional control. NVA divisions thus equipped with organic fire support units now have the capability to deploy into battle as one combat entity with greatly improved control and coordination. Another significant development in Communist command and control was the formation of the 301st Corps. The new corps, which apparently consists of the newly formed 3rd Division in Phuoc Long Province and the existing 7th and 9th Divisions, significantly enhances NVA capability to conduct coordinated multi-divisional attacks within the region.

(3) The VC/NVA also formed a division in DRV MR-7, (northern and eastern GVN MR-3) which, like the 3rd Division, consists primarily of existing forces.

# SECRET



# SECRET

(4) The Communists also redesignated their Military Regions (MR's). The former MR's 1, 2, 3 and 4 are now designated MR's 7, 8, 9 and the Saigon-Gia Dinh MR, respectively. These redesignations were part of the Communist program to redesignate and, in some cases, reconfigure military regions from the China border to the southern tip of South Vietnam. The primary significance of the MR redesignations probably lies in the political field as they do not appear to affect military command and control.

(5) October and November was a period of light Communist military activity in MR-3 consisting primarily of scattered local force and sapper attacks. In December, however, Communist main force units, with the exception of the 9th NVA Division, initiated major attacks against vulnerable semi-isolated GVN positions throughout the region. In Tay Ninh Province, two NVA regiments with heavy artillery support launched major assaults against RVNAF positions northeast of Tay Ninh City at Soui Da, while VC/NVA sappers and reconnaissance forces besieged the GVN position on Nui Ba Den. GVN defenders on Nui Ba Den were holding out as the quarter ended, but inability to resupply the position due to intense anti-aircraft fire diminished GVN hopes for retaining it. NVA control of Nui Ba Den would deny the GVN use of a communications facility but, more importantly, would deprive it of a key observation post for monitoring Communist troop movements and artillery fire near Tay Ninh City.

(6) Eastern MR-3 was the scene of the heaviest fighting with major attacks occurring throughout Phuoc Long Province and in northern Binh Tuy Province. In Phuoc Long Province, two divisions of the 301st Corps, the 3rd and 7th, supported by heavy artillery and armor, carried out major coordinated attacks which resulted in the loss of all four GVN district towns by the end of December. The province capital of Phuoc Long was under heavy siege and its loss also appeared imminent, a development that would remove the sole remaining vestige of GVN control in the province. Song Be would be the first province capital to fall since the Ceasefire, while Phuoc Long would be the only province ever to fall completely under Communist control. In Binh Tuy Province, three regiments of the newly formed MR-7 Division overran Tanh Linh District and applied heavy pressure against nearby Hoai Duc. The deployment of 18th ARVN Division forces into Hoai Duc prevented the loss of the district seat, although attacks were continuing as the quarter drew to a close.

(7) Throughout the remainder of MR-3, Communist sapper and artillery units carried out attacks against bridges, LOC's and logistic centers including numerous rocket attacks

1-9  
**SECRET**

# SECRET

against Bien Hoa Air Base.

(8) The initial phase of the Communist dry season campaign in MR-3 during December was significant in that Communist forces made major strides in consolidating their rear areas and because the successes have a psychological impact on both sides. Communist forces have considerably improved their tactical positions to the extent that later major attacks can be focused on more sensitive populated areas to the south. Additionally, prospects for achieving a long-standing goal, the isolation of MR-3 from the north by cutting QL-1 and QL-20, have been improved.

(9) Significantly, while RVNAF was nearly fully committed in the region, the NVA 9th Division and a portion of the 7th Division were not committed. While it is possible that the 9th Division was not prepared to participate in the initial attacks, it is also possible that the division was held in reserve, pending the outcome of attacks in other areas. If the latter is true, the 9th Division may well attack Tri Tam or Lai Khe, while the 7th Division attacks Chon Thanh. Success in such attacks would then facilitate attacks on more populous areas in southwestern Binh Duong and northern Hau Nghia Provinces and enable Communist forces to seriously threaten QL-1 between Saigon and Tay Ninh City. At a minimum, the disposition of Communist forces and the momentum gained in the initial attacks portend a sustained period of major combat in early 1975.

(10) The Communist order of battle in MR-3:

Divisions	7 (4 Infantry, 1 Artillery, 1 Air Defense, 1 Sapper)
Regiments	31 (15 Infantry, 5 Artillery, 1 Armor, 3 Air Defense, 7 Sapper)
Combat Troops	40-45,000
Admin Service	30-35,000
Guerrilla	4- 5,000
Total Personnel	74-85,000
Armor	190-200
Artillery	80- 90

# SECRET

d. MR-4.

(1) The fourth quarter in MR-4 began with the year's mildest highpoint and ended with a prolonged, intensive surge in December which far surpassed anything taking place earlier in the year. The December surge represented clear implementation by Communist forces of COSVN guidance for 1975 which calls for VC/NVA units to kill significant portions of RVNAF, extend control over land and people, and drive wedges into cracks which the VC/NVA perceive in the GVN/RVNAF defense structure. In line with these objectives to accelerate an already disturbing erosion of RVNAF strength and control in outlying areas, the Communists increased their force structure both qualitatively and quantitatively by forming the 8th and 4th Divisions from already existing units, and by committing the 5th Division to combat missions in the upper delta. The 8th and 4th Divisions were formed in the upper and lower delta respectively, and while they do not constitute an increase in Communist strength, their creation will facilitate VC/NVA efforts to overcome difficulties in dealing with ARVN main force units of regimental size or above.

(2) In December, the Communists opted to accelerate the process by which they made gradual gains throughout the year by launching widespread, intensive attacks to drive RVNAF out of rural areas, and inflict heavy casualties. Unlike other highpoints, the VC/NVA coordinated timing in both the upper and lower delta (DRV MR's 8 and 9 respectively) and extended the highpoint over a three-week period.

(3) In the upper delta, the first jolt was focused along the RVN-Cambodian border and in Dinh Tuong Province. It was highlighted by strong Communist threats against Tuyen Nhon District Town in southeastern Kien Tuong Province, which lies astride a critical infiltration corridor. NVA 5th Division forces displayed once again their inability to exploit a critical situation, and were not able to drive out RVNAF defenders who were running low on supplies and munitions. Similar, though less intense attacks, were directed against other key RVNAF positions in Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong Provinces but did not result in any major loss of terrain control for RVNAF. Overall, VC/NVA forces did not accomplish their immediate objective of establishing a secure zone in the northern delta from which to stage later attacks deeper into GVN terri-

# SECRET

# SECRET

tory. In addition, Communist casualties will somewhat hamper the planning and execution of near term renewal of pressure against resupplied and prepared RVNAF units.

(4) Remaining areas of the upper delta also were hit hard by harassment attacks and numerous shellings, and while RVNAF forces were kept on the defensive, they did not suffer any major losses. Future pressure could be more severe if the 8th and 5th Divisions are able to conduct coordinated attacks, which could represent the stiffest challenge RVNAF has faced since the Ceasefire.

(5) Activity in the lower delta was less favorable to RVNAF, and despite a professional response to Communist attacks throughout the southern delta provinces, VC/NVA units were able to drive RVNAF out of considerable expanses of countryside. Both sides emerged somewhat stunned following the gradual downswing which began in the last week of December, with RVNAF seriously jolted in some locales and Communist units, including the highly touted D.2 NVA Regiment, taking high losses. Although much attention was focused on the loss of remote Hung Long District Town in Chuong Thien Province, losses in Vinh Binh, An Xuyen, and Kien Giang Provinces represent more significant setbacks in terms of RVNAF terrain control and the inability of provincial regional forces/popular forces to reestablish a status quo ante. Communist forces also increased emphasis on another aspect of the delta war, that of destroying the GVN's civil and economic infrastructure. In a number of instances, VC/NVA struck hamlet and village headquarters, health and welfare facilities and reportedly killed any GVN civil servants who were not able to flee. Thus, militarily, politically and economically, the VC/NVA sought to place the greatest possible burden on RVNAF and the GVN, and render it incapable of dealing with the problems which arose. In many cases they were successful, but at a reported cost of over 4,000 KIA.

(6) The fourth quarter must be considered a qualified VC/NVA success, in that they continued the process of pressuring and overburdening RVNAF, and steadily expanded the extent of control and influence in outlying areas which now include key LOC's as well. New GVN MR-4 leadership, and the belated RVNAF recognition that VC/NVA units have the initiative, may both contribute to a slowdown in Communist

# SECRET

# SECRET

momentum in the next quarter, or at least render it more costly. However, the current alignment of factors working against RVNAF, which were very visible during the turmoil of the December highpoint, will still apply in the months to come.

(7) The Communist order of battle in MR-4:

Divisions	3
Regiments	19 (15 Infantry, 2 Artillery, 2 Sapper)
Combat Troops	24-29,000
Admin Service	12-15,000
Guerrilla	12-14,000
Total Personnel	48-58,000
Armor	0
Artillery	5-10

4. (S) COMMUNIST INTENTIONS.

a. Communist documents indicate that the first six months of 1975 and possibly beyond will witness a sustained period of heavy combat throughout South Vietnam. A COSVN Resolution for 1975 and similar guidance from Communist planners in GVN MR-1 and MR-2 calls for a large-scale military campaign to inflict a "fundamental defeat" upon GVN pacification. To achieve this goal, the following ambitious program is to be implemented:

- (1) Kill one-third of the GVN armed forces
- (2) Remove all isolated GVN outposts
- (3) "Liberate" the bulk of the countryside
- (4) Gain control of additional population

**SECRET**

(5) Cut key LOC's and isolate Saigon

(6) "Liberate" Binh Dinh, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces

(7) Develop the revolutionary spirit among the masses.

b. The 1975 dry season campaign began on schedule in December with the widespread attacks throughout MR-3 and MR-4. Meanwhile, Communist forces in MR-1 and MR-2 generally refrained from major combat and concentrated on building strength for anticipated attacks when the weather improves.

c. A recent report indicates that a primary Communist goal is to force the GVN to agree to establishment of a National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC) as called for in the Ceasefire Agreement, through intense military pressure. Communist guidance, however, stresses that GVN political concessions represent only an intermediate objective on the course toward eventual complete domination by the Communists.

d. Quite clearly, then, the struggle for control of South Vietnam will, in the coming months, feature a significantly heightened phase of combat which Hanoi hopes will prove decisive. It is all but certain that the GVN's greatest test since the Ceasefire lies in the near future.

**SECRET**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 2

### FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. (C) OVERVIEW. Communist cease-fire violations set a record high for the second consecutive quarter. Military Regions (MR) 1 and 2 showed a gradual decrease, while MRs 3 and 4 experienced a considerable upsurge. Significant activity in MR 1 consisted mainly of RVNAF operations in the Thua Thien Province, Mo Tau Mountain area. The 1st Division and the 15th Ranger Group were successful in gaining control of the entire complex on 11 December, inflicting heavy casualties on the communist forces. ARVN efforts to secure objectives in the Batangan Peninsula, Quang Ngai Province resulted in heavy friendly casualties rendering one infantry and two Ranger battalions combat ineffective. Phu Bai Air Base received numerous rocket and mortar attacks resulting in closing of the field to all but helicopters and light aircraft. The field was reopened to military traffic on 13 December. The bomb storage area located at Danang Air Base exploded, cause unknown, on 29 November resulting in considerable loss of air ordnance and civilian life. With the exception of the loss of Chuong Nghia district town (Plateau Gi), Kontum Province, military activity in the central highlands remained relatively low. In the coastal area of MR 2, the greater ground action took place in Binh Dinh Province. The GVN initiated an operation that closed the southern end of the An Lao Valley. ARVN units successfully seized the high ground on the eastern side of the valley which placed them in position to interdict communist controlled Route 514. The most significant enemy action took place in MR 3, highlighted by three separate rocket attacks against the Bien Hoa Air Base; the loss of Duc Phong, Don Luan district town, Bunard Outposts, and the resettled district town of Bu Duc, all in Phuoc Long Province and Tanh Ling district town, Binh Tuy Province. At the close of the quarter, the Phuoc Long capital city was under serious siege by VC/NVA tank supported troops. The situation is critical and the GVN is making a concerted effort to prevent its loss which would culminate the communist's efforts to gain complete control of Phuoc Long. There has been an increase in the number of terrorist acts in Saigon and environs. This encompassed destruction of electric poles, throwing grenades into police posts and shooting ARVN personnel on city streets.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

During the period 6-12 December, MR 4 had a total of 1168 violations. Although enemy incidents increased in numbers they decreased in intensity. Interdiction of lines of communication (LOC) increased sharply during the quarter, particularly in Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long and Kien Giang Provinces. Route 8A between Ha Tien and Rach Gia, Kien Giang suffered daily minings of the roadway and blowing of bridges. Interdiction of inland waterways increased significantly. This activity was coupled with other regionwide minor attacks and attacks by fire to increase enemy infiltration capabilities. Hung Long district town, Chuong Thien Province, was lost on 16 December. Division areas of operation were realigned in an effort to better cope with the enemy's increase in activity in heretofore relatively calm areas. The 7th Division area now encompasses only Dinh Tuong, Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces. Sa Dec, Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces have been delineated as a separate area of operations responsible to a "Special Task Force," composed of ARVN regular and mobile regional force battalions. Task force units are rotated periodically with other province units. Communist forces continue attempts to re-establish their control in the Tri Phap area. Communist forces are gaining additional control of areas and population throughout all regions.

## 2. (C) MILITARY REGION 1.

a. Operational activity was restricted due to seasonal monsoon rains. The military situation in Quang Tri Province continues unchanged with limited exchanges of small arms and mortar fire generally west of the My Chanh River. Elements of the 54th Infantry, 1st ARVN Infantry Division and the 15th Ranger Group, attached to the 1st ARVN Division, succeeded in gaining control of the entire Mo Tau Mountain complex in southern Thua Thien Province on 11 December, inflicting heavy casualties on the defending communist forces. No major assault is planned to dislodge communist forces entrenched on Bong Mountain in southeastern Thua Thien Province. Instead, intentions are to surround the mountain and cut off enemy resupply lines, thereby forcing the enemy to withdraw.

b. The 3d Airborne Brigade withdrew their main units from Hill 1062, central Quang Nam Province, using small unit exfiltration technique during the hours of darkness to conceal from enemy observers the true size of the withdrawal. The main defensive positions have been established in the vicinity of Dong Lam Mountain, leaving a general outpost line around Hill 1062 and withdrawing one complete brigade of three battalions to a reserve position northwest of Danang City. The ARVN 14th Ranger Group plus the 78th and 79th Ranger Battalions were moved from Quang Nam Province into Quang



# CONFIDENTIAL

Ngai Province on 1 December. On 3 December the 77th Ranger Battalion was moved from Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin Province to Quang Ngai Province to act as a reserve force. This ranger battalion was replaced by the 2/6th Infantry, 2d ARVN Division, to reassure the local population. A combat operation to secure objectives in the Batangan Peninsula, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, involving elements of the 6th Infantry and the 14th Ranger Group, resulted in heavy friendly casualties leaving one battalion of the 6th Infantry and two ranger battalions combat ineffective.

c. Rail service between Danang and Hue remains suspended as reported previously. During the latter part of December, QL-1 and secondary roads in several parts of the region were closed due to high flood waters which damaged or washed away parts of bridges, culverts and by-passes. ARVN engineers are attempting to maintain the traffic on QL-1 but are unable to reopen other LOC because of continuing problems with swift flowing water and heavy rain. Enemy sappers increased their attacks against LOC and civilian commercial vehicles. Phu Bai Air Base was reopened to Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) traffic on 13 December. Prior to this, repeated rocket and artillery attacks on the airfield restricted its use to helicopters and light observation aircraft. VNAF moved in supplies necessary to support limited air activity. The base has not yet been opened to civilian air traffic. Danang Air Base was last rocketed 18 December.

d. The bomb storage area of Danang Air Base exploded 29 November. Several secondary explosions followed as a result of sympathetic detonation of other bombs in the storage area. At present, the exact cause of the initial explosion has not been determined, although military officials highly suspect sabotage within the storage area. In addition to the large quantity of munitions destroyed, 11 military and 108 civilians were injured and 1558 civilian houses from six surrounding hamlets were affected (lightly damaged to completely destroyed).

(Figure 2-1)

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 2-1

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 3. (C) MILITARY REGION 2.

a. In the central highlands, military activity continued at a low level. With the exception of the loss of Chuong Nghia district town (Plateau G1), activity was unusually light in Kontum Province. There was a major shifting of GVN forces during the latter part of November. Infantry units of the 23d Division were withdrawn and deployed in Pleiku Province. These units were replaced in Kontum by the II Corps Ranger Command with four Ranger groups (4th, 6th, 22d and 23d). The regrouping of Ranger groups under their own command structure contributed to aggressive patrolling and a high level of performance, deterring the communists from further encroachments against Kontum City. In Pleiku, the "Hoa Binh" operation, conducted west of Thanh An district town during November and December, was highly successful. ARVN units inflicted heavy casualties and preempted near term communist threats against Thanh An. Significant TACAIR was employed against communist logistic sites and supply routes in both Kontum and Pleiku Provinces throughout the period. An operation against Montagnard dissident groups (K'Pa Koi) was conducted in Darlac Province without making contact but did force the groups to withdraw to secure locations. This action cleared Routes 14 and 21 from harassing activity believed to be dissident related. A communist sapper team cut a portion of the penstock (water pipeline) running from the reservoir in Tuyen Duc Province to the Da Nhim hydroelectric plant in Ninh Thuan Province. This penstock consists of two parallel lines, and electrical power was not disrupted.

b. In the coastal provinces, the majority of ground activity occurred in Binh Dinh Province. The most significant action was a GVN-initiated operation that closed the southern end of the An Lao valley and brought communist controlled province Route 514 under interdicting fire, destroying a bridge. On 15 October, territorial forces destroyed another bridge in the central An Lao Valley (Route 514 is the main artery through which communist troops and supplies reach the coastal lowlands in Binh Dinh Province). Communist forces counterattacked and heavily shelled ARVN forces but have been unsuccessful in dislodging them. Ranger units supported this operation and were successful in taking a number of strongly fortified outposts and gaining control of the high ground overlooking the south bank of the An Lao River. Heavy monsoon rains hampered ground fighting on both sides and, at the end of the period, 22d Division units were still in control of the southern approaches to the An Lao Valley. Activity elsewhere in Binh Dinh Province was confined to shelling and harassing fire. The anticipated increase in communist harassment in Binh Thuan Province materialized in early December. Population centers and resettlement sites were shelled, and Routes 1 and 8B were temporarily interdicted at several locations. Khanh Hoa

# CONFIDENTIAL

Province experienced communist harassment along lines of communication. In early November armed intelligence units made a successful raid against the headquarters of the communist Khanh Hoa Provincial unit where 16 VC staff officers were killed and numerous documents and weapons were captured.

c. The predicted battle for Chuong Nghia Subsector commenced during the early morning hours of 30 September. Constant ABF and probing attacks precipitated territorial forces withdrawal from numerous outposts surrounding the main camp. The camp was defended by approximately 900 men, consisting of the 254th RF Battalion, two independent RF companies, eight PF platoons, and an artillery platoon (two 105mm How). Between 30 September-2 October, communist forces maintained continuous pressure on friendly positions and heavily shelled the camp with mortar and rocket fire. Radio communication was lost intermittently between the defenders and their headquarters. TACAIR was employed in support but proved ineffective. A heliborne reinforcement effort was made but was aborted due to heavy ground fire. The displacement of 175mm artillery was attempted but bad road conditions and slow progress precluded the timely employment of this artillery in defense of Chuong Nghia outpost. Heavy communist shelling continued through 6 October, obliterating the camp and forcing the GVN forces to withdraw. Survivors made their way to Kontum City; however, the approximately 2,200 Montagnard tribesmen living in the area refused evacuation.

d. In the only major command change, MG Pham Van Phu replaced Nguyen Van Toan as Corps Commander.

(Figure 2-2)

## 4. (C) MILITARY REGION 3.

a. Military activity for this quarter was far higher than any previous cease-fire period. In early December, the number of incidents reached a new high of 99 for a 24-hour period and the December daily average was 40.8, compared to an overall cease-fire average of 20.1. The GVN position deteriorated appreciably over the past month in the eastern portion of the MR. During December, Binh Tuy Province lost Tanh Linh District to the enemy and, at the end of this period, the one remaining GVN stronghold north of QL-1, Hoai Duc district town, is threatened. The 43d Regiment moved to a position on QL-20 northeast of Dinh Quan and is attempting to reach Hoai Duc via Route 333. The 1/43d Infantry Battalion heli-lifted into Hoai Duc district town on Christmas Day to aid in its

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 2-2

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

defense. The entire 48th Regiment and 7th Ranger Group (with the 5th ACS) hold positions along Route 333 in the Long Khanh, Binh Tuy border area in an effort to leave an avenue of relief for the besieged town and to guard the resettlement sites in that area. In Long Khanh Province, Routes 20 and 1 were periodically harassed throughout the period by brush type roadblocks, causing minor delays in the vital traffic from Da Lat and Phan Thiet. During December, the enemy overran Duc Phong, Phuoc Long Province, taking the airfield previously used by VNAF C-130's. This forced VNAF to use the airstrip four km southwest of Song Be. Two C-130's were lost within a week; one was hit on the airstrip by mortar and rocket fire, causing extensive damage to the right wing, and the second was shot down by 37mm AA fire when a turn was made on departure after a resupply mission. The remaining outposts along Route 14 were either overrun or abandoned due to enemy pressures. Don Luan district town was lost. The enemy then concentrated his efforts along Route 311, Ba Ra Mountain and Phuoc Binh district areas adjacent to the Province capital and the vital remaining airfield. Five enemy tanks were destroyed on the last day of the quarter in the Phuoc Binh district area, where elements of the 1/7th Infantry were defending. At the end of the period, the situation in Phuoc Long Province was deteriorating rapidly. The only area remaining under GVN control was the province capital, and it was threatened. The defenders were low on ammunition and asking for evacuation of the wounded; the possibility of sufficient relief forces was unlikely.

b. The 9th Regiment, 5th Division, retook Base 82 in October and recaptured Rach Bap in November. Very little other activity was reported in that area during this quarter.

c. The Suoi Da and Nui Ba Den areas of Tay Ninh Province came under heavy enemy attack in November and were reinforced by elements of the 25th Division. Nui Ba Den remained a trouble spot as enemy fire prevented resupply of the RF company and communication facility on top of the mountain.

d. Enemy sapper activity circled the capital zone (Saigon) with bridge damage and destruction. The two largest losses were the Hoa An Bridge on the outskirts of Bien Hoa in October and the Phu Cuong Bridge in December.

e. Bien Hoa Air Base was rocketed three times, causing damage to several aircraft and buildings on the base and casualties in the civilian populace surrounding the area. On 16 November 1974, an alert security guard discovered an exhaust cover loose on the tailpipe of a parked F-5E. Checking the aircraft, he discovered

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

a Russian-made antitank grenade with a delay device in the tail-pipe. Other aircraft were checked immediately, and four other such devices were discovered and removed. Search of the area netted a tool box belonging to a VNAF mechanic, who admitted placing the explosives after enemy threats against his family.

f. LTG Du Quoc Dong was assigned as new commander of MR 3 during the quarter. Rear Admiral Lam Nguon Tanh was assigned as Chief, Naval Operations. These were the only major command changes occurring in MR 3 during this quarter.

(Figure 2-3)

## 5. (C) MILITARY REGION 4.

a. The level and intensity of activity during the first half of this quarter followed a fairly stable and normal pattern. After a higher-than-normal November mid-month highpoint, activity diminished until the enemy suddenly launched a regionwide offensive coinciding with the beginning of the rice gathering season in early December. During the period 6-12 December, 1168 incidents were recorded, a high for any one week period since cease-fire. The quarterly total also established a new high since cease-fire. Prior to the December offensive, enemy efforts again took the form of small-scale attacks on territorial forces, outposts and watchtowers which resulted in abandonment and loss of many posts. Artillery support for outposts under attack was limited to two rounds, after which permission for additional support had to be requested from higher headquarters. This restriction and the delay frequently encountered in obtaining approval for additional fire are often used to advantage by attacking enemy forces. Vulnerable GVN areas were quickly recognized and attacked by the enemy, who generally desisted whenever GVN forces reacted strongly. LOC interdictions increased sharply, particularly in Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long and Kien Giang Provinces. There were almost daily minings of the road and bridges on Route 8A between Ha Tien and Rach Gia cites in Kien Giang. Pressure on the road in this area was intended to tie down ARVN units to facilitate infiltration from Cambodia into adjacent north and south areas. Routes 4, 20, and 29 in Dinh Tuong were frequently mined as was Route 7A in Vinh Long. Enemy interdiction of canals and waterways in southern An Xuyen Province increased significantly. The GVN program to upgrade territorial forces, initiated in July, progressed slowly although it received strong emphasis from the new MR 4 Commander, Major General Nguyen Khoa Nam. Problems continue with phantom/flower soldiers, sale of preferred assignments, protection of draft evaders and RVNAF deserters, and ineffective recruitment programs. After assuming command 8 November, Gen Nam issued strong directives to accelerate the program

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MRS




Figure 2-3

2-13  
CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

and halt known malpractices. In another step designed to reverse the trend of deteriorating security, Nam pressed for more effective military leadership from province chiefs. He ordered province chiefs to devote 70% of their time to sector commander duties by delegating many administrative and civil functions.

b. Other major command changes in the region included assignment of Brigadier General Tran Van Hai as Commander, 7th Division, replacing Major General Nam who assumed command of the region, and assignment of Colonel Mach Van Truong as Commander, 21st Division, replacing Brigadier General Le Van Hung. These changes, personally approved by President Thieu, were intended to improve the effectiveness of regional leadership.

c. The December enemy offensive, launched on the sixth, was well planned and coordinated. The enemy was well supplied, at least for the two weeks of major thrust, as multiple high-round ABF were employed extensively throughout the region. Although numerous small outposts and villages were lost or abandoned under enemy pressure, GVN forces generally reacted well and succeeded in denying the enemy substantial gains in vital populated areas. Hung Long District, Chuong Thien Province, was lost but it was little more than a military position, and its vulnerability was recognized when formed in February 1974.

(Figure 2-4)

## 6. (C) SUMMARY.

a. The NVA/VC continue their efforts to gain control of areas and population by applying constant pressure on GVN forces in all regions. If the pressure is not military, it is political/psychological. This quarter the communists seized the district towns of Chuong Nghia in Kontum Province; Bo Duc, Duc Phong, Don Luan, and Phuoc Binh in Phuoc Long Province; Tanh Linh in Binh Tuy Province; and Hung Long in Chuong Thien Province. Additionally, Song Be, the Phuoc Long Province Capital, Hoai Duc District Capital in Binh Tuy Province and Nui Ba Den outpost in Tay Ninh Province are under heavy enemy pressure.

b. The communists suffered heavy casualties in all regions. The majority of these losses were experienced in minor contacts and skirmishes, not in concerted efforts to annex district towns or areas. Major military clashes have, in most cases, resulted in the GVN being hurt to the greater degree.

\*(Figures 2-5, 2-6A, 2-6B, 2-6C, 2-6D, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9A, 2-9B, 2-9C, 2-10, 2-11A and 2-11B)

\*Note that friendly KIA have been updated to reflect RVNAF Adjutant General figures.

CONFIDENTIAL





Figure 2-4

2-15

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**REPORTED SA-7  
FIRINGS IN RVN  
28 JAN 73 - 31 DEC 74**



**MISSILES FIRED**

	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
28 Jan 73 thru 30 Sep 74	9	24	73	49	155
1 Oct 74 thru 31 Dec 74	0	0	6	1	7
Total since Ceasefire	9	24	79	50	162

**A/C Destroyed by SA-7 (1 Oct-31 Dec 74)**

<u>A/C/Type</u>	<u>\$ Cost (Ea)</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CH 47	990,717	1	990,717
A-37	455,000	1	455,000
Total			1,445,717

Figure 2-5

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

OCT - DEC 74

## MAJOR ENGAGEMENT - WON - LOST LEDGER

<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
1	<u>MO TAU MOUNTAIN, THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u>  On 11 December, elements of the 54th Inf were successful in clearing the summit of Mo Tau of communist forces, thereby culminating an ARVN effort spanning several months and involving heavy combined artillery/infantry assaults. Enemy occupancy of the summit of Mo Tau forced the closing of Phu Bai Airfield because it was under direct observation and within direct artillery fire range. Additionally, the communists from the vantage points of Mo Tau could freely fire on traffic along Route 1 at the base of the mountain. ARVN success in clearing the summit, and subsequently all of the mountain, forced communist forces to shift their artillery further south, giving ARVN forces the ability to interdict communist resupply traffic from Route 545C. The 1st Infantry Division Commander has decided against ground assault against communist forces on Bong Mountain to the SE of Mo Tau. Plans are to surround the mountain, cut resupply lines, forcing the communist forces to withdraw. On 13 December Phu Bai Air Base, still subject to indirect fire attack, was reopened to military traffic only.	Won
2	<u>CHUONG NGHIA SPECIAL SUBSECTOR, KONTUM PROVINCE</u>  The isolated outpost of Chuong Nghia, situated on a rolling plateau adjacent to Route 5B approximately 40 air miles NE of Kontum City, came under heavy communist combined ground/artillery attack on the afternoon of 30 September 1974. Chuong Nghia was defended by the 254th RF Bn with 289 men, the 896th RF Co with 91 men, the 746th RF Co with 54 men plus eight PF plts totaling 208 men. Additionally, there were 710 Peoples Self Defense Force in	Lost

Figure 2-6A

2-18

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

MR

DESCRIPTION

LEDGER

support. The battle raged for three days with the enemy firing thousands of rounds of mixed artillery in support of the attack. On 3 October, radio contact was lost and aerial reconnaissance revealed that the entire outpost had been leveled by enemy fire. Efforts to reinforce the camp by air insertion of the 251st RF Bn were thwarted due to intense enemy ground fire. Efforts to provide 175mm artillery support failed because the access approach, LTL 5B, was in such poor state of repair it was impossible to deploy heavy weapons forward. By 17 October, 171 troops and 136 civilians had made their way back to friendly control. As of 1 November, there were still 516 MIA. Fifty-six crew served weapons, including two 105mm howitzers, plus 612 small arms and other miscellaneous materials were lost.

2 AN LAO VALLEY, BINH DINH PROVINCE

Won

In continuation of maintaining the offensive, elements of the 22d Div, supported by the 4th and 6th Rgr Gps, pushed into the southern approach to the An Lao Valley. GVN forces were successful in taking and occupying the high ground controlling the southern approach. Supporting Rgr units were successful in taking several strong NVA outposts commanding the south bank of the An Lao River. NVA elements have continuously attempted to dislodge ARVN troops and have suffered heavy casualties with each effort. At the close of the quarter, ARVN units continued to occupy the positions, and place interdiction fire on province Route 514.

3 RACH BAP OUTPOST, BINH DUONG PROVINCE

Won

On 20 November, six months to the day from the time it was lost, elements of the 9th Inf reoccupied Rach Bap Outpost in the Ben Cat area of Binh Duong. ARVN clearing operation in the southern Iron Triangle area lasted five days, meeting only light enemy resistance. The re-occupying of Rach Bap completed the recovery

Figure 2-6B

2-19

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
	of all territory lost in the Iron Triangle area during the Communist Summer/Autumn offensive. Casualties from the operation were light, 16 KIA and one member of 272d Regt, 9th NVA Division was taken prisoner.	
3	<u>DUC PHONG DISTRICT TOWN, PHUOC LONG PROVINCE</u>  Duc Phong is the first district town in MR 3 to fall to the communists since the cease-fire. On 13 December, Duc Phong came under heavy communist ABF followed by a concentrated ground attack. The heavy pressure continued into the following day. Duc Phong defenders were routed on 14 December, and the communists were in complete control. Due to inexperience and complacency, the territorial defenders were unable to withstand the attack.	Lost
3	<u>NEW BO DUC RESETTLEMENT, PHUOC LONG PROVINCE</u>  New Bo Duc District, a resettlement site, was a small, temporary governmental entity. Concurrently with the attack on Duc Phong, the communists launched an attack against Bo Duc. The site was lost on 14 December but was retaken on the 16th by a battalion of RF reinforcements. Bo Duc was lost again to the communists on 22 December.	Lost
3	<u>BUNARD OUTPOST, PHUOC LONG PROVINCE</u>  Bunard Outpost was the base area of an RF bn along QL-14. On 15 December, the post was overrun following a combined ABF and ground assault. The attack on Bunard Outpost was launched concurrently with the attack on Duc Phong and Bo Duc.	Lost
3	<u>DON LUAN DISTRICT TOWN, PHUOC LONG PROVINCE</u>  Don Luan district town came under heavy ABF on 13 December. The enemy pressure continued. NVA/VC troops surrounded the town and launched an all-out	Lost

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
	attack during the early hours of 26 December. After a massive ground and ABF attack, the town fell to the communists. The loss of Dong Luan, Bunard and Duc Phong, all situated along QL-14, gave the enemy control of most of the route and threatens the entire province.	
3	<u>PHUOC BINH SUBSECTOR, PHUOC LONG PROVINCE</u>  After being subject to increasing ABF since early December, Phuoc Binh Subsector fell on 31 December. The final assault on Phuoc Binh was made by NVA T-54 tank led troops. The defenders were successful in destroying five T-54 tanks before finally being overrun.	Lost
3	<u>TAN LINH DISTRICT TOWN, BINH TUY PROVINCE</u>  On the morning of 24 December, Tanh Linh Subsector came under intense ABF totaling over 3000 rounds of mixed fire. Later in the day, territorial forces came under heavy ground attack. Giving away under overwhelming pressure, the last remaining GVN defenders abandoned their position at Tanh Linh Subsector HQ at 0100 hours on Christmas Day; 90 men including the district chief evaded capture and made their way back to GVN control.	Lost
4	<u>HUNG LONG DISTRICT TOWN, CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE</u>  Hung Long district town is the first district town in the Delta to be lost since the cease-fire. Hung Long was defended by an understrength 200-300 man Regional Force battalion from An Giang Province. Communist forces surrounded Hung Long by moving in from the west and east. By positioning a blocking force to the south they were successful in preventing reinforcement of the defenders. Hung Long fell to the communists on the afternoon of 16 December after intense enemy fire and ground assault. Casualties on both sides are believed to be high.	Lost

Figure 2-6D

2-21

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 2-7

2-23

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 2-8

CONFIDENTIAL

# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

## MR 1

CONFIDENTIAL

WEEK

INCIDENTS

MAJ  
MIN ABF

MAJ  
MIN CTX

EN ARTY  
INCOMING

FRD ARTY  
EXPENDITURES

MAIL  
FLN SORTIES

K/W  
FRD CAS

K/D  
EN CAS

K/W  
CIV CAS

289 372 390 332 356 367 400 344 334 308 289 314 302 292 196 208 275 312 194 142

58 92 87 80 69 79 94 73 72 55 64 58 81 59 34 41 46 40 24 19

101 137 138 114 131 155 159 144 113 122 124 104 106 97 44 70 112 115 61 43

7 16 7 8 9 10 7 9 4 8 9 4 6 19 4 6 5 11 3 3

123 127 158 130 147 123 140 118 145 123 92 138 109 117 114 91 112 146 106 77

3518 8998 7901 6823 4369 5365 13475 5408 8357 3906 4022 6034 6044 3593 1840 2960 3180 2498 1252 1311

29669 26295 30880 29149 34500 26072 30375 37439 33029 20050 21398 19828 28663 27616 18170 18896 32480 37991 23636 13105

520 532 532 347 266 246 250 259 253 269 259 259 231 232 231 237 231 231 231

260 379 348 206 156 134 124 217 133 16 110 165 28 161 0 66 242 98 6 0

71 128 130 110 134 138 172 104 201 162 125 114 91 139 52 59 123 137 58 62

403 646 652 591 551 650 902 674 913 467 628 425 457 543 222 277 439 738 244 212

623 649 566 366 322 421 566 399 508 197 242 252 478 550 181 168 295 835 283 111

4 9 10 1 5 3 9 9 9 1 4 1 6 3 15 8 3 10 12 1 9

11 34 11 6 4 16 14 6 19 11 7 15 6 6 19 6 3 10 8 4

51 83 32 7 23 37 53 15 16 38 24 6 36 18 117 43 9 22 19 11

Figure 2-9A

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WEEK	9 AUG	16 AUG	23 AUG	30 AUG	6 SEP	13 SEP	20 SEP	27 SEP	4 OCT	11 OCT	18 OCT	25 OCT	1 NOV	8 NOV	15 NOV	22 NOV	29 NOV	6 DEC	13 DEC	20 DEC
INCIDENTS	163	214	163	130	135	147	155	121	96	114	104	82	55	142	113	90	115	117	107	63
MAJ ABF	29	36	22	19	15	15	14	10	2	1	9	4	5	17	5	4	9	7	6	4
MAJ CTX	37	53	40	38	38	31	43	31	20	20	22	16	11	34	22	22	27	28	25	10
EN ARTY INCOMING	14	7	3	0	1	3	5	4	1	6	1	1	2	3	5	2	4	1	3	2
EN ARTY INCOMING	83	118	98	73	81	98	93	76	73	87	72	61	37	88	81	62	75	81	73	47
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	4,376	4,319	759	1,911	787	730	797	1,721	157	145	716	547	425	1,334	401	252	409	372	402	184
AVAIL VNAF	31,356	30,036	24,484	18,266	18,453	13,430	11,277	9,173	4,981	6,397	7,035	8,843	6,263	10,946	12,035	10,603	27,613	13,812	8,391	5,359
FIN SORTIES	434	434	434	270	276	238	226	214	28	214	254	306	264	227	214	213	294	256	220	222
K/W FRD CAS	133	239	242	139	95	92	128	206	98	103	98	209	96	155	36	136	213	77	49	25
K/D EN CAS	113	78	94	63	59	75	80	54	7	31	55	25	40	45	32	32	38	24	53	16
K/W CIV CAS	352	288	250	237	200	208	237	128	119	121	154	86	59	187	185	97	143	97	105	58
K/D EN CAS	603	327	259	248	186	162	293	309	158	187	81	118	161	172	235	137	216	161	155	97
K/W CIV CAS	7	3	2	2	6	0	14	1	3	3	8	3	1	2	2	1	2	10	4	1
K/D CIV CAS	1	6	18	5	4	11	3	1	4	2	4	4	1	6	120	6	1	1	12	0
K/W CIV CAS	4	28	85	6	12	30	7	6	5	6	8	10	2	28	184	7	8	1	43	4

Figure 2-9B

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

## MR 3

WEEK	CONFIDENTIAL																																											
	9 AUG	15 AUG	16 AUG	22 AUG	23 AUG	29 SEP	30 SEP	5 SEP	6 SEP	12 SEP	13 SEP	19 SEP	20 SEP	26 SEP	27 OCT	3 OCT	4 OCT	10 OCT	11 OCT	17 OCT	18 OCT	24 OCT	25 OCT	31 NOV	1 NOV	8 NOV	14 NOV	15 NOV	21 NOV	22 NOV	28 NOV	29 DEC	5 DEC	6 DEC	12 DEC	13 DEC	19 DEC	20 DEC	26					
INCIDENTS	198	346	287	194	149	148	176	136	102	117	127	95	84	126	171	106	105	389	365	238																								
MAJ ABF	26	47	39	34	18	20	21	21	6	20	12	19	6	10	12	7	6	35	43	58																								
MIN ABF	92	155	154	83	64	63	71	52	40	38	31	30	24	30	47	33	23	114	138	120																								
MAJ CTX	4	17	8	12	2	4	4	2	3	2	10	2	1	6	3	0	1	31	23	10																								
MIN CTX	76	127	86	65	65	61	80	61	53	57	74	44	53	80	109	66	75	209	161	100																								
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,417	2,806	3,222	1,701	1,276	1,610	1,506	1,334	498	968	704	1,124	323	597	760	485	482	2,927	4,242	7,406																								
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	28,077	58,370	55,457	28,097	14,952	7,133	11,339	14,045	7,621	6,202	6,845	7,261	4,549	5,923	19,435	10,199	82,65	33,931	34,787	28,367																								
AVAF VNAF	504	504	504	284	231	231	292	282	231	231	253	318	347	315	368	211	239	327	336	343																								
FLW SORTIES	271	308	319	207	144	144	127	154	38	92	104	96	137	168	233	124	126	240	233	210																								
K/W FRD CAS	40	136	90	73	45	54	60	34	111	28	65	18	31	30	52	23	25	174	150	102																								
K/W FRD CAS	162	560	446	336	255	147	187	161	194	144	158	86	56	109	227	108	80	597	546	306																								
K/W EN CAS	297	977	607	635	350	224	221	62	81	35	74	103	114	142	307	160	230	739	355	463																								
K/W EN CAS	5	8	3	3	1	2	2	26	2	2	1	0	1	4	5	0	20	5	1	1																								
K/W CIV CAS	18	18	10	5	8	7	7	12	11	15	23	12	8	3	5	11	4	21	47	18																								
K/W CIV CAS	55	111	32	16	16	28	7	34	28	26	42	30	7	33	32	0	5	85	127	80																								

Figure 2-9C

# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

## MR 4

WEEK	CONFIDENTIAL																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							
	INCIDENTS	MAJ MIN	ABF	MAJ MIN	CTX	EN ARTY INCOMING	FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	ANAL VNAF	FLN SORTIES	K W	FRD CAS	K D	EN CAS	K W	CIV CAS	9 AUG	15 AUG	22 AUG	29 AUG	5 SEP	6 SEP	12 SEP	13 SEP	19 SEP	20 SEP	26 SEP	27 OCT	4 OCT	10 OCT	11 OCT	17 OCT	18 OCT	24 OCT	25 OCT	31 NOV	1 NOV	7 NOV	8 NOV	14 NOV	15 NOV	21 NOV	22 NOV	28 NOV	29 NOV	5 DEC	6 DEC	12 DEC	13 DEC	19 DEC	20 DEC																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																						
	345	577	386	262	331	480	321	246	237	415	327	321	237	531	526	367	263	1168	832	615																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				

Figure 2-9D

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

**KILL RATIO**  
 $\frac{\text{EN KIA}}{\text{FR KIA}}$




Figure 2-10

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

## KILL RATIO 1973

<u>MO</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
JAN	4500	8798	1.96
FEB	2480	5977	2.41
MAR	2309	6834	2.96
APR	1824	2843	1.56
MAY	1567	3067	1.96
JUN	1880	3631	1.93
JUL	1436	3214	2.24
AUG	1892	3824	2.02
SEP	1821	2143	1.18
OCT	1979	3143	1.59
NOV	1833	2256	1.23
DEC	1952	2990	1.53

Figures for FRD KIA are from the RVNAF Adjutant General.

Figure 2-11A

2-32

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## KILL RATIO 1974

<u>MO</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
JAN	1758	3039	1.73
FEB	1796	2952	1.64
MAR	1909	3392	1.78
APR	2357	5461	2.32
MAY	2516	5625	2.24
JUN	2433	5451	2.24
JUL	2818	6737	2.39
AUG	3788	9026	2.38
SEP	3492	4545	1.30
OCT	2730	3614	1.32
NOV	2354	4648	1.97
DEC	*3415	7599	2.23

Figures for FRD KIA are from the RVNAF Adjutant General.

\* Estimated (AG figures not complete at reporting time)

Figure 2-11B

2-33

# CONFIDENTIAL



# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## CHAPTER 3

### RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

#### 1. (S/NFD) J2/JOINT GENERAL STAFF.

##### a. Organization.

(Figure 3-1)

b. Personnel. The authorized strength of J2 increased by one officer during the reporting period:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	156	121
NCOs	102	92
EM	<u>30</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	288	233

c. Operational Effectiveness. The operational effectiveness of the Office of the J2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J2 who has been in office since May 1971.

#### 2. (S/NFD) UNIT 306.

(Figure 3-2)

a. Organization. Unit 306 is the designation of the former Military Intelligence Center and consists of: Division 1 (Intelligence); Division 2 (Document Exploitation); Division 3 (Military Interrogation); Division 4 (Materiel Exploitation); and Division 5 (Administration/Support).

b. Personnel. The actual strength of Unit 306 was increased by 16 officers and decreased by one EM.

	<u>DIVISION 1</u>		<u>DIVISION 2</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	58	45	29	24
NCOs	59	53	27	31
EM	<u>24</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>09</u>
TOTAL	141	118	69	64

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES




Figure 3-1

3-3

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM




Figure 3-2

\* ALSO SERVES AS DEPUTY J2.

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

field interrogation teams. Significant documents are received from one to three weeks after capture; for example, there was a delay of 27 days in the receipt of COSVN Directive 8 and 11 days in receipt of the COSVN Order of the Day on the current offensive. Although the division's intelligence reports can be considered satisfactory by GVN standards, there is considerable room for improvement. Some important documents are occasionally overlooked during the initial screening, and the finished products may lack sufficient details or adequate analysis. All officers and NCOs have received some type of in-country intelligence training and some 30 percent have attended offshore schools. In addition, they average three to four years intelligence experience, with more than half of the time spent in document exploitation. However, enlisted personnel have little formal intelligence training and their performance is considered marginal. Shortages of office equipment and supplies, including paper, are becoming increasingly serious.

(3) Division 3 (Military Interrogation): Division 3 continues to be led by competent, experienced personnel. It utilizes its Saigon facility to interrogate/debrief selected PW and ralliers. The Military Regions have the capability to handle their own interrogations, but the lack of transportation hinders their effort to evacuate PW to the rear areas or to dispatch interrogators to the sectors. The Corps Interrogation Centers are not subordinate to Division 3 but cooperation is excellent. Division 3 interrogation teams continue to be dispatched to the regions to pursue special J2 requirements and to pick up captured documents on a weekly basis. During the reporting period, the division gained one officer, one NCO, and lost eight EM. It is presently working at 85 percent strength, and there is a possibility of a 15 percent cut in the near future. Budgetary limitations have created shortages of office supplies and equipment.

(4) Division 4 (Materiel Exploitation): Acquisition of new material and weapons remains at a low level. The Ordnance, QM, Engineer and Signal Sections of the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) have only a minimal amount of equipment and the Medical Section is only slightly better off. As needed, MID personnel utilize the Signal, Ordnance and QM Corps facilities to test or evaluate enemy materiel. The Division also suffers from a shortage of office and photographic supplies.

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM




Figure 3-3

3-9

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## 4. (S/NFD) CORPS AND DIVISION G2'S.

a. Corps Organization. The G2's of the four corps headquarters are organized under a common TO&E which provides for an office of the G2 plus an Intelligence Section and a G2 Air Section. The G2 is supported by a Military Intelligence Detachment and an Interrogation Center, which are organized under separate TO&Es.

b. Corps Personnel. Authorized strength, including the Military Intelligence Detachment and Corps Interrogation Center, is 54 officers and 110 EM. The actual strength of these units has been averaging 85-90 percent of the authorized level. The range is from 80 percent of the authorized strength in I Corps to 96 percent in III Corps.

### c. Corps Operational Effectiveness.

In each corps, the position of G2 is held by an experienced and dedicated intelligence officer who has served in that capacity in the area for a lengthy period. Training and experience of assigned personnel is generally satisfactory. This is a major factor contributing to effective corps operations. Limitations imposed on transport, aircraft and communications are having a negative impact on exploitation of prisoners and ralliers and aerial photography. Low morale and poor motivation also degrade effectiveness.

d. Division Organization. Division G2 offices are organized under a common TO&E that provides for an office of the G2, an Intelligence Section, and a G2 Air Section. There is also attached to each division a military intelligence detachment organized under its own TO&E.

e. Division Personnel. No serious personnel shortages are known to exist in any of the division G2's. Assigned strengths are estimated to be averaging 80 percent of authorized levels. Authorized division strength, including the attached military intelligence detachments, is 15 officers and 48 EM.

### f. Division Operational Effectiveness.

(1) The operational effectiveness of division G2 elements remains generally good. The intelligence produced by these staffs continues to be comprehensive, accurate, and reliable and is disseminated in a timely manner.

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

(2) A high percentage of the senior officers in these staff elements have had offshore and formal in-country intelligence training. A large number of NCO's also have had in-country training, but the enlisted personnel generally have had little or no formal training. Offshore training is no longer available and in-country training has been reduced. Degradation of professionalism can be expected to accelerate as trained personnel are lost through retirement, reassignments, etc., and less well-qualified individuals replace them.

(3) The deterioration of morale and esprit caused by the worsening economic situation is adversely affecting G2 staffs. Personnel are more concerned about daily living problems than they are about professional matters. The previously heavy reliance on modern technology for collection and exploitation is also creating problems. Many of these modern systems have been withdrawn or have physically deteriorated. In other cases, their utilization has been curtailed because of economic necessity. Air reconnaissance and aerial photography have been most seriously affected and are areas of major concern to division commanders and their G2 staffs. Economies in electrical, ground and air communications have further hampered the development of effective exploitation and exchange of information which have never been truly effective. Less costly alternative methods have been explored but without any success to date.

## 5. (S/NFD) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS).

a. Organization. Not available.

b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	1,034	1,059
NCOs	2,198	2,013
EM	<u>1,096</u>	<u>1,019</u>
TOTAL	4,328	4,091

(1) The authorized strength of MSS was reduced by 433 personnel during this quarter while actual strength increased by 38 officers, 22 NCO's, and decreased by 17 EM. During the third quarter FY 75, MSS will undergo a 30 percent reduction in actual strength which may necessitate a reorganization. Currently about

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

90 percent of the incumbents at branch and section level are serving at the TO&E grade; the remainder are serving below this rank.

(2) The Military Security Directorate with a staff of 657 personnel is the headquarters element of the MSS and located in Saigon. In the Capital Military District, there are 48 officers, 125 NCO's and 48 EM; a total of 221 personnel. A field office of 30 personnel is maintained in each province and in the major cities. A contingent of six personnel makes up the sub-field offices within each district. Also, units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to corps and division, respectively. MSS personnel are attached to regiment, battalion, company, and platoon level.

c. Operational Effectiveness. The MSS, a joint service organization, is the counterintelligence arm of the RVNAF. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department - not the J2, Joint General Staff. Its mission embodies the full scope of responsibilities associated with counterintelligence (countersabotage, countersubversion and counterespionage). As a by-product of its counterintelligence operations, it collects information on enemy order of battle and intentions which serves the requirements of tactical commands. The operational effectiveness of MSS has been impaired by a 50 percent reduction in the number of assigned vehicles and gasoline and a shortage of spare parts. This has reduced the number of CI and security inspections and limited the organization's capability to conduct surveillance or effect meetings with sources. Despite these weaknesses, the MSS continues to be an effective instrument in providing stability and in maintaining the integrity of the RVN. Because of the political unrest generated by opposition political parties at the beginning of the quarter, the MSS realigned its priorities to concentrate on these groups until the threat was diffused by the end of the reporting period. Throughout the quarter, MSS produced daily and biweekly reports on the activities of opposition parties which gave a clear insight into the nature and extent of the threat. In coordination with the National Police, it proved extremely effective in neutralizing VC/NVA proselyting and espionage efforts. More than 60 suspected Communist penetration agents working for COSVN were arrested, including the VC/NVA chiefs of proselyting of RVNAF armor/airborne troops, the VNN and VNAF, and the chief of Saigon Military Dependent Civilian Proselyting. The investigation is proceeding in a highly professional manner and more arrests are expected. There are no indications to date that the compromise of US defense information is involved.

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM



# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## 6. (S/NFD) UNIT 101.

a. Organization. Under the operational control of J2, Unit 101, JGS/RVNAF, organizes, directs and controls in-country and cross-border military intelligence collection operations. It has six field detachments and 27 teams, 39 collection projects, 92 collection nets, and 196 coded sources. Certain changes in the number and organization of subordinate field detachments are under consideration and will be discussed in the next quarterly report.

### b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	--	333
NCOs	--	256
EM	--	146
TOTAL	874	735

No changes in personnel strengths.

c. Operational Effectiveness. Unit 101 is under the operational control of the J2, JGS, and it is the only ARVN Military Intelligence collection group. It has country-wide and third country (primarily Cambodia) responsibility for collecting tactical and strategic military intelligence against NVA/VC targets in support of the Joint General Staff, corps, sectors, and ARVN field units. Redirection of efforts from essentially tactical collection operations in support of field units to long-range strategic penetration operations has resulted in disruption of operations and production losses in some units, particularly Detachment 66 which is responsible for coverage of MR-II. The reorganization, redirection, and retargeting of Unit 101 assets and operations is expected to result in more valuable and useful intelligence reporting. Unit 101 continues to have excellent Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection potential and capabilities. However, it could not continue to operate without US financial support which presently exceeds \$8,000 per month.

## 7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

### a. N-2.

(1) Organization. The N-2 is an operational staff for the

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

Chief of Naval Operations with four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence, and Exploitation. Its mission is to analyze information received from the Special Collection Detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of Communist intentions.

## (2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	42	15
Petty Officers	24	18
Seamen	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	81	45

There were no changes in personnel strength during the quarter.

(3) Operational Effectiveness. The N-2 headquarters staff has an interrogation team which can be dispatched to exploit targets of opportunity. The team has the capability to interrogate in Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian, and Thai as well as to exploit foreign documents and materiel. It did an excellent interrogation of five Chinese Nung defectors who were picked up at sea by a Vietnamese Navy patrol boat. DAO is assisting N-2 in developing a simple new system for computerizing junk sightings by Vietnamese Navy ships. When the system is implemented, it should help the VNN control the movement of junks in Vietnamese coastal waters.

## b. UNIT 701 - SPECIAL COLLECTION DETACHMENT (SCD).

(1) Organization. The Headquarters element of the Detachment consists of a command section and three branches: Operations, Signal, and Support. It has two field elements. The covert element has six collection teams composed of agent handlers and informants. Because of the mounting communist threat to Vietnamese Navy warships anchored in the Saigon port, SCD plans to establish a seventh collection team which will be responsible for the Capital Military District (CMD). However, the seventh collection team will not be assigned until another TO&E is approved by the Joint General Staff increasing the authorized strength and the number of Unit 701 collection teams.

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## (2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	50	69
Petty Officers	62	146
Seamen	<u>09</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	121	231

There was an increase of one officer in personnel strength, which includes 34 radiomen and one electronics technician. The Headquarters element has 9 officers, 28 petty officers, and 5 seamen.

(3) Operational Effectiveness. The redirection of the collection effort is continuing with the emphasis changing from tactical intelligence obtained by visual means to the recruitment of assets in the ranks of the VC/NVA to gather intelligence on enemy plans and intentions. An interesting developmental contact has been made in Quang Ngai Province; the agent candidate is now in a testing period.

8. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE. VNAF Directorate of Intelligence (DOI).

(1) Organization. The DOI includes a Collection Branch, Target Branch, Air Photo Center, and a Special Collection Detachment.

## (2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	249	220
NCO & EM	<u>389</u>	<u>307</u>
TOTAL	638	527

There was a decrease of three officers and one EM during the quarter. Authorized strength appears to be adequate for VNAF DOI to accomplish its assigned mission. VNAF personnel are efficient, well qualified, and generally have a high educational level compared to other services.

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## (3) Operational Effectiveness.

(a) VNAF Special Collection Unit. This unit has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of 12. Without US funding, this Unit could not operate.

(b) Air Photo Center. VNAF photo intelligence collection was severely curtailed on 1 Sep 1974 because of cuts in US aid which reduced fuel allocations and hence flying hours for VNAF photo reconnaissance. VNAF is scheduling only 150 hours of RC-47 and 45 hours of RF-5 time per month. Prior to the reduction, RF-5's were scheduled 68 hours per month and the RC-47's had 170 hours. The photo reconnaissance capability had also been degraded by the increased AA threat. Procurement of an improved camera system with greater operating altitude flexibility is under consideration, but no action can be taken under the current budget constraints. VNAF continues to be hampered by the limited number of reconnaissance aircraft, their vulnerability to enemy AA defenses (which have grown stronger during this period), and the inadequacy of the camera system. VNAF can provide very little photo coverage over MR's 2, 3 and 4. Due to the AA threat, virtually all of MR-1, along with the most active areas of MR-2 and MR-3, is denied to VNAF's reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore, the RVN continues to rely on the US Buffalo Hunter for its coverage of these important areas. Despite several recent attempts to improve the VNAF's reconnaissance program, the major problem continues to be camera systems, especially the KS-92, 70mm framing camera mounted in the RF-5. There is a definite requirement for a panoramic camera with higher operating altitude and greater resolution that is adaptable to the RF-5 aircraft. However, funding constraints prevent any action toward procuring such a camera system. In photo exploitation, the APC continues to be plagued with inadequate and obsolete equipment. Imagery interpreters show high standards of professionalism, despite aging equipment and inadequate working conditions.

## 9. (S/NFD) SIGINT.

a. The J7, Directorate General for Technical Services, is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT collection and for providing timely intelligence to field commanders. It serves in a dual capacity as a staff element of the JGS and as an organization directly responsible to the Office of the President.

# SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

b. One ARVN Special Technical Detachment is assigned to each infantry division (11) and Special Support Teams are subordinate to Airborne, Marine, and Ranger commanders. This collection effort is further augmented by the four Corps Centers located in Danang, Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho. TO&E shortages, especially of AN/PRR-15 radios, are inhibiting the collection potential. Manufacturing costs and lead time preclude solving these problems in the immediate future.

c. The RVNAF SIGINT program continues to make progress in the analytical and reporting fields, but shortages in equipment and the need for additional secure communications hinder the collection effort.

d. The Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) program is comprised of 28 operational aircraft which fly 12 missions a day over the RVN. The ARDF program is a joint effort with VNAF supplying aircraft and flight crews and the J7 providing operators. Funding limitations have reduced the number of flying hours available to the ARDF program. To compensate for this loss of collection time, the J7 has instituted collection management procedures which should improve the quality of the intelligence product.

### 10. (S/NFD) SUMMARY.

RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. DAO liaison with them continues to improve, and the products received from them are generally satisfactory and timely. Some RVNAF intelligence activities would have to be drastically reduced or eliminated without US funding assistance. DAO is trying to assist VNAF in improving its photo reconnaissance capability. Procurement of an improved camera system with higher operating altitudes is still in great need, and this need will increase in coming months as the enemy increases activity during the dry season. Other weak areas in RVNAF intelligence are the failure to exploit captured documents and materiel in a thorough, timely manner, and the lack of an operational data processing system for intelligence information.

## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

# SECRET

## CHAPTER 4

### RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (S) GENERAL. During the quarter the Force Structure Branch, Organization Division, J3/JGS implemented several force structure changes to establish a more viable and balanced force capable of providing security for the people of South Vietnam in the face of an increasing threat. These changes are being made within the fiscal constraints imposed by the drastic reduction in Defense Assistance, Vietnam (DAV) funding for fiscal year 1975 (FY 75). Efforts to reduce both RVNAF forces and high cost equipment, while still maintaining a force with mobility, flexibility of employment, better management and reserve capability, are being met by making economies in material and exploiting manpower assets in RVNAF units not contributing directly to combat and combat support.
2. (S) FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES. Force Structure changes that have been implemented and are ongoing:

#### ARVN

##### Unit Deactivations

##### 28 Border Defense Artillery Platoons

- MR 1: 9 Plts
- MR 2: 12 Plts
- MR 3: 7 Plts

##### 38 Front Reconnaissance Teams/Artillery Bn, 105mm

- 1 Front Recon Team from each Arty Bn in  
11 Inf Div and 5 Sep Arty Bn

##### 25 Sentry and Scout Dog Platoons

- 12 Sentry Dog Plt from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and  
5th Log Cmd
- 13 Scout Dog Plt from 11 Inf Div and CMD

##### 11 Ground Reconnaissance Radar Platoons

- 11 Ground Recon Radar Plt from 11 Inf Div

##### 66 Territorial Artillery Platoons

- 30 Terr Arty Plts effective 31 Oct 74
- 36 Terr Arty Plts were deactivated effective  
31 Aug 74

# SECRET

# SECRET

## Military Dog Assignment and Training Center

### 4 Topography Platoons

- 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Topography Plt

## Defoliation Section/Territorial Security Division/ J3-JGS

### Chemistry Management Section/Office of the Surgeon General

### 4 Chemistry Sections

- Hqs Corps and MR's 1, 2, 3, and 4

### 13 Chemistry Sections

- 11 Inf Div
- Abn Div
- Marine Div

### 10 RF TAC CP

## Unit Activations

### 15 Arty Btrys for 15 Ranger Groups

### 31 Arty Btrys for 31 RF Mobile Groups

### 10 RF Mobile Groups

### 3 Arty Btrys for 10 RF Mobile Groups

### MOND Computer Center

## Unit Reorganizations

### Increase Authorized Strength for Special Technical Security Branch

- Increase strength of J7/JGS from 209 to 220
- Increase strength of Da Nang Center from 321 to 506
- Increase strength of Pleiku Center from 254 to 280
- Increase strength of Unit 15 from 233 to 259
- Increase Management Information Systems Office/  
JGS from 27 military to 66; from 3 civilians to 10
- Increase J5/JGS from 79 to 130

### Support Battalion, Abn Div

- Hq, Hq & Svc Co increase strength from 165 to 236
- Finance Co decrease strength from 124 to 123
- Technical Co decrease strength from 236 to 235

# SECRET

- Supply Co decrease strength from 233 to 193
- Maint Co decrease strength from 268 to 239

## Amphibious Support Battalion, Marine Div

- Hq & Svc Co increase strength from 90 to 165
- Logistics Supply Co decrease strength from 100 to 63
- Maintenance Co decrease strength from 268 to 239
- Shore Party Co decrease strength from 139 to 130

## Engineer Branch

### Engineer Augmentation

- Delete Engr Augmentation of 190 spaces to 20th Engr Gp

### -- Deactivate:

- 4 Engr Co, Lt Equip
- Engr Aug (523 spaces)
- Engr Aug (60 spaces)
- Tam Bo Industrial Center
- Nui Sam Gravel Facility
- 4 Engr Co, Hvy Equip

### -- Reorganize

#### Engr Svc/Area Logistic Command Hq

### Deactivate:

- 12 Engr Area Constr Ofc
- Saigon Mil Property Constr Ofc
- 3 Sub ACO, Type A
- 4 Sub ACO, Type B
- Quang Trung Special Area Constr Ofc
- Phu Quoc Special Area Constr Ofc
- Fire Fighting Team

### Activate:

- 4 Engr Svc, Type A
- 1 Engr Svc, Type B
- 13 Facilities Maint Det, Type A
- 1 Facilities Maint Det, Type B
- 5 Facilities Maint Teams, Type A
- 5 Facilities Maint Teams, Type B
- 6 Facilities Maint Teams, Type C
- 1 Facilities Maint Team, Type D
- 215th Engr Co, Lt Equip
- 115th, 315th, 415th Engr Co, Lt Equip
- 505th, 605th, 705th, 805th Engr Co, Hvy Equip



# SECRET

- 1 Facilities Maint Team, Type E
- 1 Facilities Maint Team, Type F

## -- Reorganize

### Mobile Support Platoons and Support Detachments

- Hq, Hq & Svc Co, Engr Constr Gp decrease strength from 107 to 106
- Hq, Hq & Svc Co, Engr Constr Bn decrease strength from 145 to 139
- Engr Constr Co decrease strength from 141 to 138

### Activate:

- 7 Engr Spt Det
- 1 Mobile Spt Plt, Type A
- 5 Mobile Spt Plt, Type B
- 1 Mobile Spt Plt, Type C

The equipment of the 28 Border Defense Artillery Platoons, 66 Territorial Artillery Platoons, 38 Front Reconnaissance Teams, 11 Ground Reconnaissance Radar Platoons and 4 Topography Platoons was used in activating the Ranger Artillery and RF Mobile Group Artillery Batteries. Dog Handlers and Dogs from the Sentry Dog and Scout Dog Platoons were assigned to RF units assuming responsibility for guarding depots and logistic commands. Equipment from the Chemistry and Defoliation units was turned in to support depots.

## VNAF

Pursuant to orders from the Chief of Staff, JGS, and in conjunction with the VNAF stated priorities of Close Air Support, MEDEVAC, Recce and Mobility, the VNAF placed into temporary storage 224 aircraft (A-1, O-2, AC-119G, C-7, AC-47, T-41 and T-37) and deactivated the following squadrons:

- 3 A-1 Fighter Squadron
- 3 C-7 Transport Squadron
- 1 AC-47 Squadron
- 1 AC-119G Squadron
- 1 T-41 Training Squadron
- 1 T-37 Training Squadron

# SECRET

# SECRET

In addition, the utilization rates in the active inventory were reduced to the absolute minimum. By reducing force size and reducing the activity level of the active force, the number of contractors have also been reduced with considerable savings. The impact of the aforementioned reductions is difficult to measure at this time; however, prolonged periods of reduced activity may degrade pilot proficiency and related combat effectiveness.

## VNN

Reductions of FY 75 DAV funding to \$700 million has allowed only \$11.9 million for VNN support. To remain within this limitation it became necessary for VNN to drastically curtail operations. Priorities assigned to the Vietnamese Navy for expending their allotment of \$11.9 million dollars are: Sealift Mobility, Coastal Surveillance and Riverine Operations. The VNN presented a three phase plan for making decrements in the Vietnamese Navy to accommodate the reduced funding level. Effective 1 November, the following actions were taken in Phase I and II:

### *Deactivate*

#### 13 Riverine Units

- 71 and 73 River Assault Interdiction Division (RAID)
- 53, 56 and 63 PBR River Patrol Division (RPD)
- 24, 27, 29, 30 and 32 River Assault Division (RAD)
- 82 Zippo and Douche Division
- 91 and 92 Mine Interdiction Division

In Phase II which began on 15 December, two more PBR River Patrol Divisions, 5 River Assault Divisions and 1 Seal Support Division were deactivated.

#### 103 Warships and Logistic Support Craft

- 2 YOG (Gasoline Barge)
- 6 PGM (Patrol Gunboat Motor)
- 6 LCU (Landing Craft Utility)

# SECRET

# SECRET

- 1 YFR (Refrigerated Covered Lighter)
- 5 Utility Boats (UB) (from Support Bases)
- 2 Utility Boats (UB) (from Logistics)
- 2 Patrol Boat (WPB) (from Coastal Flotillas)
- 8 Patrol Craft Fast (PCF) (from Coastal Patrol Force)
- 66 Junks and Coastal Raiders (Coastal Patrol Force)
- 34 Miscellaneous Craft (Harbor Defense Force)

In Phase II which began on 15 December, five more Junks deactivated, 29 Miscellaneous Support Craft from Coastal Patrol Force and 46 Miscellaneous Craft from Support Bases deactivated. Funds were provided through reprogramming action to reactivate the 34 Miscellaneous Craft from Harbor Defense Force.

VNN did not propose to make any reductions in their Capital Ship Navy or Blue Water Fleet consisting of 16 Destroyer Escorts (DER), Patrol Craft Escort (PCE) and High Endurance Cutters (WHEC). The VNN proposes to have only two types of Riverine Divisions in the future: a Light Division made up of 20 River Patrol Boats (PBR) and a heavy all purpose division composed of 15 different types of craft.

The deactivated warships and craft are being placed in a reserve readiness status along with supporting equipment. Personnel are being reassigned to other naval units in accordance with requirements of VNN Headquarters, and an attempt is being made to maintain unit and personnel proficiency.

### 3. (S) PLANNED FUTURE REDUCTIONS AND REORGANIZATION.

Planning continues for future reductions and reorganization of units with emphasis toward improving combat capability and eliminating redundancy to meet the constrained funding situation. Representatives from JGS/J3 Organization Division are studying plans for activating a Marine Brigade, 1 Ranger Group, 2 more Action Companies and a TAC CP for 81st Airborne Ranger Group to constitute a reserve force.

# SECRET

**SECRET**

Also plans to activate 8 Disbursing Offices are being formulated to speed up payment of troops. Under study also are plans to deactivate 4 Military Police Battalions and 4 Railway Security Battalions. Plans are being formulated to reorganize the 1st Infantry Division to provide an augmentation of 1st Logistical Battalion and 1st Signal Battalion in support of the 51st Infantry Regiment (separate) assigned to the 1st Infantry Division.

4-7

**SECRET**

# SECRET

## CHAPTER 5

### VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN)

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH. The authorized and assigned strengths of the ARVN combat divisions are shown in Figure 5-1.

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION (AO).

a. Military Region (MR) 1 is broken into five Division AO. The Airborne Brigades were deployed into three separate AO due to the threat in Quang Nam Province (P). The 2d Division's AO was increased to encompass the southern portion of Quang Tin (P).

b. In MR 2 the 22d and 23d Divisions continue to have no well defined AO boundaries.

c. MR 3 is comprised of five AO; Capital Military Zone, Ranger Command, 5th, 18th, and 25th Divisions.

d. MR 4 division tactical areas of responsibility were changed twice during this quarter. Kien Tuong Province was added to the 9th Division area effective 12 November. This change permitted the 7th Division to concentrate on enemy infiltration efforts in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. On 15 December, several major realignments were made. The 9th Division lost northern Kien Giang and gained southeastern Kien Tuong Province; 7th Division now has Dinh Tuong, Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces in their entirety; 21st Division has Bac Lieu, An Xuyen, Kien Giang and Chuong Thien Provinces. Remaining provinces were assigned to a newly formed task force commanded by the senior Regiment Staff Officer. Territorial force troops remain under sector control but sector chiefs in the task force area report to Regional HQ.

(Figure 5-2)

e. Locations of tactical units, regiment and above, are shown in Figures 5-3, 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6.

3. (C) COMBAT ARMS.

a. Combat Divisions:

# CONFIDENTIAL

## AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS

AS OF 30 Nov 74

DIV	AUTH	A S S I G N E D				% AUTH
		OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	
1st	17102	999	3259	8951	13209	77%
2nd	14159	878	2654	7595	11127	79%
3rd	14159	853	2821	7761	11435	81%
5th	14159	835	2455	7522	10812	76%
7th	14175	930	2867	6684	10481	74%
9th	14175	924	2851	7085	10860	77%
18th	14159	879	2678	7887	11444	81%
21st	14175	949	2820	6565	10334	73%
22nd	17233	1045	3237	7995	12277	71%
23rd	14168	927	2571	7445	10943	77%
25th	14220	893	2657	8778	12328	87%
Abn	13684	933	2967	8753	12653	92%
Rgr	34418	1983	5472	20701	28156	82%
Mar	14471	1003	2533	11070	14606	101%
TOTAL	224457	14031	41842	124792	180665	80%

Figure 5-1

5-3

# CONFIDENTIAL



**SECRET**

**ARVN**

**MR 1**




FIGURE 5-3

5-7

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

ARVN

MR 2




Figure 5-4

5-9

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**ARVN**




Figure 5-5

**SECRET**

SECRET




Figure 5-6

5-13

SECRET

# CONFIDENTIAL

(1) The VNMC Div remains committed in a defensive posture in the northernmost AO in MR 1. The Div occupies positions from southern Quang Tri Province to ten kilometers into Thua Thien Province. The Div continues to conduct in-place training and to improve its defensive line. The effective combined action program continued to enhance readiness of RF, PF and PSDF units. Under this program RF are integrated into Marine Brigades for training. PF and PSDF units receive their training at province level from VNMC Mobile Training Teams. Training emphasis has been on anti-aircraft defense, crew served weapons, demolition, tank and infantry tactics. The 2d Bn has been the only Marine unit to experience contact this quarter. On 25 December, communist troops fired 230 mixed mortar and artillery rounds and launched a ground attack on positions manned by elements of the 2d Bn in the O' Lau River Valley west of Hue. Morale of the troops remains high. The VNMC Div is highly effective.

(2) The 1st and 3d Abn Brigades (Bde) remain in Quang Nam Province. The 2d Abn Bde in Thua Thien Province under Operational Control (OPCON) of the VNMC. The 2d Bde saw little activity. Units conducted small reconnaissance patrols and remained in a static defensive position. The 3d Bn of the 2d Abn Bde was shifted back to Thua Thien to become a reserve component after sustaining heavy casualties in the Hill 1062 campaign west of Da nang. The AO of the remaining ~~six~~ Bns of the Abn Div comprises the area east of Thuong Duc and north of the Vu Gia River, bordered by the ranger AO on the north and the 3d Div AO to the south and east. Following withdrawal from Hill 1062, airborne brigades will be deployed to the Dong Lam Mountain area, leaving squad and platoon-size forces forward to form a general outpost line. Airborne losses during the recent fighting west of Dai Loc were due to heavy communist ABF against units occupying static positions. Heaviest casualties were sustained by the 2d, 8th, 9th and 11th Bns. The Abn Div is considered the most proficient in the use of air and artillery in support of ground operations. The division is equally proficient in small unit operations behind enemy lines. These operations have proven very effective. There has been sufficient individual equipment for all troops. Previously airborne units were rotated by air to Saigon allowing members to spend one month each year with their families. The current leave budget precludes this program, lowering the morale of the troops. The airborne remains an effective, elite force.

(3) The 1st Inf Div AO remains unchanged; however, its four regiments and the 15th Ranger Group rotated areas of operation. The 51st Inf moved from Phu Loc district to the Song Bo River to relieve the 15th Ranger Group which was committed with the 54th Inf to retake Mo Tau Mountain. The void in Phu Loc was filled by the newly formed 914 Mobile RF Group. The 1st Inf was tasked with securing Bong Mountain and the 3d Inf was assigned to central Thua Thien Province, south of Provincial Route 547. The operation,

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

launched 26 October to recapture Mo Tau Mountain, by the 54th Inf and the 15th Ranger Group succeeded on 11 December. Casualties were reported as costly to both sides, lowering some ARVN battalions' strength to fewer than 400. Of greater significance than numbers of casualties was the high proportion of officer and NCO losses. Replacements did not keep pace with losses. For example, during a one-month period the division received 329 replacements, fewer than half the losses for the same period. Of this number, 80 were prisoners released by the military courts and 108 were draftees. As the proportion of ex-prisoners and draftees rose, unit commanders complained of increasing discipline and morale problems. Aside from the reduced allocation of artillery projectiles and a shortage of mortar ammunition, logistics and support were adequate and did not significantly affect the division's performance. The 1st Division's CG noted that M-16 magazines, grenades, and Claymore mines were in short supply. The shortage of artillery projectiles affected the morale of troops, who feared that ARVN's supply was being exhausted. Reports indicate the primary factor contributing to low morale, as well as poor tactical performance, is inept division leadership. The 3d Inf leadership was disappointing. Removal of the regimental CO and at least one of his battalion commanders was recommended. The heavy fighting southeast of Hue resulted in heavy casualties. The 1st Division is considered unlikely to be able to perform well against major initiatives by NVA units in the immediate future.

(4) The 3d Div remained deployed in southern Quang Nam Province. The three regiments subordinate to the 3d Div, the 2d, 56th and 57th, are marginally combat effective. The 2d Inf is rated the best in the division. All three regiments sustained considerable casualties in recent fighting. The 56th Inf suffered most from attrition of small unit leaders and has not recovered. The 57th Inf is not capable of conducting effective offensive operations although it is capable of defensive operations. Replacements consisted mostly of prisoners released by military courts, including 60 officers who were formerly declared deserters. The division is training reconnaissance patrols to discover the assembly areas and location of enemy units to compensate for reduced observation aircraft allocations. Long range reconnaissance patrols are training to conduct sabotage on enemy rear LOC to make up for the lack of interdiction of roads by air strikes and artillery. Fire support bases and strongpoints are no longer effective because of increased enemy artillery and sabotage capabilities.

(5) The 2d Div's three inf regiments, 4th, 5th and 6th, re-occupied their former areas in Quang Ngai Province. The 4th Inf, which transferred from the Que Son Valley in Quang Nam Province, deployed from Duc Pho district town south to Sa Huynh; the 5th Inf deployed from Binh Son district town southeast to the Binh Son, Son Tinh district border; the 6th Inf is deployed in eastern

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Son Tinh District. In addition, the 2d Div operationally controls the 11th and 14th Ranger Groups in Quang Ngai Sector and Nghia Hanh Subsector. Clearing operations, initiated in the Batangan Peninsula and northeastern Son Tinh district by the 6th Inf and the 14th Ranger Group, resulted in one battalion of the 6th Inf and two Ranger Battalions rendered combat ineffective due to heavy casualties. The 2d Div has a difficult AO. Div elements are regularly required to aid or assume functions of the Quang Ngai territorial forces which are rated the least effective in the region. In many cases, territorial forces when attacked dispersed so rapidly that 2d Div elements had insufficient time to provide artillery support or request tactical air strikes, much less deploy ground reinforcements. Combat performance of 2d Div units was consistently poor. The 6th Inf rated lowest and the 4th Inf considered the better of the remaining two regiments. A major cause of poor morale and performance was ineffective leadership at battalion level and below. While division operational planning appears sound, units are unable to carry out missions. Replacement of 2d Div officers was difficult as cadre from other ARVN divisions resisted transfer to duty with 2d Div. The 2d Div is considered only marginally effective. It is probably capable of defending against the current threat, but would require reinforcement to carry out any offensive activity or to counter an increased enemy threat.

(6) The 22d Inf Div, stationed in Binh Dinh Province with its headquarters south of An Nhon, was joined by the 40th Inf which had remained in the Central Highlands northwest of Kontum City when the division originally deployed to the coastal province. As MR 2 has no firm divisional AO due to the large geographical areas involved, the division remains highly mobile and ready to reinforce the Central Highlands. Minor communist attacks in the vicinity of Routes 1 and 19 were successfully countered by the 47th Inf and the roads were kept open. The areas north of Qui Nhon and northwest through the Binh Khe and An Ke Passes to Pleiku were quiet. The 41st Inf with one bn of the 40th Inf deployed to the high ground northwest of Hoai Nhon which covers the An Lao Valley. They succeeded in restricting enemy use of Route 514 running through the An Lao Valley. The 41st Inf inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and reduced enemy pressure on the town of Hoai Nhon. The 2/47th Inf and elements of the 42d Inf maintained security in the general vicinity of Hoai Nhon. One bn of the 41st Inf near An Tuc provided security along Route 19. The 22d Div showed excellent mobility when responding to enemy initiatives. Because of their continuous commitment the units need refresher training and rest. The 22d Div is considered combat-effective.

(7) The 23d Inf Div completed its move from Kontum to Pleiku Province. The HQ along with the 45th Inf and 8th ACS deployed south of Pleiku City and northwest of Camp Enari. The 44th Inf deployed to the south and southwest of Pleiku City. The 53d Inf

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

deployed northeast of Pleiku City with Regt HQ near FSB 93. Deployment of all units to the field precludes refresher training. The 45th Inf was considered the most effective, primarily due to its successes in operations south of Thanh An City and along OL-19. The 44th Inf was rated as the weakest regt because of the reverses it suffered in fighting for OP-4 and OP-5 in Kontum Province. The 23d Div is combat effective. The division's high desertion rate is related more to economic than to combat considerations; the location of the division makes it difficult for the average soldier to support his family with extra money from "moonlighting."

(8) The 25th Inf Div has shown only minor improvement in its performance this quarter. Its elements engaged enemy forces in numerous contacts around Tay Ninh City and in a clearing operation in the Iron Triangle. Heavy losses were sustained during the early December enemy drive northeast of Tay Ninh City and while attempting to relieve encircled Regional Forces at Suoi Da Outpost. Five battalions were involved with elements of the 5th and 18th Div and 81st Abn Rgr Gp in ARVN operation "Quyet Thang 18/24" launched 14 November in the Iron Triangle area. These units performed unusually well in several major contacts with enemy forces, contributing to the overall success of the operation, which terminated 24 November. However, one battalion, while returning to Tay Ninh via truck, carelessly allowed itself to stumble into a disastrous ambush just south of Tay Ninh. The battalion was routed and effectively removed as a fighting element during the entire Tay Ninh enemy offensive. Lack of effective leadership continues to be the basic problem of the 25th Div. Improvement in this area may be forthcoming with the recent appointment of a new division commander. The 25th Div remains marginally effective.

(9) The 5th Inf Div continued improving over the past quarter. The commander was promoted to BG during this period. The overprotective attitude of previous MR COs towards the 5th Div has been continued by LTG Dong, i.e., restriction of commitment and AO. The division is usually limited to operations in the Lai Khe, Ben Cat, and Phu Giao areas of Binh Duong Province. Phuoc Long Province is part of the division's AO and, for the first time in a year, division elements entered this province in December. The 1/7th Inf, 5th Recon Co, 18th Recon Co (18th Div) and 46th Recon Co (25th Div) were moved to the besieged capital of Phuoc Long to reinforce the territorial forces there. During this quarter, combat commitments centered in the Base 82-Rach Bap area of the Iron Triangle. This area, lost to the enemy in May of 1974, was retaken during this period. After the action of late September that left the 1/8th Inf badly hurt, the 9th Inf took over the push for Base 82 and Rach Bap. The 9th Inf took Base 82 with only light contacts but significant ABF. Both enemy and friendly casualties and equipment losses were light. A 30-day wait allowed the division elements to rest prior to moving on to take Rach Bap,

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

recaptured as easily as Base 82. Enemy main force elements had withdrawn from the area, leaving delaying forces who carried out the ABF and minor harassing actions. The 5th Inf Div is still considered marginally effective; a possible improvement in this rating must wait until it is combat-tested.

(10) The 18th Inf Div remained the ARVN mainstay in MR 3. The div has an assigned AO of the southeastern quarter of MR 3; however, the unit is used as a mobile reaction force to perform all the difficult tasks in the MR. The fighting strength of the battalions decreased from a high of 700 last year to approximately 550 at present. Many company grade officers and NCOs were casualties. Its continuous commitment afforded little chance for rest and recuperation, while the steady drain of casualties prevented recruiting programs from maintaining its strength. Its mobile role reduced the number of volunteers because young men are no longer confident that joining the div will allow them to remain close to home. General Dao is an effective leader and maintains a close relationship with his subordinate unit commanders. He uses this relationship to motivate the combat units. His guidance, policies and the unit's mobile role kept this div almost free of any corruption, ghost or flower soldier problems. Over the past quarter the div performed all assigned tasks effectively and at the end of the quarter remained fully committed. The 43d Regt with two bns is along Route 20 and south along Route 333 on the approaches to Hoai Duc district town. In a relief operation the 1st Bn was helilifted into Hoai Duc on Christmas Day to bolster the defenses there. The 48th Regt, with the 7th Rgr Gp was holding positions along Route 333 on the Long Khanh Province border south of Hoai Duc. The 52d Regt was working in the area between Tan Uyen, Bien Hoa Province and Phu Cuong, Binh Duong Province on the northern approach to Saigon. The unit's combat effectiveness has not yet been affected, but will soon decline unless the 18th Div is given a period of lighter commitment. Continued heavy commitment could cause major morale problems and reduce combat effectiveness. The enemy now has an ammo supply advantage leading to higher casualty figures. The division casualties have been 60% from enemy artillery. This division remains a combat effective unit.

(11) The 7th Inf Div maintained its reputation as one of the best ARVN units. During this period, the division's Commanding General was promoted to MR 4 Commander. Since this change of command the division has not been seriously tested. The division's AO was reduced in size; it now includes Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces. During the quarter, the 7th Div shared responsibility with elements of the 9th Div for blocking NVA/VC infiltration

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

into the northern Delta. In this role they exacted a relatively high toll of enemy troops. The division is at approximately 74% of authorized strength and has suffered a relatively high desertion rate, attributable in part to its high level of activity. The division is combat-effective despite its low assigned strength.

(12) The 9th Inf Div has not yet been employed as an integral unit. Its AO has been expanded to include the four provinces of Chau Doc, An Giang, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong. The primary assignment of the division has been as a blocking force against traditional NVA/VC infiltration routes; in this role it has performed creditably. The 14th Regt and its subordinate bns engaged units of the NVA 5th Div in northern Kien Tuong Province, inflicting heavy casualties on the communists. Elements of the 14th and 15th Regiments have been instrumental in preventing NVA/VC forces from reestablishing their old base area in Tri Phap. The 16th Regiment, minus one battalion, is OPCON to the 21st Div and is based in central and western Kien Giang Province as a blocking force across communist infiltration routes. No major engagements have occurred during this quarter, making assessment of combat effectiveness difficult. Based on past performance the 9th Div is considered combat-effective.

(13) The 21st Inf Div is the least effective unit in MR 4. Command emphasis on the upgrading of leadership, improvement of training and the eradication of corruption at all levels has had no noticeable effect on the units performance. During the last quarter the division was responsible for the largest AO in the region. This quarter the AO has been realigned and reduced in size; however, the division's units are still over-committed and spread far too thin to react on a timely basis against mobile enemy units. One instance of prolonged contact in Duc Long district resulted in over 150 enemy killed, while ARVN casualties were light. This was a notable improvement over operations during the previous quarter. However, the overall burden of reacting to enemy initiatives on a timely basis and providing security in the 21st Div AO fell upon the territorial forces. The 21st Div is not considered combat-effective.

(14) Ranger Command.

(a) Ranger units in MR 1 sustained high casualties in Thua Thien and Quang Ngai Provinces during this quarter. The

# CONFIDENTIAL

15th Rgr Gp moved from the Bo River corridor SW of Hue to the Mo Tau Mountain area south of Phu Bai. Elements of the 94th and 60th Bns of the 15th Rgr Gp and 54th Regt simultaneously attacked objectives on the NW and NE slopes of Mo Tau Mountain. The 94th Rgr Bn received a ground attack one kilometer NE of Mo Tau, resulting in three wounded, while communist losses were 24 killed. To the east, the 60th Rgr Bn received a 200-rd ABF of various caliber followed by a ground attack, resulting in two rangers killed and six wounded. Communist casualties were reported as five killed. On 11 December, Mo Tau was retaken by friendly units, permitting ARVN artillery to cover the area south of the mountain and to reopen Phu Bai Airfield to military use. The 21st Rgr Bn of the 12th Rgr Gp moved South to the Duc Duc district, Quang Nam Province, and will regroup in preparation for a retraining cycle in Hoa Khanh Training Center. The remainder of the 12th Rgr Gp moved west of Danang and was designated as part of the MR 1 strategic reserve force. The 14th Rgr Gp moved into Binh Son district, Quang Nam Province, on 1 December as back-up for an ARVN operation in progress. On 6 December, the communists launched multiple ABF followed by ground attacks on elements of the 77th Rgr Bn, distressing the rangers and inflicting losses of one killed, 32 wounded and 38 missing. On 8 December, the dispirited Rgr battalions were redeployed south of Nghia Hanh district town to be regrouped and reorganized. The 77th and 78th Rgr Bns were considered combat ineffective after less than a week of combat in Binh Son district. The 14th Rgr Gp will require additional training and consolidation before it can perform in combat. The present combat strength of the three battalions averages less than 250 men, many of whom were released recently from military custody. The 11th Rgr Gp in Quang Ngai remains in a static defensive position, with the 69th Rgr Bn at Tra Bong and the 68th Rgr Bn at Son Ha. The Ranger Command in MR 1 is considered highly effective with the exception of the 14th Ranger Group which has never recovered from defeats suffered last July. The 15th and 12th Ranger Groups were highly successful in their operations.

(b) The MR 2 Ranger Command saw little combat with the exception of the 4th and 6th Rgr Gps, which supported the 22d Div in the An Lao Valley operation in Binh Dinh Province. During late November, the 4th and 6th Rgr Gps moved from Binh Dinh to Kontum Province and joined the 22d and 23d Rgr Gps in the defense of Kontum City. Aggressive ranger patrolling deterred the communists from further encroachments against Kontum City. The 21st Rgr Gp moved from Quang Duc Province to Darlac Province to counter Montagnard dissident groups northeast of Ban Me Thuot and subsequently moved to Kontum in late December. The 24th Rgr Gp remains in Quang Duc where it has been successful in keeping LOC open. In late December, the 4th Rgr Gp

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

returned to Long Binh post, in MR 3, to join the JGS reserve. The 25th Rgr Gp remained in Pleiku Province. The Ranger Command in MR 2 has seen little action. The newly organized single Ranger Command has considerably improved morale and resulted in more aggressive combat patrolling. The MR 2 Command is combat effective.

(c) Ranger units in MR 3 continued to defend isolated outposts such as An Loc and Chon Thanh without decisive contact with NVA main force units. The 7th Rgr Gp of two ranger battalions and a headquarters element was deployed with the mission of relieving Tanh Linh and Vo Dat district towns. One ranger battalion was ambushed while moving on a main LOC and suffered heavy casualties, bringing the relief operation to a halt. The Ranger Command in MR 3 is considered combat effective.

(Figure 5-7)

b. Artillery. The overall operational readiness (OR) rate decreased slightly but remains well above the ARVN standard of 83%. The OR rates for the quarter were as follows:

\* ARTILLERY OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES

	<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>175mm</u>
1st Qtr/75	95%	93%	88%
2d Qtr/75	95%	92%	93%

(Figures 5-8A, 5-8B,  
5-8C and 5-8D)

c. Armor. The overall OR rate for armor improved slightly to 91%. This is well above the ARVN standard of 83%. Repair of defective computers and electrical fire control systems has improved, with the Vietnamese Army Arsenal now repairing computers to a limited degree. Contractor personnel continued to conduct on-the-job training to raise the skill level of ARVN technicians involved in troubleshooting and repair of fire control systems.

\* ARMOR OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES

	<u>M-113</u>	<u>M-41A3</u>	<u>M48A3</u>
1st Qtr/75	90%	89%	90%
2d Qtr/75	90%	92%	90%

(Figure 5-9)

\* Prior report listed Readiness Condition rates.

5-21

# CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

# RANGER DISPOSITIONS




Figure 5-7

5-23

SECRET

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm		
	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS
<u>I ALC</u>									
DSL Ctr/Thua Thien	12	12	0						
11th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
12th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
14th Arty Bn	18	17	0						
21st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
22nd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
DSL Ctr/Quang Nam	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Quang Ngai	8	6	0						
DSL Ctr/Quang Tin	8	8	0						
44th Arty Bn				18	19	2			
10th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
20th Arty Bn				18	19	1			
30th Arty Bn				18	18	3			
101st SP Arty Bn							12	12	0
102nd SP Arty Bn							12	11	0
105th SP Arty Bn							12	12	2
31st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
33rd Arty Bn	18	17	2						
23rd Arty Bn	18	18	1						
DSL Ctr/Quang Tri	14	11	0						
12th Ranger Group	4	4	0						
SUB-TOTAL	198	191	5	72	74	6	36	35	2
<u>II ALC</u>									
DSL Ctr/Kontum	6	6	0						
DSL Ctr/Phu Bon	6	6	0						
63rd Arty Bn	18	18	3						
69th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
221st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
223rd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
DSL Ctr/Binh Dinh	20	20	0						
DSL Ctr/Phu Yen	18	18	0						
DSL Ctr/Pleiku	6	6	0						
37th Arty Bn				18	18	3			
103rd SP Arty Bn							12	12	2
220th Arty Bn				18	18	3			
222nd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
23rd Ranger Group	4	4	0						
SUB-TOTAL	150	150	5	36	36	3	12	12	2

Figure 9-8A

5-24

# CONFIDENTIAL

AD-A094 491


DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC  
DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 2ND QUARTER--ETC(U)  
FEB 75 H D SMITH, M LAMONT, W E LEGRO

F/G 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 of 3  
AD-A094491



# CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNs	AUTH	OH	UNs	AUTH	OH	UNs
<u>III ALC</u>									
DSL Ctr/Gia Dinh	12	12	2						
DSL Ctr/Long Khanh	10	10	2						
52nd Arty Bn	18	18	2						
53rd Arty Bn	18	17	2						
181st Arty Bn	18	18	2						
182nd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
183rd Arty Bn	18	17	0						
251st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
252nd Arty Bn	18	18	4						
61st Arty Bn	18	18	1						
DSL Ctr/Bien Hoa	8	8	3						
DSL Ctr/Binh Duong	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Binh Tuy	6	6	0						
DSL Ctr/Hau Nghia	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Phuoc Tuy	6	8	1						
46th Arty Bn				18	18	6			
180th Arty Bn				18	18	1			
250th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
104th SP Arty Bn							12	12	0
Amphibious Spt Bn/Mar	54	54	0						
Spt Bn/Abn Div	54	54	0						
51st Arty Bn	18	18	1						
DSL Ctr/Binh Long	6	6	0						
DSL Ctr/Phuoc Long	0	1	0						
DSL Ctr/Long An	8	8	0						
7th Ranger Group	4	4	0						
31st Ranger Group	4	4	0						
32nd Ranger Group	4	4	0						
50th Arty Bn				18	17	1			
SUB-TOTAL	354	355	20	72	71	8	12	12	0

Figure 5-8B

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm		
	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS
<b>IV ALC</b>									
DSL Ctr/Phong Dinh	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/An Giang	4	4	0						
DSL Ctr/An Xuyen	12	12	0						
DSL Ctr/Ba Xuyen	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Chau Doc	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Dinh Tuong	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Go Cong	6	6	1						
DSL Ctr/Kien Giang	12	12	0						
DSL Ctr/Kien Hoa	10	10	1						
DSL Ctr/Kien Phong	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Kien Tuong	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Sa Dec	6	6	0						
DSL Ctr/Vinh Binh	8	8	0						
DSL Ctr/Vinh Long	8	8	0						
67th Arty Bn	18	18	3						
68th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
71st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
72nd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
73rd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
91st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
92nd Arty Bn	18	18	9						
93rd Arty Bn	18	18	0						
211th Arty Bn	18	18	10						
212th Arty Bn	18	18	2						
213th Arty Bn	18	18	4						
47th Arty Bn				18	18	1			
70th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
90th Arty Bn				18	18	12			
210th Arty Bn				18	20	2			
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>15</b>			

Figure 5-8C

## CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

U N I T	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNs	AUTH	OH	UNs	AUTH	OH	UNs
<u>V ALC</u>									
DSL Ctr/Darlac	12	12	Ø						
DSL Ctr/Binh Thuan	8	8	Ø						
DSL Ctr/Khanh Hoa	14	14	Ø						
DSL Ctr/Ninh Thuan	8	8	Ø						
DSL Ctr/Tuyen Duc	8	8	Ø						
DSL Ctr/Quang Duc	12	12	2						
231st Arty Bn	18	18	Ø						
232nd Arty Bn	18	18	Ø						
233rd Arty Bn	18	18	1						
230th Arty Bn				18	18	Ø			
SUB TOTAL	116	116	3	18	18	Ø			
*GRAND TOTAL	1130	1124	59	270	273	29	60	59	4
	105MM			155MM			175MM		
OR Nov 74	95%			91%			93%		
OR 1st Qtr/75	95%			93%			88%		

\* Totals include only quantities authorized and on hand in combat units. Authorizations for training units, maintenance float, depot stocks, and off-shore assets are excluded.

Figure 5-8D

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	APC M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS
7th Armor Cav	42	42	1	17	15	1			
4th Armor Cav	42	42	3	17	17	2			
20th Tank Sqd	12	12	1				54	54	9
17th Armor Cav	48	48	2	17	17	0			
11th Armor Cav	42	40	1	17	18	2			
(1st ALC) Sub-Total	186	184	8	68	67	5	54	54	9
14th Armor Cav	42	36	4	17	16	4			
3rd Armor Cav	48	43	1	17	16	2			
21st Tank Sqn	12	12	0				54	53	3
19th Armor Cav	42	39	1	17	17	0			
(2nd ALC) Sub-Total	144	130	6	51	49	6	54	53	3
15th Armor Cav	49	49	3	17	16	1			
1st Armor Cav	42	39	0	17	15	2			
5th Armor Cav	42	40	1	17	15	2			
10th Armor Cav	42	41	2	17	15	2			
22nd Tank Sqn	12	11	0				54	53	4
18th Armor Cav	58	56	3						
533rd Ammo Dump	0	3	0						
534th Ammo Dump	0	2	0						
(3rd ALC) Sub-Total	245	241	9	68	61	7	54	53	4
2nd Armor Cav	58	58	12						
9th Armor Cav	58	58	15						
12th Armor Cav	58	58	11						
16th Armor Cav	58	57	9						
6th Armor Cav	58	58	5						
(4th ALC) Sub-Total	290	289	52						
8th Armor Cav	42	35	4	17	15	0			
(5th ALC) Sub-Total	42	35	4	17	15	0			
5 ALC's									
GRAND TOTAL *	907	879	79	204	192	18	162	160	16
	M113			M41A3			M48A3		
OR Nov 74	90%			92%			90%		
OR 1st Qtr/75	90%			89%			90%		

\*Totals include only quantities authorized and on hand in combat units. Authorizations for training units, maintenance float, depot stocks, and off-shore assets are excluded.

Figure 5-9

5-29  
CONFIDENTIAL

# UNCLASSIFIED

## 4. (C) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS.

a. (U) During this period the impact of suspension of funds in January 1974 continued to be felt. Although receipts from CONUS and off-shore have improved due to June 1974 requisitioning actions, receipts are still below the level necessary to replenish stockage levels. Fiscal year 1975 funding levels impose additional constraints upon requisitioning rebuild Bills of Material (BOM) requirements. The subsequent effect of limited funding will impair maintenance management efforts and create slippages to critical rebuild programs. Collection and Classification Center and annexes continue to move unserviceable end item assets to rebuild facilities. The generation and shipment of excess assets moves at a slow pace. Since October 1973 a total of 220,348 items have been reported by units. From this quantity MRO's have been issued to move 114,062 items into stock; 12,117 are under CONUS reporting and 51,630 have MRO's issued to ship to PDO. Of the remainder 3,566 have not been identified and 2,579 are under-going processing.

### b. (U) Depot Operations:

(1) There are currently 49 ARVN personnel on 6 months TDY to the 1st AAD. These personnel, from the 2d AAD, are assisting in reducing the MRO backlog and conducting the location survey.

(2) The 3-man Army Materiel Command Quick Reaction Team provided technical assistance, guidance and recommendations for the improvement of depot operations. Significant areas and activities addressed included rewarehousing, Care and Preservation (C&P) operations, monitoring receipts from CONUS and providing assistance to the on-going location survey.

(3) The 7-man AMC/USARPAC Customer Assistance Team provided guidance and assistance for a period of 30 days in the following areas:

#### (a) Depot interface.

(b) Processing of MRO's for excess material: The team devised an assembly line method to process excess materiel and the number of MRO's processed increased considerably. Coordination with PDO personnel eliminated the requirement of typing lengthy certification statements by substituting codes.

(c) Location survey: Assisted in spot checking and conducting quality checks on the on-going location survey.

#### (d) Care and Preservation: Provided guidance and assistance

# CONFIDENTIAL

in establishing a C&P operation at the 2d AAD, Danang.

(4) The depot receiving operation has been completely revamped to expedite processing of incoming materiel. Suspense files have been established which provide instant follow-up when the materiel is not located on a timely basis. This change was required to insure that the prepositioned receipt card and locator card, if required, are submitted simultaneously. This will prevent receipt of MRO's without locations and insure that all receipts are reported to the Army Supply Center (ASC).

(5) Progress has been made in processing customer MRO's and thus reducing the backlog. The number processed per week has almost doubled; this is attributed to enforcing the established working hours, scheduling turn-in by area to shipping and streamlining the shipping activity.

(6) The depot consolidation was completed as of 31 Dec 74.

c. (C) Status of Ammunition: (October through December 1974)

(1) Available beginning of Quarter

Short tons	111,519
Dollars	234,145,848

(2) Expenditure during Quarter

Short Tons	50,935
Dollars	-9,130,247

(3) On Hand at end of Quarter

Short Tons	121,707
Dollars	289,379,406

(4) Requisitions

Short Tons	29,448
Dollars	60,954,847

(5) Stockage Objective (SO)

Short Tons	126,150
Dollars	289,118,107

d. (C) Shortfall:

(1) (U) Logistics/Management: The ASC level of operational effort continues to advance despite reduced contractor-furnished technical assistance. Stringent fund constraints cause the primary shortfall in providing all the supplies necessary for full

# CONFIDENTIAL

operations. Tight internal fiscal controls plus forced reduced requirements assure operational efficiency for the short-range period.

(2) (U) Depot Operations: The entire operation remains understrength and undertrained.

(3) (C) Ammo Deficiencies: (Term usages: DODIC=Department of Defense; Identification code: BOH=Balance on Hand)

DODIC	A131 CTG 7.62MM Ball Linked Tracer
BOH	26.5 Million Rounds
Stockage	47.8 Million Rounds
% Stockage	55.4

DODIC	B535 CTG 40MM; White Star Parachute
BOH	155.9 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	309.4 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	50.3

DODIC	B546/B568 CTG 40 MM HE M406 or M381
BOH	2,358.4 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	4,093.0 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	57.6

DODIC	B632 CTG 60MM HE
BOH	651.4 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	1,038.1 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	62.7

DODIC	C256 CTG 81MM AG
BOH	222.6 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	677.1 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	32.8

DODIC	C454 CTG 105MM; smoke WP W/O Fuze
BOH	41.1 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	94.6 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	43.4

DODIC	C650 CTG 106MM HEAT, Rifle
BOH	2.4 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	24.3 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	09.8

DODIC	C705 4.2" Mortar W/O Fuze
BOH	39.2 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	65.0 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	60.3

DODIC	D544 Proj., 155MM HE
BOH	173.3 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	481.8 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	35.9

5-32

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

DODIC	D572/D591 Proj., 175MM HE (Depp Cavity)
BOH	55.3 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	87.3 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	63.4

DODIC	G881 Hand Grenade Fragmentation
BOH	915.4 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	2,226.1 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	41.1

DODIC	G911 Grenade, Hand Offensive W/Fuze
BOH	126.2 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	600.0 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	21.0

DODIC	H557 Rocket 66MM HEAT
BOH	42.4 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	208.6 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	20.3

DODIC	L495 Flare, Surface, Trip
BOH	114.8 Thousand Rounds
Stockage	683.6 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	16.7

NOTE: "Stockage" quantities represent the Cease-Fire Level Asset Position. "% Stockage" figures represent the percentage of Cease-Fire Level stockage currently on hand. Subsequent reports will show "Cease-Fire Level" and "% of Cease-Fire Level" in lieu of "Stockage" and "% Stockage".

## 5. (C) MAINTENANCE.

a. In early December, ARVN reorganized its maintenance management structure. Under the new organizational set up, the Assistant for Maintenance, Central Logistics Command now exercises direct control over the three maintenance depots (40th EBD, 60th Signal and the Vietnamese Army Arsenal) and maintains technical cognizance over the Medium Maintenance Centers, the 12 direct support groups and the 13 divisional logistics battalions. Prior to this reorganization, the technical service elements of ARVN controlled depot operations and maintained technical surveillance over the other maintenance elements.

### b. Field Maintenance.

(1) The continued shortage of US personnel curtailed end-item use inspections during the quarter. However, a number of special studies were conducted. These studies are performed primarily by VN personnel and focus on aspects of maintenance which, if upgraded, will result in extended service life of equipment and

# CONFIDENTIAL

reduced maintenance costs.

(2) During the quarter, the Operational Readiness (OR) rate for equipment continued to remain at an acceptable level as indicated below:

## OPERATIONAL READINESS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>1st Qtr FY75</u>	<u>2d Qtr FY75</u>
Materiel Handling Equipment	68%	74%
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles	81%	81%
Combat Vehicles	84%	91%
Artillery	94%	94%
Communications & Electronics (C&E)	94%	95%

(3) ARVN Commanders have continued to show interest in improving readiness and reducing maintenance costs. This interest is particularly evident at the highest command echelons, where seminars are held to discuss state of readiness, trends and solutions to conditions impeding improvements.

### c. Artillery.

(1) The overall OR rate remained at 94%, which is well above the DA Standard of 83%.

(2) ARVN continued to make good progress in recovering many unserviceable recoil mechanisms by purging the hydraulic system, replacing a simple seal and recharging with nitrogen. In one Military Region, 18 of 22 unserviceable recoil mechanisms were recovered by this method.

### d. Combat Vehicles.

The OR rate improved slightly for M41A3 tanks. The OR rates for both APCs and M48A3 tanks remained unchanged at 90%.

### e. Materiel Handling Equipment. (MHE)

The OR rate improved significantly from 68% to 74%. This improvement resulted primarily from effective training and command emphasis on maintenance. Continued effort by contract personnel to raise the skill level of technicians and the quality of maintenance should result in further improvement in the OR rate for MHE.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## f. Tactical Wheeled Vehicles.

(1) The OR rate remained unchanged at 81%. The majority of vehicles deadlined require batteries and tires which are available in the supply system but not properly distributed. ARVN is attempting to correct this condition.

(2) The number of high mileage vehicles in use is increasing. It is becoming more difficult to recycle all of these vehicles through depot maintenance because of lack of funds for purchase of repair parts and lack of capacity to accommodate additional items.

## g. Depot Maintenance

(1) The level of self-sufficiency at the 40th Engineer Base Depot (40th EBD) rebuild facilities, particularly in the area of technical proficiency of personnel, continued to improve. However, deficiencies in ability to prepare realistic Bill of Material requirements and basic managerial skills are still apparent. A concerted effort is being made to rectify these conditions.

(2) Due to the limited availability of diagnostic and test equipment at the 40th EBD, the Inspect and Repair As Needed (IRAN) program cannot be fully implemented. In addition, equipment required to restore unserviceable track groups (track shoes, rollers, carriers, and idlers) for crawler tractors is lacking. Therefore:

(a) Costly repairs are made in overhauling components, when possibly only minor or no repair is required.

(b) Unserviceable track groups are being replaced with new, yet the unserviceable could have been restored to a serviceable condition at considerable savings.

(3) To help rectify the above conditions, and reduce costs in obtaining required allied trades equipment, a survey is being conducted to determine those items which can be fabricated or which may be in-country but unidentified. Some equipment (approximately \$60,000) required to upgrade the rebuild facilities was located at Long Binh.

(4) The FY75 Rebuild Program production on end-items slipped by 23.4 percent during the second quarter. The production on engines slipped by 44.2 percent. A concerted effort is being made to improve production.

## h. Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA)

(1) Shop Supply: During the quarter, a repair parts and materials inventory was completed. A reconciliation of Arsenal



# CONFIDENTIAL

and Army Supply Center records is now being conducted.

## (2) Maintenance Facilities.

(a) Power Train Shop: The planned reorganization of production equipment continued to be delayed primarily because of production demands. The CD500 cross-drive transmission test stand is now operational; however, it is not being fully utilized. Efforts are being made to correct this situation.

(b) Tire Shop (Da Nang): Restoration of this fire-damaged facility has progressed to the point of limited production.

## (c) Phase II Upgrade and Foundry Installation.

(1) Construction of the new Combat and Artillery Shops is now 30 percent complete. Target date for completion is FY 76.

(2) The installation of production equipment in the foundry was completed, except for the air compressors which are expected to be installed by the end of January 1975. Construction of the reserve water system has progressed and the project is expected to be completed by 30 January 1975.

## 6. (C) PETROLEUM OIL AND LUBRICANTS (POL).

a. Contract was awarded to ESSO Products Trading Company in December 1974 for CY75 for MOGAS, DIESEL and JP4.

b. Limited FY75 funding required VNAF to deactivate the following aircraft: A-1, C-7, AC-47, AC-119G, T-37, T-41 and O-2. This action reduced the VNAF 115/145 AVGAS reported average monthly consumption from 45 MBBLs to 15.8 MBBLs per month as of 30 December 1974.

c. Other conservation measures implemented by RVNAF have reduced the consumption of ground fuels by approximately 1 MBBLs per day.

d. RVNAF is continuing to procure and supply bulk and package POL to FANK based on requirements submitted from MEDTC.

e. POL stocks in-country are sufficient to maintain 60 days of supply at the current rate of consumption.

## 7. (U) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations less Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions which are performed by a US contractor, Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. Stevedoring is performed by ARVN Military personnel and Vietnamese commercial

# CONFIDENTIAL

# UNCLASSIFIED

companies under contract with AFVN. Tonnage handled through ARVN operated water terminals during the period 1 April 1973 through 29 December 1974 amounted to 882,540 Measurement Tons (MT) inbound and 39,662 MT outbound for RVNAF with US interest cargo totaling 130,360 MT inbound and 89,117 MT outbound.

b. The intracoastal cargo backlog on hand at military water terminals was reduced to a manageable workload. The efforts of transportation managers resulted in improved utilization of LST's and other military watercraft, thereby contributing significantly to the reduction in the volume of cargo on hand at the various ports. During the quarter, there were no Military Sealift Command assets applied to the intercoastal movement of RVNAF cargo.

c. Shortfall. Cargo handling operations at ARVN ports remains below the desired Military Sealift Command standard of 1500 MT per day. During the quarter, the cargo handling rate at ARVN water terminals increased slightly to an average of 1112 MT per day from 1092 MT per day during the prior three month period.

## 8. (U) RVNAF FACILITIES ENGINEERING SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM.

a. Large Generator, Air Conditioner Support Facility Program. The deadline rate of generators and air conditioners increased slightly to 15% and 8%, respectively. On 28 November, the hazardous condition (HAZCON) rate dropped to zero for the first time since the ARVN assumed total responsibility for operation of the sites. The percentage of ASL fill at the MMCs is now 73%. The percentage of BOM (FY73, FY74) on hand at the 40th EBD increased from 48% to 58%. At the end of the quarter, 86 complete BOM kits had been assembled at the 40th EBD. These kits are being shipped to the MMCs for support of the overhaul program. Since May 1974, 21 large generators have been overhauled.

b. Deep-Well Renovation Program. During the quarter, 2 wells were renovated at Van Kiep Training Center and a well was drilled at DAO Tan Son Nhut Annex. Six wells were renovated at Quang Trung Training Center.

## 9. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM.

a. As announced in the assessment for the 1st Qtr FY 75, construction of RVNAF dependent shelters has now been halted by the Chief, OCE, ARVN due to nonreceipt of US promised materials. OCE has also directed that remaining materials will be used to complete units already under construction.

b. US Secretary of Defense message DTG 032158Z August 1972 initiated program delay by deferring expenditure of half the FY 73

# UNCLASSIFIED

Operation Maintenance Army (OMA) funding and the entire year's Military Construction (MILCON) funds. Other necessary DAO Saigon reprogramming actions eliminated remaining FY 74 funding and current FY75 DAV funding. The program presently is carried as an \$11.2 million shortfall for FY75.

c. Program statistics are:

	<u>Number of Units</u>
Completed	40,300
Under Construction	6,530
Not Started	<u>3,170</u>
Total Program	50,000

d. In the absence of receipt of adequate funding, the overall subject of the Dependent Shelter Program will be eliminated from all subsequent assessments.

## 10. (U) ARVN LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) PROGRAM.

a. Progress in the ARVN LOC Program improved as a result of availability of asphalt products, POL and rock in the Delta. Deteriorating security in the Highlands hampered production on LTL-07 and QL-14.

b. The delivery schedules for rock and asphalt products have been revised and are being updated monthly. As of this date 27.5 percent (approximately 5.5 million gallons) of the program requirement for asphalt has been delivered.

c. The Defense Attache Office (DAO) rock-hauling contract was completed very successfully from all viewpoints. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) rock-hauling contracts in support of the program are behind schedule. Security has been the chief problem.

d. The Dynalectron MCA LOC equipment maintenance contract was extended to June 1975 with the omission of two sites, revision of equipment density to 250 items and a staff reduction to 40 Americans and 267 Vietnamese. Training in the first, second, and third echelon maintenance is now 80% complete, and fourth echelon training at Long Binh was gotten underway. Complete self-sufficiency in the Engineer Maintenance of MCA LOC equipment is expected prior to July 1975.

e. The overall management of the ARVN LOC Program will be assumed by the Vietnamese Highway Agency (VHA) in the near future. Those projects which have not been completed will be integrated

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

into the National Priorities List and will be reidentified as VHA construction projects. ARVN LOC as a subject title will become VHA Special Projects. Quality control and structural review of all work will be performed by VHA.

f. During the quarter, 30 kilometers of highway and 215 meters of bridges were constructed.

## 11. (U) SPECIAL CATEGORY ARMY WITH AIR FORCE (SCARWAF).

a. The contemplated SCARWAF program faltered shortly after its conception when the DAO was unable to obtain funding from higher commands for utilization in the program. ARVN's role in this program is to assist the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Base Civil Engineers in accomplishing selected projects required at the nine major VNAF air bases. Preliminary groundwork has been accomplished to permit the ARVN to make contributions to the program in the form of troops and equipment during FY 75, and over 42 projects have been tentatively allocated to the ARVN engineers for accomplishment. Over \$1.42 million in materials will be funded from US sources in support of this program.

b. Implementation of the SCARWAF program is in abeyance awaiting further funds.

12. (U) RETROGRADE PROGRAM. The planned retrograde of all Delong pier barges was concluded on schedule.

13. (U) ARVN AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROGRAM. Programs as previously reported are continuing; however, no significant reportable events occurred during 2d Qtr, FY75.

## 14. (U) PROCUREMENT.

a. Quality Assurance Training. Training efforts continue to result in improved inspection techniques at contractor facilities by RVNAF personnel performing in-plant inspections and providing laboratory support.

b. Standardization of RVNAF ICP Specifications. Progress has been made in the development of technical capabilities within RVNAF for the standardization of purchase descriptions and quality criteria, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals and subsistence. RVNAF officers detailed to Procurement Branch under ICP orders are working on the basic requirements and quality assurance procedures to eliminate previous quality difficulties identified during in-process inspections. In carrying out this effort, significant use has been made of GVN standards obtained from the National Standards Institute and other GVN offices concerned with the food and drug programs.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## c. Canned Food.

(1) The Joint US/RVNAF Committee for the Study of Causes of Spoilage in Canned Food determined that bacterial contamination and inadequate processing controls were the major causes of spoilage; however, the technological capability does exist to produce canned rations for storage under general field conditions with a shelf life of at least one year. Additional contributing factors to food spoilage were the inadequacies of in-storage surveillance and stock control.

(2) No basic changes in product requirements were felt necessary by the committee; however, greater emphasis has been placed on developing the ICP contractors quality control programs. Prototype specifications with concomitant in-plant inspection techniques have been introduced for the FY75 in-country procurement of canned food which has been resumed.

## 15. (C) SUMMARY.

### a. Supply.

(1) The impact of January 1974 fund suspension and FY75 fund constraints has been and will continue to be felt.

(2) Excess program is still slow but steady.

(3) Formal and on-the-job training program continues to graduate personnel at 1st and 2d AAD in ALC aspects of Depot Operations; however, the entire operation remains understrength and undertrained in the middle management area.

(4) AMC/PAC Quick Reaction Team provided technical assistance, guidance and recommendations to ARVN for improvement of depot operations.

b. Ammunition. Paragraph 4c provides status on ammunition while paragraph 4d(3) displays deficiencies.

c. POL. One additional contract for POL for CY75 awarded in December 1974. Two types of AVGAS consumption reduced by deactivation of certain types of aircraft.

d. Transportation. Cargo-handling rates at military ports improved during the quarter. Increased availability of MHE was a key factor in effecting this improvement.

e. Field Maintenance: The OR rates for key categories of equipment continued at a high level. The OR rate for MHE improved significantly. First and second echelon maintenance continued to remain inadequate.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

f. RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self Sufficiency Program. ARVN continued to progress towards complete self-sufficiency. Technical assistance is now limited solely to complex tasks, such as equipment calibration and diagnosis of mechanical and electrical malfunctions.

5-41

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# SECRET

## CHAPTER 6

### VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. The budget reduction from \$555 to \$159 million resulted in various major decisions. Significant actions taken were:

- Non replacement of 162 destroyed aircraft.
- Squadron reduction from 66 to 56.
- Deactivation of 224 aircraft.
- Flying hours, contractor support and supply levels reduced.

Presented in the following paragraphs are manpower resources, equipment status, logistics, operating programs and the DAO assessment.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL.

a. VNAF manning as of 31 December 1974 reflects the following:

<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED/PERCENT</u>	
Officers	10,193	7,871	77
Enlisted	54,712	34,714	100
Civilian	762	670	88
TOTAL	65,667	63,255	96

(Figure 6-1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, including other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available aircraft on a sustained surge basis. Assigned squadron crews totaling 1536 represent 73 percent of the authorized manning level. The majority of the air crews are capable of performing basic combat missions. Figure 6-2 shows the current manning by type of aircraft.

3. (S) VNAF FORCE DEPLOYMENT. The authorized force deployment, including deactivation of squadrons, is shown by Military Region (MR).

(Figures 6-3 & 6-4)

CONFIDENTIAL

VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/DIVISION	OFFICER		ENLISTED		TOTAL MIL		CIVILIAN	
	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN
VNAF Hqs	884	621	1927	1736	2811	2357	45	34
Air Medical Center	62	34	174	131	236	165	6	4
Air Ops Comd	425	277	872	685	1297	962	0	0
AC & W Gp	158	139	869	814	1027	953	1	1
Air Tech Log Comd	403	291	5932	5101	6335	5392	369	323
Air Tng Cen	487	320	1170	1001	1657	1321	7	7
TSN Prop Const Area	19	11	62	50	81	61	0	0
Air Adm Unit	17	17	117	125	134	142	0	5
Detached Pers	122	173	63	170	185	343	0	0
1st Air Div	1237	823	7027	5852	8264	6675	105	90
2nd Air Div	1033	659	5889	5909	6922	6568	22	22
3rd Air Div	1313	904	7732	6721	9045	7625	70	66
4th Air Div	1364	887	7797	6073	8761	6960	32	18
5th Air Div	1298	1051	6650	5914	7948	6966	95	93
6th Air Div	1123	779	6380	5613	7503	6392	10	7
Sub Total	9945	6987	52261	45895	62206	52882		
Pipeline	248	884	2451	8819	2699	9703		
Total	10193	7871	54712	54714	64905	62585	762	670

Figure 6-1

6-3

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

## VNAF AIRCREWS \*

TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OR	% OR
<b>Fighter</b>				
A-37	350	300	239	80
F-5	217	118	114	97
<b>Total</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Transport</b>				
C-130	54	56	38	68
C-119G	20	23	17	74
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>Reconnaissance</b>				
EC-47	48	50	49	98
RC-47	19	19	16	84
U-6	10	12	12	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>Helicopter</b>				
UH-1	944	544	539	99
CH-47	80	68	53	78
<b>Total</b>	<b>1024</b>	<b>612</b>	<b>592</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>Liaison</b>				
VC-47	15	20	9	45
U-17, O-1	329	296	296	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>Gunship</b>				
AC-119K	27	30	28	93
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>93</b>

\* Deactivated aircraft crews not included

Figure 6-2

6-5

# CONFIDENTIAL

# SECRET

## VNAF FORCE DEPLOYMENT

AIR BASES	WING	SQUADRON	NUMBER & TYPE AIRCRAFT	
MR 1				
DA NANG	41	110	5-01/7-U17/20-02*	
		120	25-01/7-U17	
		427	16-C7*	
		718 Det	10-EC47	
		821 Det	8-AC119K	
	51	213	38-UH1	
		233	38-UH1	
		239	38-UH1	
		253	38-UH1	
		257	24-UH1	
		247	16-CH47	
	61	516	24-A37	
		528	24-A37	
		550	24-A37	
		538	24-F5	
	MR 2			
	NHA TRANG	62	114	25-01/7-U17
			215	38-UH1
			219	38-UH1
259C			8-UH1	
817			16-AC47*	
ATC		918	18-T41*	
PHAN RANG		92	524	24-A37
	534		24-A37	
	548		24-A37	
	259D		8-UH1	
	ATC	920	21-T37*/8-UH1	
PLEIKU	72	118	10-01/7-U17/15-02*	
		530	24-A1*	
		229	38-UH1	
		235	38-UH1	
		259B	10-UH1	
PHU CAT	82	532	24-A37	
		241	16-CH47	
		243	38-UH1	
		259A	10-UH1	

\* Aircraft deactivated.

\* Aircraft deactivated.

figure 6-3

6-7

# SECRET

SECRET

AIR BASES	WING	SQUADRON	NUMBER & TYPE AIRCRAFT
MR 3	23	112	25-01/7-U17
		124	25-01/7-U17
BIEN HOA		514	24-A1*
		518	24-A1*
	43	221	38-UH1
		223	38-UH1
		231	38-UH1
		245	38-UH1
		251	38-UH1
		237	16-CH47
		259E	12-UH1
	63	522	24-F5A/B/6-RF5
		536	18-F5/6-F5E
		540	24-F5
		542	24-F5
		544	24-F5
TAN SON NHUT	33	314	4-VC47/4-UH1/2-U17
		716	12-RC47/2-EC47/2-C47/8-U6
		718	20-EC47
		429	16-C7*
		431	16-C7*
		259G	12-UH1
	53	819	18-AC119G*
		821	10-AC119K
		435	16-C130
		437	16-C130
MR 4			
BINH THUY	74	116	25-01/7-U17
		122	25-01/7-U17
		520	24-A37
		526	24-A37
		546	24-A37
	84	211	38-UH1
		225	38-UH1
		227	38-UH1
		259I	12-UH1
CAN THO	64	217	38-UH1
		255	38-UH1
		249	16-CH47
		259H	12-UH1

\* Aircraft deactivated.

Figure 6-4

6-9

SECRET

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 4. (C) VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY. Status of the VNAF aircraft inventory as of 31 December 1974:

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSG</u>	<u>STORED</u>	(1) ATTRITED <u>VERIFIED</u>	(2) <u>OTHER</u>
A-1	72		61	15	3
A-37	240	210		28	10
F-5A/B/E/RF	152	134		25	6
C-7	48		52	3	1
C-130	32	30			2
C/VC/AC/EC/RC-47	66	50	12	9	1
C-123					
U-6	8	9		1	
U-17	58	80		1	4
O-1	165	169		22	12
O-2	35		31	3	1
T-41	18		22	2	
T-37	21		24		
UH-1	842	703	31	91	33
CH-47	64	62		6	2
C/AC-119G/K	36	32	22		
TOTAL	1857	1479	255	206	75

### Legend:

(1) Verified attrition means lost aircraft certified by the Joint General Staff (JGS).

(2) Other attrition means final status of aircraft undetermined.

## 5. (C) MAJOR EQUIPMENT STATUS.

a. Status of major VNAF equipment is depicted in Figures 6-5 through 6-9. The following paragraphs address factors causing fluctuations in Operational Ready (OR), Not Operational Ready Maintenance (NORM), and Not Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rates for helicopter, liaison, transport, gunship and fighter aircraft.

(1) Helicopter Aircraft. The OR rate for the helicopter fleet was below standard due to inadequate supply support and limited repair capability for reparable items. Major items required and not available which affect the helicopter fleet are short-shaft boots, hydraulic pressure switches, skid assemblies and power train components.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 6-5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 6-6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 6-7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 6-8

6-17

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 6-9

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Liaison Aircraft. The fleet NORS rate was excessive due to insufficient stock of random items. Another contributing factor was the long procurement lead time experienced in obtaining commercially supported items.

(3) Transport Aircraft. The FY 75 budget reduced VNAF transport capability with the deactivation of 52 transports. The fleet experienced a high NORS rate due to lack of repair parts. In addition, requirements for critical spares with long lead times have increased the NORS rate.

(4) Gunship Aircraft. Thirty-four aircraft were deactivated leaving the AC-119K as the sole fixed-wing gunship. The fleet OR rate was affected by lack of engines and excessive repair time on electronic gun control systems. A concerted maintenance effort to produce operational airframes improved the December NORM rate.

(5) Fighter Aircraft. VNAF fighter force structure was reduced by 61 aircraft. Loss of these deactivated aircraft lessened VNAF strike capability. The NORM rate was satisfactory. The fleet NORS rate was adversely affected by errors in forecasting and subsequent requisitioning for time change items, lack of parts for routine maintenance workloads and lack of in-country repair capability for critical items.

## 6. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. Seek Point (Beacon Bombing System). The site at Da Lat was relocated to Binh Thuy. Operational rates for subsystems were: RADAR - 84.5 percent, COMPUTER - 99.75 percent, Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) - 7.25 percent. (TACANs are not essential to Seek-Point system operations.)

b. Commando Gopher (Restoration of Ground Equipment). Two TACAN units and automatic changeover controls were replaced at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. Both bases have dual unit systems. One overhauled height radar has been received and is currently being installed at Ban Me Thuot.

c. Air Navigational Aids. TACAN operational readiness rate for the quarter was 85.5 percent. The TACAN at Hue/Phu Bai was down this quarter awaiting flight check. The EC-47 type aircraft utilized for flight checks were not available. Ground Control Approach (GCA) operational readiness rate for the quarter was 89.6 percent. GCA at Nha Trang was decommissioned and removed for replacement and the GCA at Binh Thuy was turned off pending

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

runway repair. Nondirectional Beacon (NDB) operational readiness rate for the quarter was 87 percent. Almost all of the downtime was due to air conditioning or primary power outage.

d. Aircraft Control and Warning Systems. Search radar OR rate remains about 95 percent. Backup channels on the two dual channel radars at Tan Son Nhut and Monkey Mountain serve as a source for spare components and never become fully operational. The dual channel radars at these sites are programmed for depot overhaul in FY 76. Height finder radar OR rates at Danang, Pleiku, Tan Son Nhut and Binh Thuy are better than 90 percent. The height finder at Ban Me Thuot is to be replaced with a unit from CONUS and is expected to be operational in January 1975.

e. VNAF Flying Hour Program. A comparison of programmed flying hours with actual hours flown, during the second quarter of fiscal year 1975, is shown at Figure 6-10.

## 7. (C) LOGISTICS.

### a. Computer Events.

(1) Computer downtime on all systems decreased. Downtime was attributed to weather, power fluctuation and air conditioning malfunction. During November 1974 there was a significant decrease in backlog on the "E" primary system. The backlog during the first twelve days of December 1974 was zero. Also, due to improved computer utilization, computer management products are now being provided on a timely basis. Downtime on the "DCT-2000" transceiver was 58 hours due to equipment malfunction and communication line problems at Bien Hoa and Clark Air Force Bases. No backlogs were created as a result of this downtime.

(2) The JGS has approved a request for 14 additional remote communication lines in support of the satellite economic order quantity conversion. In addition, better quality communication lines will be installed to coincide with the conversion of each Air Division (AD). Conversion of the Third AD is scheduled to begin 1 March 1975 and is contingent upon operation of the new 15-ton air conditioners of the "C" system computer facility.

(3) Construction within the computer area by Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E) is completed. The project included installation of double doors leading into the computer area to reduce the amount of debris entering the computer rooms, addition of windows for the "E" and "B" systems computer room, repaneling and painting of the building.

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VNAF FLYING HOUR PROGRAM									
ACFT TYPE	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER		NOVEMBER		DECEMBER		
	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL	
C-119G	120	91	120	107	120	109	120	114	
AC-119K	300	141	272	147	272	114	272	250	
EC-47	1525	1288	1374	1061	1374	1164	1374	1055	
RC-47	250	235	150	143	150	129	150	141	
VC-47	91	43	80	50	80	59	80	108	
C-130	1733	1305	1248	1030	1248	964	1248	853	
O-1	5000	3909	5726	4065	5726	4212	5726	5341	
U-6	200	243	320	293	320	307	320	308	
U-17	933	687	811	654	811	586	811	685	
F-5A/B	376	328	710	540	710	447	640	679	
F-5E	583	383	360	328	360	468	360	415	
RF-5	40	80	40	26	40	24	40	38	
A-37	4750	2383	3500	2234	3500	2377	3500	2592	
UH-1	7133	6324	8268	7226	8268	7643	8268	10239	
CH-47	530	486	672	642	672	613	672	672	
TOTAL	23564	17926	23651	18546	23651	19216	23581	23490	

Figure 6-10

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Total computer utilization hours available during the second quarter were 6,624. Computer downtime hours and causes:

## COMPUTER DOWNTIME

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>OCT 74</u>	<u>NOV 74</u>	<u>DEC 74</u>
"E" Primary	97	94	74
"E" Secondary	98	54	37
"B" Primary	<u>119</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>50</u>
TOTAL	314	235	161

## DOWNTIME CAUSES

## TOTAL HOURS

Remedial Maintenance Hardware Malfunction	120
Power Outage and/or Fluctuation	140
Inclement Weather	191
Air Conditioning	44
Communication Line	0
Rocket Attack	6
Linkage Check/Preventative Maintenance	<u>209</u>
TOTAL	710

b. Reparable Processing Center (RPC). The RPC program was implemented and is operational. Basically, the program provides for the establishment of a storage warehouse for reparable in conjunction with the processing center. Separate data products reflecting assets in the repair shops (R-26 report) and a balance listing reflecting the location of assets are generated by the program. The R-26 report is management's tool for tracking and expediting reparable through the shops. The balance list is used to determine repair priorities and subsequent inputs to the repair facility or other methods of overhaul.

c. Due In For Maintenance (DIFM) Accounts. Excessive outstanding delinquent DIFM items resulted in a joint DAO and VNAF project to purify DIFM accounts at all VNAF bases. The project started on 12 November 1974 and was completed 14 December 1974. Approximately 12,500 line items were screened and their status verified. VNAF was made aware of the importance of expediting the flow of DIFM assets between the base customer, the Reparable

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Total computer utilization hours available during the second quarter were 6,624. Computer downtime hours and causes:

## COMPUTER DOWNTIME

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>OCT 74</u>	<u>NOV 74</u>	<u>DEC 74</u>
"E" Primary	97	94	74
"E" Secondary	98	54	37
"B" Primary	<u>119</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>50</u>
TOTAL	314	235	161

## DOWNTIME CAUSES

## TOTAL HOURS

Remedial Maintenance Hardware Malfunction	120
Power Outage and/or Fluctuation	140
Inclement Weather	191
Air Conditioning	44
Communication Line	0
Rocket Attack	6
Linkage Check/Preventative Maintenance	<u>209</u>
TOTAL	710

b. Repairable Processing Center (RPC). The RPC program was implemented and is operational. Basically, the program provides for the establishment of a storage warehouse for reparable in conjunction with the processing center. Separate data products reflecting assets in the repair shops (R-26 report) and a balance listing reflecting the location of assets are generated by the program. The R-26 report is management's tool for tracking and expediting reparables through the shops. The balance list is used to determine repair priorities and subsequent inputs to the repair facility or other methods of overhaul.

c. Due In For Maintenance (DIFM) Accounts. Excessive outstanding delinquent DIFM items resulted in a joint DAO and VNAF project to purify DIFM accounts at all VNAF bases. The project started on 12 November 1974 and was completed 14 December 1974. Approximately 12,500 line items were screened and their status verified. VNAF was made aware of the importance of expediting the flow of DIFM assets between the base customer, the Repairable

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Processing Center, Base Supply and Air Technical Logistics Command (ATLC). Review of the DIFM R-26 Report, dated 7 December 1974, reflects a large number of credit DIFM transactions. The credit transactions indicate improvement in DIFM detail status since large numbers of credit entries are indicators that bases are processing reparable assets in a timely manner. Performance will be monitored to assure timely processing of reparable assets through the DIFM accounts on a continuing basis.

## d. Corrosion Control Program.

(1) General. A team of CONUS corrosion control engineers and technicians conducted a survey to determine the status of the VNAF corrosion control program and condition of aircraft. The survey was conducted 21-27 October 1973 at the direction of CINCPACAF and results indicated excessive corrosion due to lack of necessary equipment, facilities and materials.

(2) A follow-on survey conducted by DAO during January and February 1974 confirmed the CONUS team findings. Projects were established to improve the posture of the VNAF corrosion control program. Status of DAO/VNAF corrosion control program projects is as follows:

(a) Facilities. Civil engineering personnel have established projects to repair and construct washracks at five VNAF bases; i.e., Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Danang, Can Tho and Nha Trang. Two projects are completed; estimated date for completion of the other three projects is February 1975. Additional projects, which are not funded, have been established to repair or construct washracks at the other VNAF bases (Phan Rang, Binh Thuy, Pleiku and Phu Cat). Future projects include repair of paint facilities at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Phan Rang and Phu Cat; and construction of new paint facilities at Binh Thuy, Can Tho, Nha Trang and Danang.

(b) Equipment and Materials. Equipment and materials, including portable air compressors, pumps and generators, required for operation of existing washracks are being requisitioned. Receipt is estimated in February 1975.

(c) Resources and Procedures. A program is being developed for hiring dependent Vietnamese personnel to augment manning of washracks. The program is time phased with the availability of equipment, materials and facilities.

(d) Training. Additional training aids (35mm slides, corrosion training film, and charts) are available to VNAF. A program is being developed to upgrade corrosion control technicians contingent upon receipt of job training materials.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(e) Technical Data. Required technical data has been identified and is being requisitioned by VNAF. Receipt of data is estimated by February 1975.

e. Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance Program (JEIM). The reduced flying hour program resulted in revalidation of requirements at all air divisions. Repair requirements and bench stock levels were revised based upon the decrease in reparable generations. Recommendations pertaining to bench stock levels were sent to VNAF Headquarters for dissemination to using activities. A new minimum tool listing was approved and forwarded to VNAF Headquarters for updating the cost account/custody receipt listing at each air division. The Contractor Engineering Technical Services personnel at each air division were granted temporary authority to screen the warehouses for special tools and spare parts. Items found will be picked up on computer records for issue or redistribution.

f. Status of VNAF Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) being repaired by contract:

QUANTITY	UNITS
Contracted for Repair	160
Shipped to Contractor	155
In Process for Shipment	5
Required by Contractor	110
Produced to Date	47

g. Quality Assurance. DAO Vietnamese quality assurance specialists are in the process of preparing an intensive course in the theory, procedures and operations of quality assurance and quality control. The purpose of this course is to instruct VNAF officers who will be assigned to the new VNAF Headquarters Quality Assurance (QA) office. These specialists will act as instructors. The course is scheduled to last approximately three months.

h. Two specialists were sent on temporary duty to all VNAF air bases to receive first hand knowledge of current Quality Control (QC) operations. Information gained during the visits plus other QA and QC data, provided the necessary information to establish an in-depth QA and QC training course. VNAF QA manual 74-1 was published in Vietnamese and English and will be used in the new training course.

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

i. Common Item Support. ATLC currently has 12,952 active common items with 128 items added and 635 items deleted this quarter. Requisitions submitted to the Army Supply Center (ASC) during 1 October to 12 December 1974 totaled 1433. Of these, 309 were filled, 1124 back ordered and none were cancelled. Continuous review and coordination with ASC assures that the common item file is current and permits consolidation of VNAF common item requirements with other Republic of Vietnam services or agencies.

j. Technical Data Management. DAO and VNAF personnel reviewed requirements for technical orders and technical manuals submitted by VNAF bases. As a result of this review approximately 40 percent of requisitions were cancelled.

k. Munitions. FY 75 flying hours and sorties were reduced due to funding constraints. As a result, a munitions stockage objective was developed to establish minimum essential requirements. The stockage objective was calculated on initial FY 75 expenditures and includes a 60-day surge capability.

l. Supply and Transportation. A CONUS team developed and service tested QC programs in the central receiving, storage, and inventory activities. The team also provided on-the-job training (OJT) for nine VNAF personnel to assure QC program continuity. DAO personnel will provide guidance and monitor the program to assure that a comprehensive QC program is used in initiating corrective and preventative management actions.

(1) Vehicle Parts. Accountability of vehicle parts which were turned in as the result of contractor phase-downs continued to improve. This project consists of transferring and computerizing approximately 20,000 parts. Research and inspection efforts to identify these items to valid stock numbers is in process. Manual stock records were established and bench stock levels determined. Action is being taken to consolidate like items screen against stock number user directory, prepare turn-in documents and move material to ATLC storage facilities. Completion date is projected for 28 February 1975. Progress was hampered this quarter for the following reasons:

(a) In October 1974, contractor strength was reduced from 33 to 21 personnel assigned to the processing of vehicle parts at Comando Wheels.

(b) The 31 October 1974 rocket attack damaged a warehouse and the lack of warehouse space prevented the binning of newly identified items.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(c) The influx of excess and surplus parts from other bases caused further delays in reducing the backlog.

(2) Storage. A contract was awarded to a Vietnamese firm for renovation of 11 warehouses within the supply and transportation area. The renovation included repairing of floors, roofs and walls, repainting metal and concrete structures and repairing of light fixtures. Work began 15 July 1974 and was completed on 28 October 1974. The renovation will provide improved storage, security and ease of warehousing operations.

## (3) Inventory.

(a) Inventory of base support group property began 1 August 1974 and was completed 30 November 1974. This inventory included civil engineer, base construction material and base support stocked items. Approximately 12,800 items were inventoried.

(b) A second-cycle inventory of ATLC assets began 15 August 1974 and is scheduled for completion 30 April 1975. Quality checks are being conducted throughout this inventory to insure accuracy of physical counts. Inventory lots not meeting a count of 95 percent accuracy are being rejected and recounted until 95 percent accuracy is obtained. As of 30 November, 19,000 (14 percent of the projected 140,000 items) were inventoried.

(4) Packaging and Preservation. A project began 15 April 1974 to restore items in outside storage and 1050 units (85 percent of the total) were restored.

(5) ATLC Central Receiving. Incoming receipt and due-out release documents indicate a continuing increase of transactions; from 33,200 in September 1974 to 51,400 in November 1974. VNAF realigned personnel to augment central receiving manpower in order to reduce the heavy increase of debit transactions.

m. Vietnamese Equipment Management Team (VEMT). Equipment allowance and utilization surveys were completed at all VNAF bases except ATLC at Bien Hoa Air Base. The Joint VNAF and DAO VEMT objectives included authorized versus in-use dollar values, allowance source codes, validity of Federal Stock Numbers, shortages and redistribution of excesses. Surveys have been beneficial in validating equipment requirements and updating accountable records. VEMT members gained experience and DAO was able to reduce personnel from nine to four. Four DAO members will continue to participate in the VEMT survey scheduled for ATLC in January 1975. VNAF self-sufficiency progress is considered adequate and DAO, except for one specialist, will phase-out of the VEMT program after January 1975.

# CONFIDENTIAL

n. End Item Use Inspections (EIUI). The EIUI program is progressing satisfactorily. The overall inspection program was increased in depth and scope while decreasing the volume of personnel and frequency of visits. All VNAF bases were visited during this quarter and inspections were conducted in the areas of maintenance, supply and transportation, civil engineering, munitions, POL, quality assurance, base fire protection, AGE, corrosion control and major equipment status including aircraft storage.

o. Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI). The reduced requirements of AIMI are a direct result of aggressive VNAF actions. Re-evaluation of VNAF requirements for seven selected items contributed to the increase of VNAF requirements. Crash battle damage, depot maintenance requirements and anticipated fluctuation in flying hours were the main contributing factors. AIMI Negotiated Level Dollar Value (NLDV) versus Requisition Dollar Value (RDV) for the third quarter are:

NLDV	RDV
\$73,955	\$46,441

p. Contracts.

(1) The reduction of 829 US employees from Air Force contracts greatly reduced contractor augmentation efforts in behalf of the VNAF. Additional reductions are contemplated for other contracts during the next quarter. The Lear Siegler contract (orders SM01 and SM02) was extended through 30 June 1975 or until funds are exhausted.

(2) VNAF officers were assigned as Government Representatives (GRs) on a contract with Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc for base civil engineer operating and maintenance services at all VNAF bases. The VNAF GRs attended the post-award conference and good working relationships were established between DAO, VNAF and the contractor. Three on-site Representative Contracting Officers (RCOs) (Danang Air Base, Pleiku/Phu Cat and Nha Trang/Phan Rang) monitor and evaluate contractor compliance in coordination with VNAF GRs.

(3) The overall Air Vietnam aircraft maintenance program was sharply reduced. As a result, Air Vietnam was able to concentrate their manpower on completing the aircraft remaining in house under FY 73/74 programs. A total of 11 aircraft were completed. The quality of maintenance on these aircraft was good although excessive manhours and flowtime were expended due to lack of adequate supply support from ATLC, Bien Hoa.

(4) A facilities contract signed in 1969 between the US Government and Air Vietnam, provided the contractor with sufficient equip-

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

ment and facilities to accomplish aircraft maintenance programs. The contract contained 209 line items of Government Furnished Property (GFP) with a US dollar value of \$339,354. Title to these facilities was transferred to the VNAF at the direction of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in December 1972. Since the contract expired on 31 December 1974 and there is no FY 75 workload at this facility, a message to higher headquarters requested disposition instructions for the GFP involved. Air Vietnam has been directed by the RCO to ship excess GFP as it becomes available to ATLC at Bien Hoa. These assets include special tools and spare parts for various aircraft. Their movement is expected to be completed by 31 March 1975.

(5) Construction of a new washrack at the Air Vietnam facility was completed during this reporting period. With the new washrack the contractor can perform corrosion control programs on VNAF aircraft should the requirement arise.

## 8. (C) CIVIL ENGINEERING.

a. Manning. The VNAF Base Civil Engineering (BCE) units have 3,460 personnel assigned versus an authorized manning of 3,806.

b. Facilities. Deterioration of facilities and systems is occurring due to several key factors: assignment of authorized personnel was limited until early 1974 and since then, personnel assigned possess a minimum skill level; costs and funding limitations affected the BCE organization and contributed to a general decline of the base facilities; most facilities transferred to the VNAF in early 1973 were in need of major maintenance and many were nearing the end of their useful service life. In addition, many facilities have had damage inflicted by hostile action. Manning requirements to maintain these facilities were based on routine maintenance needs. Consequently, manning was inadequate due to major maintenance requirements. A large contractor labor force was used to train and supplement the VNAF in order to offset these deficiencies. Funding constraints restricted this effort in early 1974. Eighty-one projects are scheduled to be placed under contract during FY 75 to alleviate major problem areas.

### c. Training.

(1) Training objectives for BCE personnel were basically completed as of 1 September 1974. More than 3,800 personnel were trained in basic BCE skills since inception of the program in 1973. Presently, training in production control and upgraded training of power production personnel is in process. OJT is being obtained as a side benefit of the contractor augmentation program. Normal work experience continues to expand and broaden the

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

ability of personnel as the BCEs maintain the bases through their own efforts. Addition of officers who are trained engineers is also being accomplished and should improve performance.

(2) Future training requirements will be restricted to upgrade assigned personnel by the use of locally initiated programs or the ARVN Corps of Engineers schools. VNAF has been encouraged to initiate a school to train middle management personnel. Assignment of trained civil, mechanical, industrial, chemical and electrical engineers is a firm requirement and training of fire department personnel requires continuous attention. Upgrading of the training program by use of training aids and lesson plans which have been translated from English to Vietnamese language is considered satisfactory.

(3) A review of all VNAF bases scheduled for the second quarter of FY 75 was delayed until the third quarter due to travel fund limitations. Target date to complete review is 28 February 1975. Information gained will be used to evaluate future training requirements.

d. Equipment. Equipment possessed by the VNAF in support of the BCE continues to be a problem. Distribution of available assets and maintenance of equipment are of major concern. The VEMT has completed surveys at all VNAF bases. Data obtained by the team will result in an overall assessment of the equipment problem, including excesses and shortfalls at each base. Information will be used to effect redistribution of available assets to satisfy shortages and eliminate excesses. Maintenance of equipment is hampered by lack of parts. Commercial air conditioners and portable generators are deadlined due to the lack of repair components. Parts breakdown for the commercial equipment is being obtained in order to requisition repair parts. Also, a minimum amount of essential bench stock will be requisitioned. The most serious equipment problem continues to be the need for new and easier to maintain firefighting equipment. DAO is in the process of designing a simplified firefighting unit utilizing 5-ton cargo (M-series) vehicles. The design is approximately 80 percent complete and will be presented to VNAF for approval on 10 January 1975. It is anticipated that difficulties experienced in maintaining the (O-11A) firefighting units can be eliminated when the new unit is obtained. The planned cancellation of the maintenance contract for specialized vehicles creates the need for a simplified vehicle that is within VNAF automotive mechanic maintenance capability.

9. (C) CONCLUSIONS. The reduced VNAF budget spawned a myriad of consequences from the decisions necessary to accommodate the reduction. In many cases no alternatives were available and actions taken were dictated by the severity of the financial constraints.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Recapitulation of the major events which have taken place and the subsequent effects are addressed in the following paragraphs:

a. Loss of the gunships and fighters reduced VNAF's strike capability. Removal of reconnaissance aircraft decreased forward air control and visual reconnaissance capability. The reduction of transports reduced airlift capacity. Loss of trainer aircraft was not expected to have an immediate impact since the reduced force composition also reduces pilot training requirements. The decreased level of contractor support is expected to decrease aircraft availability. The general condition of aircraft is anticipated to deteriorate as all contract repair programs for corrosion control, depot maintenance, and analytical condition inspections were eliminated at Air Vietnam. The condition of the 224 grounded aircraft is expected to degrade since there are no funds available for their permanent storage.

b. Several plus factors could lessen the seriousness of the preceding impacts. Improved VNAF efficiency in operation of their fighter and visual reconnaissance aircraft could offset the impact of fewer sorties. Reduction of their aircraft inventory should simplify and improve logistic support for the remaining weapon systems. The decreased aircraft inventory offers the opportunity to increase the VNAF manpower per aircraft ratio thereby improving maintenance of equipment.

c. In summation, the VNAF adjusted well to the short term implications of the austere budget. However, self determination and the willingness to make the best of a dire situation are not substitutes for material resources. Long term consequences can only be measured and evaluated with the passage of time.

6-30

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CHAPTER 2

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)1. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Authorization: The 31 December 1974 VNN manpower authorization is 40,177 (6,152 officers and midshipmen, 14,628 petty officers, and 19,397 enlisted personnel). These figures represent slight changes from recent quarters.

b. Strength: The actual strength as of 31 December 1974 was 39,946, composed of 5,980 officers and midshipmen, 13,604 petty officers, and 20,312 enlisted. These figures represent a small decrease over last quarter.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. The personnel readiness of the VNN continues to reflect long standing and periodically demonstrated characteristics of responsiveness to emergency situations, high combat morale, willingness to face personal danger, and active use of formal training programs. Similarly, however, familiar serious deficiencies continue to widely persist in such vital areas as local unit level assignment/utilization of trained personnel, unit level training and readiness development, shipboard morale, basic assistance (particularly aboard ship), and basic command management practices impacting on personnel readiness throughout the chain of command.

b. In the face of these traditional shortfalls, indications of effective reaction and high performance continue to reflect viable progress and offer further encouragement. In particular, the VNN riverine sailor appears, thus far, to have stood up remarkably well to a sharply increased enemy effort throughout the Delta in December. These initiatives in the Delta, while part of the general upsurge of enemy activity, have sought to take maximum advantage of the extensive stand-down of VNN riverine forces imposed by major cuts in U.S. Security Assistance funding. Despite substantial reductions in operational assets, a large increase in fire fights during riverine patrols, a particularly sharp increase in indirect fire attacks on naval bases, and consequently a major increase in VNN personnel wounded, the VNN has not yet suffered either significant operational setbacks or large increases in fatalities. An example of this greatly increased enemy pressure, which the VNN riverine sailor has thus far withstood, was an unusually large scale ground assault on Thuyen Nhon Naval Base on the Vam Co Tay River in northern MR IV. While the VNN reported the enemy attack as badly organized with

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

poorly trained troops, VNN defenders successfully withstood a major assault, repeated ground probes, frequent indirect fire attacks, and, in reaction, managed to gain an impressive cumulative enemy body count with numerous weapons captured.

c. The second phase of the program to upgrade the effectiveness of the VNN Fleet Training Group (FTG) was completed in November 1974. This phase involved one month of on the job training (OJT) at the U.S. Navy Fleet Training Group San Diego for a 14 member VNN Underway Training Team. This visit followed joint USN-VNN readiness evaluations of representative major units of the VNN during a series of visits to Vietnam by a USN Technical Assistance Team from FTG San Diego. These evaluations had provided confirmation of various standard personnel readiness shortfalls in such areas as maintenance, unit level training and utilization of trained personnel, etc., although VNN crews seemed generally well disciplined and responsive to training. The OJT at FTG San Diego, coupled with the joint evaluations of VNN ships and the related recommendations for improvement of deficiencies, has provided a balanced program of significant value to continuing efforts to upgrade the readiness posture of the VNN fleet.

d. During the quarter, VNN reported a total of 1,645 personnel entering and 1,461 completing in-country training courses, with an average of 2,337 personnel in training at various Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) service schools throughout the period. Participation in offshore training courses included five officers and 21 enlisted personnel beginning training and 30 officers and 20 enlisted completing their courses of instruction. Some of those graduating personnel were enrolled in prior quarters.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT.

a. As of 31 December 1974, the authorized number of ships and craft remains at 1,547.

b. Reports of figures for craft actually available normally vary from month to month due to combat losses and other mishaps, faulty reporting from the field and faulty tabulation of reports and records. The N4 project to purify records and reconcile the actual number of craft on hand with inventory records by individual craft number is continuing and is gradually improving craft accountability. Latest figures for VNN craft by general category (which do not include sunken craft awaiting salvage) are as follows:

**CONFIDENTIAL**



# CONFIDENTIAL

## COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CRAFT

DEP (Destroyer Escort Radar Picket)	
VTEC (High Endurance Cutter)	7
PCE (Patrol Craft Escort)	7
PGM (Patrol Gunboat Motor)	20
WPB (Patrol Boat)	24
PCF (Patrol Craft Fast)	103
Yabuta Junk	140
Kien Giang Junk	5
Command Junk	23
Coastal Raider - Ferro Cement	88
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	419

## RIVER PATROL CRAFT

ATC (Armored Troop Carrier)	78
ASPB (Assault Support Patrol Boat)	72
CCB (Command Communications Boat)	7
Commandement	13
LCM Monitor (Landing Craft Mechanized)	22
LCM Refueler	15
LSIL (Landing Ship Infantry Light)	5
LSSL (Landing Ship Support Large)	1
Monitor	12
Monitor Zippo	7
PBR (Patrol Boat River)	29

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## RIVER PATROL CRAFT (CONT'D)

RPC (River Patrol Craft)	27
STCAN (Fom)	38
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	593

## HARBOR AND MINE DEFENSE CRAFT

LCMMS (Landing Craft Mechanized Minesweeper)	5
LCPL (Landing Craft Personnel Large)	23
MLMS (Motor Launch Minesweeper)	10
MSM (Minesweeper Mechanized)	5
MSR (Minesweeper River)	6
Picket	17
Vedette I 3600	15
Vedette S 3700	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	82

## LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT

AGP (Auxiliary General Purpose)	2
ARL (Landing Craft Repair Ship)	1
APL (Auxiliary Personnel Lighter)	2
Water Barge	1
CSB (Combat Salvage Boat)	4
FNC (Floating Naval Club)	1
LCM-3	23
LCM-6	104
LCM-8	49

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT (CONT'D)

LCM Fire Boat	1
LCM Pusher	12
LCU (Landing Craft Utility)	14
LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)	39
LCVP Pusher	5
LSM (Landing Ship Medium)	5
LSM/H (Hospital Ship)	2
LST (Landing Ship Tank)	6
Skimmer	32
UB 50 (Utility Boat)	2
UB 100	6
YFR (Refrigerated Covered Lighter)	1
YLLC (Salvage Light Lift Craft)	3
YOG (Yard Oiler)	6
YR (Floating Repair)	2
YRBM (Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge)	4
YTL (Small Harbor Tug)	9
YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)	3
Flag Officer Barges	3
RB (Refuel Barge)	4
YW (Transport Craft)	1
FB (Fuel Barge)	5
BW (Boston Whaler)	36
VIPER	5

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

BC (Transportation Barge)	7
WLV (Floating Radar Site - HQ 304)	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	421
GRAND TOTAL:	1515

c. From the beginning of the ceasefire (28 January 1973) through 31 December 1974, 107 miscellaneous craft have been lost or sunk by enemy action. Many of these craft have either been salvaged or are awaiting salvage. Latest cumulative loss report is as follows:

<u>CRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
WPB	2
Command Junk	8
PBR	15
Monitor	2
ATC	20
LCM-6	7
LCM-8	1
Yabuta Junk	4
LCVP	7
STCAN	5
Picket	3
PCF	5
LCM-3	3
PCE (lost during engagement with PRC)	1
ASPB	11
CHESS (former chessman ferry converted to repair craft)	1

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

<u>CRAFT TYPE (CONT'D)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
CCB	2
MSM	2
Coastal Raider	1
LSSL	1
LCM Monitor	2
LCU	1
Skimmer	1
Commandement	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	107

#### 4. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. General: Promulgation of the 1975 VNN Logistics Development Plan (LDP) has been delayed until the completion of a review of all projects supported by the reduced Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) budget. The effect of this is still being assessed to determine capabilities to operate administratively and to maintain the most effective VNN combat capability. Promulgation of a final LDP has been deferred until it becomes clear as to what resources can be applied to the various program elements.

#### b. Technical Management:

(1) Phase III, stage one, of the Coastal Radar Improvement Program has been reviewed and new proposed milestones developed for Problem Area I (Design) and Area VII (Maintenance and Repair). Construction of the Nha Be Electronics Repair Center Radar Overhaul Building has progressed from 50% to 76% completion during this quarter. Based on VNN provided data, the availability of the Coastal Radar System averaged 82.4% for the quarter.

(2) Four point contact bearing/bullgear repairs and contract procurement in Japan for the AN/TPS-62 radar has been discontinued. Bullgear repairs at Ship Repair Facility, Sobic, have also ceased due to inadequate machining capability. Initial contact with Messinger Bearing, Inc., in the United States, indicates a willingness to repair the gears. Repairs will soon be attempted.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Two 60KW Libby generators have been installed and in operation at Coastal Radar Site (CRS) 201, De Gi, since 4 December 1974. At CRS 102, Mui Da Nang, the replacement generators are operating with temporary hook-up pending decision on final placement. The generators damaged by sapper attack last quarter are on site. At CRS 302, Vung Tau, the lightning damaged transformers have been replaced, and a water system improvement project is being initiated. At CRS 401, Poulo Obi, the two 30KW Libby generators have not been transported to the radar van.

## c. VNN Shipyard:

(1) Contractor personnel have poured approximately 40 deck slab sections during this quarter, completing 100 of the required 120 deck slab sections. The remaining deck slabs will be poured in place thereby completing the deck. During this quarter production pile driving commenced. To date, fifty of the 195 piles have been driven. Productivity has increased. At the beginning of the quarter the project was approximately 50% behind schedule; now figures indicate that the project is only 25% behind the predicted schedule.

(2) Classes covering the SPS-10 radar system were completed this quarter. Preparation of lesson plans and course outlines for conducting classes on the SPS-25 radar system are underway. The English version of these plans is now being translated into Vietnamese. It is estimated that work on this course of study is 95% complete.

(3) The CY-74 program scheduled thirty-two Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) LCM-8's to start overhaul by 1 December 1974. Thirty craft have been started of which sixteen have been completed and fourteen are in overhaul. Of these, nine started overhaul and six were completed this quarter.

## d. Miscellaneous Construction:

(1) The number of completed U.S. Navy sponsored dependent shelters is 5051 of 5129 units planned. At Hon Tre, the self-help project for 30 units was planned to be completed by December 1974, but only 17 units have been completed. Difficulties have been encountered in site preparation. The base has requested the use of a bulldozer and crane to help level the terrain for the construction of the remainder. At Ha Tien, due to lack of available material, only 10 units were completed out of 30 units planned. At Binh Thuy, the contractors have completed 30% of 45 units planned. Target completion date of the 45 units is 15 May 1975.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The commercial power line connection to the Vietnam Power Company System at Nha Be was completed, inspected and turned over to the Vietnamese Navy during October 1974. Logistic Support Bases (LSB's) Nha Be, Binh Thuy, Da Nang and Cat Lo, and ISB Cat Lai report that no problems were encountered in using base generators. At LSB Nha Be the second phase of the commercial power installation is yet to be initiated. The second phase which provides for the installation of an underground cable and a motor generator set is to provide 60-cycle power for electronic equipments.

## 5. (U) Supply.

a. Average order and shipping time for VNN Supply Center (VNNSC) stock replenishment items received this quarter was 135 days, up from 114 days for the previous period. The increase was caused by Continental U.S. (CONUS) processing time and Sea Land transit time. The latter was attributed primarily to bad weather. VNNSC requisition and receipt processing times were significantly better than last quarter.

b. VNNSC's supply support effectiveness continued at about the same level as for the two previous quarters. Demands and issues dropped off significantly, reflecting the austerity of Operating Target (OPTAR) funds allotted to VNN units for operations and repairs. VNNSC supply effectiveness data was:

<u>Demands</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Not In Stock</u>	<u>Not Carried</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>		
				<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>AR*</u>
37,685	29,349	5,070	3,266	85.3%	77.9%	91.3%

\*Accommodation Rate: The percentage of requisitions received for carried items.

Obligation of DAV funds for material requisitioned from CONUS totalled \$1,702,224. Sales to VNNSC's customers amounted to \$1,983,647.

c. A small improvement was shown in the overall supply effectiveness of the LSB's/ISB's. As with VNNSC, the number of demands and issues recorded at the field supply units was down.

	<u>Demands</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Not In Stock</u>	<u>Not Carried</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>		
					<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>AR</u>
LSB's	16,443	10,245	3,047	3,151	77.1%	62.3%	80.8%
ISB's	3,899	2,767	638	491	81.3%	71.0%	87.3%
Total	20,342	13,012	3,685	3,642	77.9%	64.0%	82.1%

# CONFIDENTIAL

d. The VNN Data Processing Center (VNNDPC) experienced the following equipment downtime:

Maximum potential operating time: 2208 hours

System down due to malfunction: 223.6 hours

System down due to scheduled Preventative Maintenance:  
17.7 hours

System down due to scheduled power outage: 54.4 hours

Percent of scheduled operating hours system was inoperative:

$223.6 \text{ hrs} \div (2208 \text{ hrs} - 72.1 \text{ hrs}) = 10.5\%$

These down time figures include the computer (360/20), printer, card reader, sorter and collator. An estimated 7% of the work done by VNNDPC for VNNSC was delayed because of equipment malfunctions. Scheduled power outage is the time required for generator changeover every eight hours.

e. Combined DAO/VNN Field Assistance Support Teams inspected eight coastal radar sites, three LSB's, two ships and the VNN Shipyard. The teams evaluated each unit's compliance with supply procedures and, where applicable, the quality of supply provided to its customers. A rating scale permits a unit to be judged unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, excellent or outstanding. Three of the coastal radar sites visited this quarter were rated satisfactory and four were unsatisfactory. The three LSB's were satisfactory. No grade was assigned to one coastal radar site, the two ships or the Shipyard.

f. Quality Control checks continue to reveal an unacceptable error rate in location maintenance at VNNSC. The Planning Department has initiated a study to determine the cause of this situation.

g. In December, 1,272 line items of excess VNNSC stock valued at \$723,737 were retrograded to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland. The material was identified in the quarterly depth excessing program. Another 307 line items worth \$127,474 (on order from CONUS) were identified as excess to current requirements. Requests to cancel these requisitions have been sent to CONUS.



# CONFIDENTIAL

## 6. (C) OPERATIONS.

### a. Coastal Surveillance System:

(1) VNN-reported boarding 103,342 craft during the quarter, which resulted in 312 craft and 1,089 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the coastal radar stations average 82.4, which is a negligible change from the previous quarter. An average of 2 of the 16 stations were down per day. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 6,461, of which 6,278 were tracked. A total of 164 Filter King exercises were conducted to test the system of which 113 were considered satisfactory for a detection rate of 69%.

(3) Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) flights were requested on 300 occasions, but only 112 were actually flown. Additionally, 15 air support missions were requested and 12 provided. These figures continue the sharp downward trend from last quarter. These figures were imposed by more stringent funding limitations.

b. Tempo of Operations: Average figures for the tempo of operations and cumulative days away from home port for major fleet units during the quarter are indicated below. Tempo of operations figures represent time at sea while days away from home port cover the combined periods spent at sea and in ports other than Saigon (home port for all Fleet Command ships). Figures relate to cumulative days available for all units, excluding periods under repair, for the following ship types:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TEMPO OF OPERATIONS</u>	<u>DAYS AVAILABLE</u>	<u>DAYS AWAY FROM HOME PORT</u>
DER	69%	74	70
WHEC	76%	425	392
PCE	70%	327	314
LST	26%	412	252
AGP	37%	123	83

c. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS): VNN ships provided NGFS for tactical operations in 15 missions. A total of 12 ships were assigned to these missions at various coastal areas as requested by field and territorial ground forces, as well as other naval commands. Expenditures included 112 rounds of 5", and 900 rounds of 20mm, 235 rounds of 81mm, and 937 rounds of 40mm ammunition. Following two quarters of significantly increased requests for NGFS from ground forces, these figures represent drastic reductions

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

imposed by funding constraints. Within the quarter, however, the bulk of these figures represent missions in December in response to the sharp step-up in enemy initiatives.

e. Combat Operations: During the quarter, VNN units were involved in 83 fire fights, 12 mining incidents, and 38 attacks by fire. These actions led to a total of 109 VNN casualties of which 13 were KIA, and the sinking of nine VNN craft with 40 others damaged. While these figures generally represent substantial reductions from last quarter, this decline is attributed to sharply reduced patrol activity by VNN riverine units due to the stand down of 21 of 44 riverine units imposed by large cuts in DAV funds. In December, however, a sharp upsurge in enemy initiatives was experienced with dramatic increases in fire fights and attacks by fire (indirect fire). This activity included increased daytime attacks on patrolling naval craft, the sinking of two craft by rocket fire, which is unusual as craft are normally only sunk by mines, and a major ground assault on a naval base (Tuyen Nhon on the Vam Co Tay in Northern MR IV).

f. Miscellaneous:

(1) During the quarter, planned reductions in active fleet units and more extensive cuts in riverine forces were executed, as required by cuts in DAV funds. While none of the VNN's 16 major combatants have been placed in reserve, six of 20 small ocean patrol craft, 10 of 126 coastal patrol craft, 71 of 226 naval junks and ferro cement Coastal Raiders and several miscellaneous logistic support craft have stood down. A more serious reduction of operational assets, however, was the stand-down of 21 out of 44 riverine units. While the reduction of active blue water units will have a minimal impact on the current VNN operational role, the sweeping cuts in operational riverine units mean a significant loss of VNN presence in various heavily contested areas and some vital LOC's, as well as substantially greater freedom of movement for the enemy in the Delta.

(2) Areas affected by the riverine reductions include heavily transited areas of the Saigon River (including both the northern approaches to Saigon and the Long Tao Shipping Channel south of the Capital), a vital area of the lower Hau Giang (Bassac) River (a major Delta waterway) and both western and southern areas of the Delta. The reductions result in a loss of VNN presence on the Vinh Te Canal, an important enemy LOC along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border from the Hau Giang River nearly to the coast in the northwestern portion of MR IV; reduced VNN presence on the Ha Tien Canal (also an enemy LOC) along the northwestern coast of MR IV; and no VNN presence on the major portion

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

of the Cai Lon River from the western coast of RVN leading into the Delta (also an important enemy LOR). These reductions mean substantially greater freedom of movement for the enemy in the Delta; the VNN is now in a position to retain control only of major LOC's and temporary control of other major convey routes.

(3) Related to longstanding operational readiness shortfalls aboard VNN major fleet units was action initiated during last quarter to establish a much needed Mobile Ordnance Training Unit (MOTU) and a formal damage control (DC) training program. Both programs are now operational. While the formal DC training has graduated three classes, this course of instruction is to be augmented by a "Buttercup" trainer (designed to simulate compartment flooding), which is expected to be constructed during the coming quarter. Both programs are considered very valuable and should markedly improve the capability of the VNN in these two vital areas.

(4) Mekong Convoys: During the quarter 11 regular and two special convoys were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory.

(5) Cargo moved by LST's under operational control of the Central Logistics Command was as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMOUNT (SHORT TONS)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TRIPS</u>
October	9,618	25
November	5,929	18
December	9,585	20

## 7. (C) SHORTFALLS.

a. Significant limitations of VNN capabilities continue to relate to the threat against VNN blue water assets in the event of a full scale conventional conflict with North Vietnam. The major current limitations relating to the anticipated VNN role in such a conflict include inadequate defenses against North Vietnamese aircraft and missile boats, inadequate amphibious transport capabilities, and a shortage of heavy water transportation assets needed for contingency purposes.

b. Within its current operational role, the major VNN shortfall has been the drastic reduction of operational riverine forces (the stand down of 21 out of 44 riverine units) compelled by large cuts in DAV funds. These cuts have forced a substantial decline in the primary VNN operational role in the war with the result of ominously increased enemy freedom of movement throughout the Delta, particularly in the northwestern, western, and

# CONFIDENTIAL

southern portions of MR IV. While the strain on the Delta riverine units took place in two increments (3 units on 1 November and 6 more units on 15 December 1974), adverse effects were quickly experienced with early complaints by ARVN commanders. These included concern over reduced mobility, a pronounced lessening of capabilities to respond to enemy Delta initiatives, increased enemy attacks on commercial river traffic, and the generally increased attacks on patrolling VNN craft, including more daytime attacks and the unusual sinking of two craft in December by rocket fire. A dramatically sharp increase in attacks on VNN units was noted in December, including greatly increased indirect fire attacks on naval bases and a major ground assault and numerous ground probes on one base. In the face of reduced operational assets and stepped up enemy pressures, the VNN control of Delta waterways is generally limited to the most vital LOC's and temporary control of selected waterways as required for major convoy transits.

c. Significant shortfalls relating to the routine operational role of the VNN include deficiencies in such diverse areas as the status of vital shipboard equipment, the speed of major combatant ships, intelligence collection operations, and political warfare (POLWAR) operations. Familiar technical deficiencies relate to chronically inoperative fire control systems, often including marginal or inoperative weapons which limit the effectiveness of shipboard main batteries, and speed limitations restricting the pursuit and interdiction capabilities of major combatants. Material and technical deficiencies are obvious problem areas aboard any warship. Intelligence and POLWAR operations, which include various security and pacification programs essential to counter insurgency warfare, are also considered to be vital naval mission areas. The VNN operational role represents an unusually fertile potential in these areas, particularly in the case of the coastal and riverine forces which involve hundreds of continuously patrolling naval craft from numerous permanent bases along the coast and major rivers resulting in a major daily contact with the civilian population and vital commercial traffic. It is considered that current naval programs in both intelligence and POLWAR operations are still considerably short of the special VNN potential contribution in these important fields.

d. Additionally, the serious food problem aboard VNN ships persists as a significant and particularly unfortunate morale problem. While inadequate food remains a major problem in messes throughout RVNAF, the quality of messes aboard VNN ships continues to be particularly serious. The VNN sailor at sea still faces a fundamental disadvantage in coping with this hardship because he

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

is less able to supplement his diet from other sources as is normally done at shore units.

c. Although several encouraging positive signs have been noted during the quarter, the most significant general problem limiting VNN progress toward realizing its potential level of operational effectiveness continues to be command management. This problem is still most critical in the lack of consistent, concerted headquarters level emphasis on comprehensive VNN operational readiness. The effects of the general problem are traditionally most conspicuous in the technical context of VNN's major combatant ships and relate to both the readiness standards themselves and the distribution of responsibilities for maintaining appropriate standards.

## 8. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The operational combat capability of VNN riverine forces has declined below the level required to meet current VNN operational commitments in the Delta. Coastal and ocean patrol forces alone remain capable of meeting current combat requirements of their assigned areas of the VNN mission.

b. The ability of VNN to make the best use of both equipment and trained personnel continues to be often lacking due to general command management deficiencies, although encouraging indications of more deliberate command attention to such problems have been noted during the quarter. It is essential to the operational effectiveness of the VNN in its varied role that naval command management doctrine and practice develop toward consistent emphasis from the highest levels on down focusing on the general readiness posture of VNN. In order to make headway against traditional problems, such an emphasis must focus on clearly defined readiness standards, distribution of supporting responsibilities, and a reliable monitoring and evaluation system which ensures effective reaction to readiness shortfalls.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 8

### VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)

#### 1. (C) PERSONNEL STRENGTH.

a. Authorization: The total VNMC personnel authorization as of 31 December 1974 was 14,438 Marines, with 964 officers, 2,490 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 10,984 other enlisted.

b. Strength: The VNMC reported a current on board strength of 14,486 Marines at the end of December 1974. This figure includes 1,006 officers, 2,495 NCO's and 10,985 other enlisted Marines. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC by grade is as follows:

RANK	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Major General	1	0
Brigadier General	1	1
Colonel	9	5
Lieutenant Colonel	34	20
Major	75	48
Captain	262	112
First Lieutenant )		
Second Lieutenant)	582	341
Warrant Officer )		209
Master Sergeant	49	81
Gunnery Sergeant	326	237
Staff Sergeant	787	807
Sergeant	1328	1370
Corporal	2213	1242
Lance Corporal	1755	1999
Private First Class	2898	4729
Private Second Class	<u>4118</u>	<u>3015</u>
TOTAL	14,438	14,486

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS. The quarter was characterized by a relatively low level of casualties and continuous training and operations in Military Region I. As a result the Marine Division's personnel readiness remains high, with experienced officers and noncommissioned officers leading all units. Noncommissioned officers continue to represent nearly twenty percent of the enlisted strength of units in the field, providing stability and adding to unit pride

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

and cohesiveness. Turnover of personnel in the division remains low, further reinforcing the strong unit attachment characteristic of the VNMC.

## 3. (C) LOGISTIC READINESS.

a. General: The VNMC continues capable of logistically supporting its assigned mission. Shortages of some major items of equipment and repair parts continued during the quarter, but did not materially impair readiness. The general low level of operations in the marine area of operations has enabled the VNMC to conserve supplies, ammunition, fuel and other consumables.

b. Ongoing Projects: Progress during the quarter on ongoing projects designed to permit the VNMC to understand, comply with and gain the maximum possible support from the Vietnamese Army logistic system was as follows:

(1) Achieve a valid inventory of all equipment with a high level of confidence of accuracy: An inventory of 315 selected major items of equipment and tool sets was completed during the quarter. Supply records and associated mechanized reports were adjusted to reflect the results of the inventory. Inventorying is continuing with an additional selection of high dollar value items to permit further redistribution of any discovered excesses and correction of records and reports.

(2) Validate and redistribute major equipment excesses in the VNMC; validate and fill major equipment shortages in the VNMC: Redistribution of excesses was continued among VNMC units as results of the inventory of major items of equipment and tool sets were obtained. Most remaining identified excesses will be used to assist in initial outfitting of the newly-authorized units described in paragraph 4 of this chapter.

(3) Develop self-sufficiency in internal VNMC supply accountability: Spot shortages of certain spare parts demonstrated the need for a thorough examination of internal VNMC procedures and VNMC/Army Supply Center coordination to assure that requisitions were being prepared and forwarded properly and that appropriate follow-up action was being taken as prescribed in Army Supply Center customer instructions. That examination was conducted during the quarter. It consisted of a review of the flow of requisitions internally within the VNMC and to the Army Supply Center along with the flow of status information to the VNMC; a review of the internal procedures applied to the receipt of material from the Army Supply Center including the handling of material receipt confirmation cards; a review of the procedures for assigning priority designators; a review of the due-in

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

and status history files; and finally a review of VNMC follow-up procedures. Permanent VNMC supply liaison representatives were assigned to the Army Supply Center and to army associated depots, and plans were initiated to have VNMC representatives trained by the Army Supply Center in automated data processing procedures used at the center. Additionally, a conference of all key VNMC logistic personnel was called for early in the 3d quarter of FY-75 to review performance in calendar year 1974 and establish goals for calendar year 1975.

(4) Develop financial management procedures adequate to support budgeting and monitor spending: Progress is continuing on the development of a program to extract information from the computer file of the Army Supply Center that will enable the VNMC to establish subsidiary monetary controls for requisitions and issues. The information would permit accumulation of usage data by appropriate military assistance program financial category. The data would be used to provide an accurate basis for revising budget estimates, monitoring spending, recording the dollar value of receipts by financial category (as a means of measuring actual versus planned performance) and assisting in the planning of future requirements.

## 4. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. The marine division continued to occupy defensive positions in the northernmost area of operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The area of operations remained unchanged from the previous quarter. Enemy activity was light and sporadic, consisting primarily of mortar attacks, with one minor ground engagement. Poor trafficability caused by the seasonal rains contributed to the low level of activity.

b. VNMC casualties during the quarter were substantially less than in the preceding quarter:

	July - September	October - December
KIA	96	38
WIA	163	110
MIA	50	0

c. The Joint General Staff directed in December that the VNMC form an additional infantry brigade and artillery battery, to be fully operational by the end of April. The brigade will be designated the 468th Brigade and will consist of three infantry battalions (designated 14th, 16th and 18th) and a headquarters company; normal marine task organization was directed. The 468th

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

Brigade will be formed and trained in Military Region I and upon completion of initial training will be located at the Song Than Base Camp near Saigon.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS. The Vietnamese Marine Corps continues able to perform its mission. It is affected in the same degree as ARVN divisions by the limited fund availability, but the relatively low level of combat operations during the quarter in its area of operations permitted the marine division to conserve its personnel and supplies, preserve its equipment, and concentrate on individual and unit training in position.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 9

### TERRITORIAL FORCES (TF)

#### 1. (C) REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES (RF/PF).

a. This chapter presents an assessment of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces and significant changes and/or modifications in their organization, mission and employment that reflect progress or regression since the previous quarterly assessment. This assessment is based primarily upon an analysis of staff and field activity reports from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and U.S. Embassy field operations staff. Its purpose is to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the current cease-fire situation militarily, politically and psychologically. The overall organizational, operational, logistical, and employment/deployment situation remains basically unchanged. Therefore, this assessment is confined only to reporting changes, revisions, modifications, problem areas, or progress that have had significant impact on the territorials during this quarter.

b. Enemy forces, in a rerun of the third quarter, continued moderate to heavy pressure against Territorial Forces and, in several areas of MR 3 and MR 4, scored significant successes with the capture of several district towns, with several others seriously threatened as CY 74 ended. Enemy-initiated attacks against the Territorial Forces continued to have serious and deleterious impact on territorial security during the quarter, particularly in the rice belt areas of MR 4 where Vietnamese farmers were preparing for the annual rice harvest. Although the enemy has traditionally opened the "Winter-Spring" campaign with heavy shelling and coordinated ground attacks on the rice-growing areas to replenish his depleted food stocks, field reports reflect that, from the ferocity of his attacks in recent weeks, it is conceivable that a general offensive along the lines of Easter 1972 could be imminent. The situation that confronts the RF and PF is not expected to improve significantly in the near future, at least not as long as the enemy exacerbates this situation with increased violence in the rural countryside.

c. The primary mission of the RF and PF for general purposes was all but forgotten as enemy forces launched large-scale attacks against TF tactical and defensive positions, particularly in MR 3 and MR 4 during the latter part of December 1974. The

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

role of defending the rural populace took a back seat as many RF mobile battalions and a significant number of PF platoons were shoved into the breach in an extensive effort to suppress enemy advances into several areas under heavy attack. As the quarter ended, enemy attacks were increasing along predetermined battlefronts, with his forces continuing to advance almost unabated into lightly defended areas of MR 3, resulting in the capture of several district towns with several others under siege. During the melee of attacks against government militia forces, several battalions of RF occupying forward positions were either overrun or lost communications with their respective tactical operations center and subsector or sector headquarters. Approximately 3,000 RF/PF are still missing and presumed captured by the enemy.

## 2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES (RF).

a. The organizational chart that reflects command and control of the territorial forces down to the sub-subsector remains essentially unchanged. However, for information purposes, this chart is depicted in this assessment at Chapter 13, which covers RVNAF command and control.

b. Current RF assigned strength, as reported by the Joint General Staff (JGS), is approximately 239,900 men and remains basically unchanged from that reported in the previous assessment (Figure 9-1). MR field reports during the quarter reflect that increasing combat losses (including a significant increase in desertions) continued to take a steady toll of RF combat personnel. Losses inflicted upon the RF have generally been the result of increasing enemy attacks against RF tactical positions in their assigned Areas of Operation (AO). Overall losses decreased by approximately 50% in MR 1 and MR 2, primarily resulting from an appreciable reduction in enemy-initiated attacks, when compared to reported losses during the third quarter CY 74. However, RF reported combat losses in MR 3 in December 1974 more than tripled over those losses for October and November; and in MR 4, reported losses in December more than equaled losses reported during the previous two months. Although RF assigned strengths remained fairly stable through most of CY 74, combat strengths steadily declined to the point where many of the 360 RF mobile battalions were well below acceptable combat levels. Battalion combat strengths during the quarter averaged between 65 and 75% of their authorized Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) strength of 550 men. There appear to be no immediate solutions on the horizon to correct this long-standing problem, one that continues to impact significantly on the state of combat readiness of the RF.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

# REGIONAL FORCES ASSIGNED STRENGTH

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 324,799




Figure 9-1

9-3

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

c. As previously noted, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) continues in its efforts to restore, improve, or consolidate territorial security in the rural populated countryside. As in the past, this effort (though short of its long-term goals) has primarily been applied to those areas that have traditionally suffered from successful enemy incursions, and areas where trained enemy agents have continued to successfully penetrate local village governments for the purpose of subverting GVN control and exploiting the rural populace. Territorial security in general has steadily deteriorated since the first of 1974, reaching a low point in the last two weeks of December, with the loss of seven district towns, one in MR 2, five in MR 3, and one in MR 4, with several others under heavy attack and seriously threatened. The enemy continues to demonstrate his capability to expand his base areas in order to strike at friendly forces. This has occurred to a large degree because sufficient RF combat units are not available that could otherwise be employed as blocking forces to blunt enemy advances into GVN-controlled areas.

d. The mission of the RF is effective implementation of GVN territorial security policies and defense of the rural populace against enemy offensive activities. In light of the enemy's recent intensified attacks against lightly defended district towns (which have reached alarming proportions), the Joint General Staff (JGS) continued to direct MR and sector commanders to place command emphasis on intelligence collection, reconnaissance and analysis of enemy movements as a basis for attacking enemy forces when they are moving into or threatening GVN-controlled areas. In the most recent actions in MR 3, RF deployed forces, in general, have been outmatched by numerically superior enemy forces, firepower and armor. However, in these actions, the RF generally maintained excellent combat discipline and fought courageously and tenaciously, even though their units were overrun and many subsequently captured.

e. The implementation of the presidentially-decreed sub-sub-sector program, which has been extensively covered in previous assessments, has been completed with the assignment of over 13,000 RF officers and NCOs to more than 2,160 sub-subsectors. This subject will not be included in subsequent assessments except where there are significant revisions or modifications to the existing program or to reflect significant evidence of enemy targeting of the sub-subsectors.

f. As previously stated, territorial security deteriorated rapidly in many areas of the country, particularly in MRs 3 and 4. In December, combat losses inflicted on the RF were the heaviest of the year, when the enemy conducted large-scale ground

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

attacks supported by armor and long-range artillery. Quickly and in succession, between 22 and 31 December 1974, enemy forces overrun and captured Bo Duc, Duc Phong, Don Luan, and finally Phuoc Binh district towns in Phuoc Long Province. As the year ended, the last bastion of defense for friendly forces was in a small pocket in the provincial capital. Remnants of three RF battalions, several PF platoons and the remaining elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), were engaged in a bitter struggle against superior enemy forces. Other district towns that fell to enemy forces in December were Tinh Linh in Binh Tuy Province (MR 3), and the recently activated district town of Hung Long in Chuong Thien Province (MR 4). The GVN and several world volunteer relief organizations have expressed serious concern over the fate of more than 50,000 newly generated civilian war victims that have been caught in the recent savage fighting in MR 3 and MR 4, particularly in Phuoc Long, Binh Tuy, Tay Ninh and Chuong Thien Provinces. GVN sources state that since 1 October 1974, increased enemy attacks throughout the country have generated approximately 200,000 registered and unregistered war victims and displaced persons.

g. MR field reports reflect that the enemy continued to attack sub-sector commands at an alarming rate during December, with the ultimate objective of usurping and subverting GVN control in the villages and hamlets, and discrediting the Thieu Government in the eyes of the rural populace. From the inception of the sub-sector plan in March 1974, through the latter part of December, enemy forces launched 245 attacks against the sub-sectors, overrunning 44 (10 were subsequently being reoccupied by friendly forces). Out of the 245 attacks reported by JGS, 106 occurred during the first three weeks of December when enemy forces unleashed large-scale attacks. Additionally, according to JGS reports, 815 GVN-controlled hamlets (of a total of 11,290) were overrun and occupied by enemy forces during CT 74 with a total of 678 subsequently reoccupied by the GVN, leaving a total of 137 more hamlets still in enemy hands as the year ended.

h. During the quarter, enemy forces initiated a total of 6,733 incidents against the territorial forces, inflicting a total of 12,516 combat casualties, according to MR field activity reports. These statistics compare favorably to those reported in the third quarter, with the exception of December, when enemy incidents and friendly casualties either equaled or more than doubled the first two months of the quarter.

i. Concept of employment of the RF remains generally unchanged. RF field operations continue to employ 45 sector

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

tactical commands, 360 mobile battalions, which include 1,440 RF rifle companies and 326 separate companies, and over 2,160 sub-sector headquarters. Of the 360 battalions, 123 have been committed to form the newly created 41 RF Mobile Groups. Additionally, RF must maintain approximately 1,200 outposts ranging in size from major operating bases of battalion-level down to squad size. Continued manning of this large number of outposts has not significantly improved territorial security of the rural populace or CWN-controlled areas, as evidenced by the fact that during December, a total of 115 outposts were either overrun by enemy forces or abandoned by the RF/PF. During the defense of Phuoc Long Province in late December, as an example, three RF battalions and their forward command posts, and a string of lightly defended PF positions were overrun or abandoned during the heavy fighting that enveloped that province. Continued enemy initiated cease-fire violations, coupled with increased enemy offensive operations against ARVN regular forces, have forced MR commanders to redeploy significant numbers of RF mobile battalions outside their assigned sectors to reinforce ARVN forces, interdict enemy lines of communications and conduct blocking and security operations. MR commanders continue to realign their available combat forces to meet an ever-increasing enemy threat in their tactical areas.

j. In the previous assessment, brief mention was made of the recently conceived RF Mobile Group concept that, when completed on 31 December 1974, would initially deploy 31 RF Mobile Groups to MRs 1, 2 and 4. This number was increased to 41 with the inclusion of eight groups in MR 3 and two additional groups in MR 4. Each RF Mobile Group will consist of three RF Mobile Battalions, a tactical headquarters, and a territorial artillery battery of two platoons each with four 105mm Howitzers. When implemented on 1 January 1975, the RF Mobile Group Order of Battle will include seven groups in MR 1, eight in MR 2, eight in MR 3, and 18 in MR 4. The charts at Figures 9-2A and 9-2B and 9-3A and 9-3B depict the current status of the RF Mobile Groups' strengths, equipment and unit refresher training status and their batteries' designation, assignment and location. Pending a complete review of organization requirements, the RF Mobile Groups will continue to use the existing TOE for the RF battalion, Sector Tactical Command Post (STCP) and for the Territorial Artillery platoons. It is estimated that the 41 RF Mobile Groups will be totally operational on or about 15 March 1975, according to current JGS planning. A joint JGS committee, under the supervision of J-3/JGS, was organized to assist MR and sector commanders in the planning, organizational, operational, employment, training and logistical areas of the two-phase plan. Periodic reports will be submitted to the Chief, JGS/RVNAF reflecting the status of implementation of the plan.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 3. (C) POPULAR FORCES (PF)

a. The information presented in the previous assessment remains generally unchanged. Current assigned strength is more than 193,500, a decrease of approximately 1,000 from the August 1973 total and 4,000 from a CY 74 high of over 197,000 as depicted at Figure 9-4. Although their assigned strengths have varied only slightly through most of CY 74, PF operational strengths have diminished significantly as a result of increased enemy attacks against GVN controlled villages and hamlets, particularly during December. Authorized strength remains at 206,000, consisting of 6,699 29-man platoons. There was a total of 6,297 platoons reported in December, of which 310 were held in pipeline status to be used as reserve replacements.

b. More than one-third of the PF operational strength continues to man and maintain approximately 4,000 various size outposts throughout the country.

c. Overall PF performance remains basically unchanged according to J-3/JCS sources. Field visits by MR and sector staffs were curtailed through most of the quarter because of the serious deterioration in overall security, resulting from increased enemy attacks against the rural populated areas of MRs 3 and 4. This increase in enemy activities has resulted in increased PF combat losses. Additionally, a substantial number of PF platoons were redeployed from their assigned AOs to reinforce RF units under increased enemy pressure.

4. (U) LOGISTIC SUPPORT. No significant change from that reported in previous assessment. During the quarter, Central Logistics Command (CLC) discontinued publication of the RF/PF Quarterly Logistics Status Report. This document was extremely useful in determining logistic requirements of the TF and progress in resolving long-standing discrepancies and deficiencies in logistic support of RF/PF deployed units. A suitable substitute for this report has not, as yet, been established by the CLC. DAO continues to monitor closely logistic support of the RF/PF and significant changes, revisions or modifications, if any, will be reflected in the next quarterly assessment.

# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS OF 41 NEWLY-ACTIVATED RF MOBIL GROUPS

References: - JGS/J-3 Memorandum # 3475, dated 11 September 1974  
- JGS/J-3 Memorandum # 4247, dated 19 November 1974

MRs/Sector	Units	Strength Status				Equip Status	Refresher Trng	
		Auth	Asgd	%	Ops		Compl	In-Trng
<u>MR 1</u> Quang Nam Quang Ngai Quang Tri Thua Thien Quang Nam Quang Tin Quang Ngai	911st RF MG	1789	1435	80%	1307	65%	x	
	912nd RF MG	1789	1251	70%	1103	59%	x	
	913rd RF MG	1789	1760	98%	1553	49%	x	
	914th RF MG	1789	1661	93%	1445	71%		x
	915th RF MG	1789	1354	76%	1118	63%		x
	916th RF MG	1789	1578	88%	1284	50%		x
	917th RF MG	1789	1267	71%	1031	44%		x
<u>MR 2</u> Binh Dinh Khanh Hoa Pleiku Phu Yen Binh Thuan Darlac Binh Dinh Kontum	921st RF MG	1789	1618	90%	1090	58%	x	
	922nd RF MG	1789	1695	95%	1543	66%	x	
	923rd RF MG	1789	1384	77%	1354	78%	x	
	924th RF MG	1789	1406	79%	1132	70%	x	
	925th RF MG	1789	1668	93%	1527	69%		x
	926th RF MG	1789	1204	67%	1018	60%		x
	927th RF MG	1789	931	52%	629	63%		x
	928th RF MG	1789	1044	58%	876	67%		x
<u>MR 3</u> Gia Dinh Long An Bien Hoa Tay Ninh Binh Duong	931st RF MG	1789	1620	91%	1457	85%		x
	932nd RF MG	1789	1633	91%	1411	60%		x
	933rd RF MG	1789	1540	86%	1328	67%		x
	934th RF MG	1789	1521	85%	1423	65%		x
	935th RF MG	1789	1517	85%	1393	70%		x

Figure 9-2A

9-8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MRs/Sector	Units	Strength Status				Equip Status	Refresher Inrg	
		Auth	Asgd	%	Ops		Compl	In-Inrg
MR 3 (Cont.)								
Long Khanh	936th RF MG	1789	1454	81%	1163	63%		x
Hau Nghia	937th RF MG	1789	1394	78%	1251	62%		x
Phuoc Tuy	938th RF MG	1789	1400	78%	1329	68%		x
MR 4								
* Vinh Long	941st RF MG	1789	1153	64%	625	77%		x
* Sa Dec	942nd RF MG	1789	1153	64%	1091	76%		x
* Go Cong	943rd RF MG	1789	1408	79%	1168	82%		x
* Kien Hoa	944th RF MG	1789	1179	66%	926	82%		x
* Phong Dinh	945th RF MG	1789	943	57%	663	68%		x
* An Giang	946th RF MG	1789	1228	69%	1083	72%		x
* Chau Doc	947th RF MG	1789	1587	89%	1370	89%		x
* Dinh Tuong	948th RF MG	1789	1005	56%	614	55%		x
* Kien Phong	949th RF MG	1789	1291	72%	1076	75%		x
* Vinh Binh	950th RF MG	1789	1064	59%	773	69%		x
* Vinh Long	951st RF MG	1789	1036	58%	853	72%		x
* Kien Giang	952nd RF MG	1789	989	55%	754	62%		x
* Ba Xuyen	953rd RF MG	1789	1177	66%	870	62%		x
* An Giang	954th RF MG	1789	1199	67%	997	69%		x
* Chau Doc	955th RF MG	1789	1473	82%	1263	82%		x
* Kien Hoa	956th RF MG	1789	1171	65%	975	67%		x
* Sa Dec	957th RF MG	1789	1083	61%	894	89%		x
* Go Cong	958th RF MG	1789	989	55%	821	62%		x

Remarks: (\*) These groups were scheduled for training during Phase I, but training schedules were received late from CTC. As a result, these 12 RF MGs will be trained during Phase II, effective 2 Dec 1974.

Figure 9-2B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESIGNATION, ASSIGNMENT AND LOCATION OF RE-MOBILE GROUPS  
AND 105MM HOWITZER BATTERIES  
EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 JANUARY 1975

DESIGNATION OF GROUP	PREVIOUS DESIGNATION	SICUTUR/PROVINCE ASSIGNMENT	DESIGNATION OF TA 105MM HOW BATTERIES	PREVIOUS DESIGNATION
<u>MR 1</u>				
911th RF MG	101-143-144 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Nam	105mm How Btry 911	105-106 TA Plt
912th RF MG	225-136-142 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Ngai	105mm How Btry 912	109-110 TA Plt
913th RF MG	105-110-110 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Tri	105mm How Btry 913	113-114 TA Plt
914th RF MG	107-111-128 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Tri	105mm How Btry 914	105-120 TA Plt
915th RF MG	104-108-139 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Nam	105mm How Btry 915	107-108 TA Plt
916th RF MG	115-116-135 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Tri	105mm How Btry 916	115-116 TA Plt
917th RF MG	139-111-137 RF Bn	HQ, Quang Nam	105mm How Btry 917	117-112 TA Plt
<u>MR 2</u>				
921st RF MG	234-217-216 RF Bn	HQ, Binh Dinh	105mm How Btry 921	251-252 TA Plt
922nd RF MG	245-246-272 RF Bn	HQ, Khanh Hoa	105mm How Btry 922	258-259 TA Plt
923rd RF MG	278-240-213 RF Bn	HQ, Pleiku	105mm How Btry 923	213-214 TA Plt
924th RF MG	268-219-206 RF Bn	HQ, Phu Yen	105mm How Btry 924	203-256 TA Plt
925th RF MG	212-229-248 RF Bn	HQ, Binh Thuan	105mm How Btry 925	220-222 TA Plt
926th RF MG	211-224-225 RF Bn	HQ, Binhac	105mm How Btry 926	246-247 TA Plt
927th RF MG	217-215-209 RF Bn	HQ, Binh Dinh	105mm How Btry 927	249-250 TA Plt
928th RF MG	251-252-281 RF Bn	HQ, Kontum	105mm How Btry 928	233-234 TA Plt
<u>MR 3</u>				
931st RF MG	369-380-382 RF Bn	HQ, Gia Dinh	105mm How Btry 931	340-341 TA Plt
932nd RF MG	330-331-332 RF Bn	HQ, Long An	105mm How Btry 932	309-311 TA Plt
933rd RF MG	346-347-376 RF Bn	HQ, Bien Hoa	105mm How Btry 933	312-313 TA Plt

Figure 9-3A

9-10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESIGNATION OF GROUP	PREVIOUS DESIGNATION	SECTOR/PROVINCE ASSIGNMENT	DESIGNATION OF TA 105MM HOW BATTERIES	PREVIOUS DESIGNATION
MR 3 (Cont)				
934th RF MG	304-312-313 RF Bn	HQ, Tay Ninh	105mm How Btry 934	303-338 TA Plt
935th RF MG	306-322-360 RF Bn	HQ, Binh Duong	105mm How Btry 935	316-319 TA Plt
936th RF MG	324-342-343 RF Bn	HQ, Long Khanh	105mm How Btry 936	335-337 TA Plt
937th RF MG	305-319-328 RF Bn	HQ, Hau Nghia	105mm How Btry 937	305-306 TA Plt
938th RF MG	302-325-355 RF Bn	HQ, Phuoc Tuy	105mm How Btry 938	327-329 TA Plt
MR 4				
941st RF MG	519-464-466 RF Bn	HQ, Vinh Long	105mm How Btry 941	449-450 TA Plt
942nd RF MG	440-442-435 RF Bn	HQ, Sa Dec	105mm How Btry 942	452-453 TA Plt
943rd RF MG	515-434-433 RF Bn	HQ, Go Cong	105mm How Btry 943	439-437 TA Plt
944th RF MG	453-415-454 RF Bn	HQ, Kien Hoa	105mm How Btry 944	435-441 TA Plt
945th RF MG	475-479-416 RF Bn	HQ, Phong Dinh	105mm How Btry 945	416-413 TA Plt
946th RF MG	421-439-456 RF Bn	HQ, An Giang	105mm How Btry 946	456-462 TA Plt
947th RF MG	494-448-541 RF Bn	HQ, Chau Doc	105mm How Btry 947	421-424 TA Plt
948th RF MG	513-516-450 RF Bn	HQ, Dinh Tuong	105mm How Btry 948	440-432 TA Plt
949th RF MG	436-542-499 RF Bn	HQ, Kien Phong	105mm How Btry 949	463-425 TA Plt
950th RF MG	523-524-470 RF Bn	HQ, Vinh Binh	105mm How Btry 950	444-416 TA Plt
951st RF MG	521-465-444 RF Bn	HQ, Vinh Long	105mm How Btry 951	449-450 TA Plt
952nd RF MG	528-529-426 RF Bn	HQ, Kien Giang	105mm How Btry 952	458-411 TA Plt
953rd RF MG	408-483-486 RF Bn	HQ, Ba Xuyen	105mm How Btry 953	408-409 TA Plt
954th RF MG	437-457-518 RF Bn	HQ, An Giang	105mm How Btry 954	454-455 TA Plt
955th RF MG	425-538-540 RF Bn	HQ, Chau Doc	105mm How Btry 955	423-422 TA Plt
956th RF MG	451-507-509 RF Bn	HQ, Kien Hoa	105mm How Btry 956	436-434 TA Plt
957th RF MG	441-459-460 RF Bn	HQ, SA Dec	105mm How Btry 957	415-451 TA Plt
958th RF MG	420-462-514 RF Bn	HQ, Go Cong	105mm How Btry 958	438-431 TA Plt

Figure 9-38

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POPULAR FORCES  
ASSIGNED STRENGTH  
CY 1974

AUTH STRENGTH : 206,000




Figure 9-4

9-13

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. Territorial security in general suffered serious setbacks with large-scale enemy attacks against rural populated areas, resulting in the capture of seven district towns and several others seriously threatened, as CY 74 ended.

b. Combat losses inflicted on the RF/PF significantly increased during the quarter, particularly in MR 3 and MR 4 in December 1974, where several RF battalions and a substantial number of PF platoons were overrun and their forces presumably captured by the enemy.

c. The presidentially decreed sub-subsector program was completed, with the assignment of over 13,000 RF officers and NCOs to more than 2,160 sub-subsectors. DAO will continue to monitor this program and report significant changes, revisions, or modifications in subsequent assessments.

d. Progress was made in the RF Mobile Group concept with the organization and activation of 41 RF Mobile Groups (increased from 31) as directed by the Chief, JGS/RVNAF. All groups have been organized and activated. However, delays in carrying out refresher training, now being experienced, will undoubtedly have adverse effects on the implementation and operational phases of the plan. This results primarily from the current military situation in MR 3 and MR 4. Other shortfalls noted in JGS field visits have been in shortages of competent and qualified battalion commanders, shortages in organic TOE equipment and definitive operational procedures. It is anticipated that these problem areas that have been identified by JGS will, to a large extent, be resolved prior to mid-March 1975, when these groups are to be committed for operation. DAO will continue to monitor progress in the RF Mobile Group concept.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER 1

### RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CAPABILITY

#### 1. (U) C-E SELF-SUFFICIENCY

a. Skill levels of RVNAF have continued to improve. One-hundred percent of Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System (SIMS) personnel have become site qualified in their primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). In addition, 3.8 percent of these personnel were cross-trained in a secondary MOS during the quarter. When these personnel have completed on-site on-the-job training (OJT) in the secondary MOS in actually performing the necessary preventive maintenance tasks and repair procedures, the self-sufficiency of SIMS sites is expected to improve. Contractor technical assistance in support of Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) emergency/technical assistance callouts continued to decrease. The ARVN personnel at AMSF-V have continued to gain operation and maintenance experience and professional confidence in their own capabilities and thus have had less reliance on US contractor assistance.

b. Communications-electronics training self-sufficiency is progressing at a satisfactory rate as exemplified by the efforts put forth by the ARVN Signal Department. Recognizing that DAV funding constraints have caused a severe reduction in off-shore training quotas for senior (E7 and higher) maintenance technicians and management personnel, the RVNAF Signal School at Vung Tau independently initiated action to upgrade their training capability in support of the SIMS. Under the US/RVN sister school program, the RVNAF schools contact their appropriate counterpart schools in the US for any assistance required in training matters. The US Army Signal School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, has been providing the RVNAF with the Programs of Instruction (POI's) and other training materials to promote the qualifications of NCO specialists presently serving in the Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) and Integrated Communications System (ICS) facilities of the SIMS. These POI's are:

- Dial Switchboard Repairman - MOS 36H40
- Strategic Microwave Repairman - MOS 26V40
- Fixed Carrier Repairman - MOS 36E40
- Strategic Monitoring Repairman - MOS 32D40

Once these POI's have been translated into Vietnamese and the training implemented, the RVNAF will have not only improved their training support for SIMS but will also have made a considerable gain toward achieving self-sufficiency in this area.

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## c. Civilianization of SIMS:

(1) One of the objectives of the CINCPAC RVNAF Force Structure Task Group was the civilianization of SIMS, with usage made of excess system capability by the Vietnamese Telecommunications Authority (VTA) to produce revenue. Heretofore, while some long distance trunks have been used by the VTA, and the concept of civilian usage had long been advocated, no real progress had been made and there was a minimum of exchange of information between the civil and military communication communities. Whatever past resistance toward civilian use of military facilities may have been, the situation is now one of complete cooperation.

(2) Positive action has been taken by the RVNAF JCS/J6, VTA, and the Ministry of Interior to accomplish SIMS civilianization. A working group of the aforementioned agencies is presently engaged in identifying requirements, developing shared use agreements, studying disposition of revenue, determining how to transition equipment excess to RVNAF requirements to VTA use, arranging provisions for VTA to employ RVNAF personnel as they become excess and establishing logistic support for the systems after transition to VTA. Only fixed plant is under consideration; tactical equipment on end segments will not be considered for transfer. This would not, however, rule out the RVNAF leasing of excess circuits on tactical segments to the VTA.

(3) The concerned parties recognized that SIMS civilianization cannot happen overnight. The accelerated RVNAF transition program was completed in about 3 years, but with VTA assuming responsibility for only those facilities which have revenue producing potential, the time span for civilianization should be less. Trained and experienced military technicians and management personnel, upon release from RVNAF, will receive preferential treatment for employment by VTA.

## 2. (U) COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT AGENCY (CMA).

a. The Ministry of Defense has determined in principle that CMA will be reorganized in keeping with the realignment of ARVN Signal elements. The future structure of CMA, if it continues to exist as such, is unknown at this time.

b. Contractor provided OJT to RVNAF Signal Officers assigned to CMA will terminate when the Page Communications Engineers (PCE) contract expires on 16 January 1975. Without the contractor assistance required for practical application of the theoretical knowledge gained in the fixed plant applications engineering OJT, the ability of CMA to successfully develop engineering packages is minimal. This is primarily due to limited experience of some personnel and no experience of others. DAO C-E Division personnel will provide

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

assistance in critical areas until such time as CMA achieves complete self-sufficiency.

## 3. (U) SINGLE INTEGRATED MILITARY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (SIMS).

### a. US Reliability:

(1) A minimum acceptable management threshold for trunk reliability of the SIMS was established by the RVNAF CMA. The reliability objectives is 99.8 percent and the management threshold is 99.0 percent. These reliability thresholds constitute minimum acceptable levels of operational performance. As a general rule, failure of trunks to perform at or better than the established objective level should be just cause for concern and the initiation of remedial action. At this point in time, RVNAF Signal Department has not been able to maintain the SIMS at the level of reliability previously set as the US standard. This resulted in CMA reducing the previous US objective of 99.98 percent to their current reliability objective of 99.8 percent.

(2) The RVNAF operations and maintenance personnel have been unable to maintain system performance at their current objective level which is considerably lower than the previous level set as a US standard. This is reflected by the following monthly reliability figure for the 4th quarter of 1974.

Oct	Nov	Dec
99.93%	99.83%	99.47%

(3) Six SIMS links, which are included in the 1-76 SIMS Improvement Plan, have had a significant impact on the poor performance of the SIMS.

(4) An operational evaluation and technical assistance program has been implemented which should improve the overall system performance.

(5) Another significant factor affecting system performance is the lack of adequate transportation to get equipment and parts to and from the sites. Approximately 30 to 35 percent of the system Hazardous Conditions (HAZCONS) can be attributed to "awaiting transportation."

### b. Undersea Cable System:

(1) The RVNAF operate five undersea cablehead (CHD) terminals on the 439L and 484N undersea cable systems. Cablehead communications equipment has been relatively trouble-free due to the inherent high reliability of the equipment. However, problems have been encountered with the "no break" power systems associated with the

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

cableheads. While relatively minor, these HAZCONS could not be cleared immediately due to the long lead time required for obtaining replacement parts. Once supplied with the parts, however, the RVNAF proved capable of successfully repairing the equipment.

(2) An outage on the 439L "C" link occurred on 15 Dec 74. Critical circuits were rerouted by RVNAF technicians to minimize the impact of the service disruption. Initial troubleshooting efforts by RVNAF technicians revealed that the break was between the Da Nang Cablehead and the undersea repeater nearest Da Nang. More accurate fault location was not possible until a shore party from the Cable Ship Neptune was landed to repair the cable. The Neptune personnel discovered that the problem was caused by persons unknown tampering with the cable on the beach at Da Nang. The cable was restored to service and all groups were normalized on 30 Dec 74. To prevent future occurrences of this nature, steps will be taken to improve the physical security of beach portion of this cable. The cooperation of RVNAF elements in restoring the cable to service was excellent.

## c. Tandem Switching Centers (TSCs):

(1) The RVNAF operate four TSCs which provide long distance direct dial capability throughout the RVN.

(2) The condition of the Tan Son Nhut TSC greatly improved during this reporting period due to an intensive maintenance effort by VNAF 295 Communications Squadron and Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) personnel. Equipment is still not in full operating condition due to lack of several critical parts. These components are on order and repairs will be affected when the parts are received.

(3) Problems in completing long-distance calls through the tandems have occurred during the reporting period. Investigation by operational teams revealed that at least part of the difficulty was caused by degraded radio trunks. A continuing effort is underway to improve the quality of the ICS trunks and thereby improve service provided by the TSCs.

## d. Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTEs):

(1) RVNAF DTEs provide dial telephone service to authorized subscribers in and around major bases. These DTEs, in conjunction with tactical exchanges and switchboards, serve 124 areas in the RVN. Long-distance direct-dial telephone service is available via the four RVNAF TSCs.

(2) ARVN Signal Department technicians have successfully regraded the Long Binh DTE. Originally designed as a 5000-line

# UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

exchange to satisfy former US requirements, the long binh DTE was oversized and overtrunked for RVNAF requirements. This action by the RVNAF has resulted in reducing the size of the DTE from 5000 to 2000 lines. Resulting excess equipment will be used for future telephone projects. The ARVN have displayed a great deal of initiative and expertise in this undertaking and are to be commended for accomplishing this task successfully.

(3) The Inspect, Repair as Necessary (IRAN) program for cable plants continues. The ARVN Signal Department has embarked on an ambitious project to survey and upgrade ARVN operated outside plants. Technical assistance is presently being provided to the RVNAF in conducting pre-IRAN surveys, with the goal of establishing an organic capability to perform these surveys.

e. Air Conditioning and Power Generation Equipment: The number of HAZCONS in the SIMS system caused by defective air conditioning and power generating equipment were significantly reduced from a high of 10 unresolved HAZCONS on 1 Oct 74 to a low of zero HAZCONS on 29 Dec 74.

## 4. (C) SELECTED C-E EVALUATIONS.

### a. (C) Sensors:

(1) The 60th Signal Base Depot, including the Sensor Division, was placed under the operational control of the Central Logistics Command (CLC) maintenance division. To date, no changes have been made in the operation of the Sensor Division. C-E Division has recommended that ARVN Signal Department place the Sensor Division under the direct control of the Special Operations Center (SOC) JGS/J3 since the SOC is the only organization that can forecast requirements and control issue to using units. An additional benefit would be better management of battery assets. Battery issue is now programed by the Army Supply Center (ASC) using as a guide, battery life times the number of **articles in the user's** inventory. This method of battery issue is weak in that ASC has no way of determining actual usage of the equipment.

(2) There is still a shortage of line sensors for perimeter defense at some critical installations. As an interim measure tactical type sensors are being used wherever possible. Line sensors (and components) are on valid due-in requisitions. There are enough tactical sensors on hand or due in to satisfy FY75 requirements.

b. (C) Operational Readiness: The C-E Division field teams stationed in the four MRS continue to provide meaningful results in the End Item Use Inspections (EIUIs) of SIMS sites, tactical C-E units, Direct Support Groups (DSGs), and Medium Maintenance

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Centers (EMCs). As reported in the last quarterly assessment, there is a continuing decline in the operational readiness of RVNAF tactical communications, associated with the diminished logistic support. Current estimated averages of operational readiness in ARVN units are 23% for VHF/carrier equipment, 42% for power equipment, 36% for radio equipment, and 43% for radars. While this steady increase in deadline rates is primarily associated with a lack of repair parts, it is to some degree compounded by POL rationing which results in reduced operation of power generators at all levels of maintenance shops.

c. (U) Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE): Considerable progress has been made toward improvement in the RVNAF management of the repair and calibration of TMDE, reported as a serious deficiency in the last assessment. Within DAO, C-E Division has been designated as the office of primary responsibility for all TMDE activities, and a parallel action has been taken within the RVNAF with the establishment of a Joint Services Management Branch (JSMB) within CLC. This organization will be staffed with 18 officers, 11 ARVN, four VNAF, three VNN; 16 NCOs and six civilians. It is composed of four operating sections: Review and Analysis, Calibration Scheduling, Technical Engineering, and Inspection and Evaluation. The mission and scope of responsibility covers the entire field of TMDE activities within the RVNAF from developing policies and procedures, establishing evacuation schedules, training and assigning personnel, assessing facilities, controlling equipment assets, and quality assurance. C-E Division and the JSCB closely coordinate on efforts to improve TMDE capabilities.

d. (U) Signal Maintenance: RVNAF efforts to improve equipment maintenance operations has placed the 60th Signal Base Depot (SBD) under the operational control of CLC. The objective of the reorganization, the centralization of responsibility for high-level maintenance, is commendable; however, the separation of the SBD from the cognizance of the ARVN Signal Department may present both initial and long-term problems. DAO C-E Division will continue with responsibility for technical assistance at the SBD, and will maintain close coordination with both the Depot and the CLC maintenance division.

e. (U) AN/PVS-2A Night Vision Device: The question of credit to the RVNAF for retrograde of the AN/PVS-2A, mentioned in the last assessment, has been resolved with the finding that such credit is not allowable. Based upon this decision, a letter has been forwarded to JGS/CLC requesting RVNAF evaluate the need for this item in their inventory.

f. (U) AN/PSM-13 Battery Testers: The AN/PSM-13s issued during the previous quarter were not being used by the majority of field units as revealed by the continuing high rate of consumption

**UNCLASSIFIED**

of Battery BA-4386. DAO C-E Division has asked the ARVN Signal Department to issue instructions to stop unit explaining the purpose of the battery tester. Once the AS/PT is issued, the monthly rate of BA-4386 consumption may be reduced.

g. (U) AM/DAO-10 had reports during a visit by DAO C-E Division personnel of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMC) and Airborne Divisions in III F. It was reported that they were having considerable difficulty in maintaining the AN-100-10. As reported by these units, 10 of 14 radios were downlined due to lack of repair parts. DAO C-E and Navy Divisions are closely coordinating with RVNAF logistics organizations to solve the problem.

5. (U) LOGISTICS.

a. Area Maintenance and Supply Facility Vietnam (AMSF-V):

(1) SIMS sites supply status during the fourth quarter of 1974 remains relatively stable with an increase in dues-out continuing the upward trend begun last May. Requisitions received and requisitions shipped showed an increase in December, signifying increased responsiveness due to receipts of assets during the quarter.

(Figure 10-1)

(2) Supply effectiveness on Authorized Stockage List (ASL) items. Demand satisfaction took a dramatic jump to 99% during December. This jump is attributed to an intensive review of ASL items which resulted in a decrease of ASL lines from 2155 at the end of the first quarter's report to 128 lines by the end of the second quarter. This action, coupled with increased receipts at the beginning of the second quarter of 411 ASL requisitions received, enabled 100% fill of 900 ASL requisitions.

(Figure 10-2)

(3) AMSF maintenance reflects a general increase in completions for the last 2 months of the quarter because of the receipts of repair parts. However, receipts of unserviceable assets still remains a problem.

(Figure 10-3)

(4) AMSF maintenance, Backlog and Deadlines; the number of items deadlined continues to decrease as parts become available. The backlog during this quarter increased slightly.

(Figure 10-4)

b. 60th Signal Base Depot:

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

# AMSF SIMS SITES SUPPLY STATUS IN COUNTRY SUPPORT




Figure 10-1

10-0

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

# AMSF SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS (ASL ITEMS)




Figure 10-2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

# AMSF MAINTENANCE RECEIPT OF UNSERVICEABLES COMPLETIONS




Figure 10-3

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

# AMSF MAINTENANCE BACKLOG — DEADLINED




Figure 10-4

10-15

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

(1) The major components rebuild program is still performing better than the module program because of the shortages in Micro-wave (90%), wire (57%) and TMDE (53%). The time lag in turn-in of unserviceables and shortages of repair parts contributes to the shortfall in the other programs.

(Figure 10-5)

(2) The module rebuild program continues to fall behind schedule. Only 23% of the total module rebuild programs have been completed at the end of the second quarter of the program year. Comments in para 5b(1) apply.

(Figure 10-6)

## 6. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The RVNAF are becoming increasingly proficient in the operation and maintenance of the SIMS. A satisfactory degree of proficiency has still not been attained in the management control area, project implementation and resources associated therewith. Significant effort is being expended by JGS/J6, the ARVN Signal Department, CLC and C-E Division of DAO to correct the situation.

b. The CMA personnel attrition problem has not been solved and contractor assistance will terminate in January 1975. DAO personnel will provide assistance wherever possible in order to lessen the impact of the contractor withdrawal. Future courses of action must be developed to continue increasing the skills of CMA personnel to a point where they will be fully capable of accomplishing all tasks assigned them.

c. Management, technical proficiency, logistic support and transportation are some of the areas having impact on the failure of the SIMS to meet its performance objective.

d. Many Officers-in-Charge (OICs) and Non-Commissioned-Officers in-Charge (NCOICs) are not providing the direction and leadership to effectively implement preventive maintenance and quality assurance programs. Higher levels of management are aware of this problem and are taking correction action.

e. RVNAF Operation and Maintenance (O&M) posture has not significantly improved or deteriorated during this period. Site condition must be closely monitored to determine if JGS/J6 and Signal Department emphasis on improving site management has noticeable effects.

f. The RVNAF have not yet attained sufficient expertise, maturity and dedication to adequately and properly carry out operation of these sites. Contributing to RVNAF problems in this area are limited transportation capability for both men and equipment,

10-16

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

## EOTH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT MAJOR COMPONENTS REBUILD PROGRAM FY-75 - DECEMBER 1974




Figure 10-5

UNCLASSIFIED

10-17

UNCLASSIFIED

60TH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT MODULE REBUILD PROGRAM FY-75 - DECEMBER 1974

FY-74		MODULES	QTY SCHED	QTY COMP	% COMPLETE
SCHEDULED	% COMPLETE				
200	54	AN/PRC 74	200	29	14
395	36	AN/GRC 106	245	55	23
14320	47	AN/PRC 25	12000	2898	24
6740	43	AN/VRC 12	6010	1349	22
21655	46	TOTAL MODULES	18455	4331	23

Figure 10-5

UNCLASSIFIED

10-10

# CONFIDENTIAL

difficulties in obtaining required spare and repair parts, finding replacements for it is that have either been worn out, misplaced or broken and numerous morale problems exist in all branches of the RVNAF.

g. The RVNAF have become very accomplished in implementing reroute plans in the event of an undersea cable failure. As mentioned previously, successful implementation of the reroute plan depends on proper performance of the ICS as well as the concerned technical controllers. The reroute of the circuits on the 439L "C" link again demonstrated their abilities in this area.

h. While the RVNAF do not have any direct responsibility in repairing undersea cable faults, their ability to determine cable fault location is not adequate. Technical assistance had to be provided by CS Neptune personnel in accurately locating the Da Nang beach cut.

i. Level of maintenance of the no break power units is improving. However, HAZCONS have been of long duration since many no break power unit components have had to be ordered from off-shore.

j. Engineer support has improved greatly. RVNAF and contractor technicians have done an excellent job in responding to and correcting power/air conditioning problems.

k. Tactical C-E continues to be adversely affected by the reduced level of supply support necessitated by cutback in DAV funds. Numerous other problems ranging from ineffective or improper preventive maintenance to lack of TMDE continue to plague the tactical C-E effort.

l. The overall C-E logistic support capability has been impacted by funding constraints. The problem is compounded by reluctance of field and lower echelon units to evacuate equipment to higher echelons of maintenance due to long lag time before equipment is returned (if ever), technicians not following proper procedures in repairing and aligning equipment and lack of publications at all echelons of maintenance.

## 7. (C) SUMMARY.

a. (U) RVNAF C-E self-sufficiency continues to improve. Evidence of this is found in the increasing number of technical assistance visits being performed by ARVN personnel without the presence of US contractor technicians. With emphasis on OJT, RVNAF technicians are becoming increasingly proficient in the routine operational maintenance of SIMS facilities. Areas requiring strengthening are in the corrective maintenance of high-power tropospheric scatter systems and in both preventive and corrective maintenance of TSCs.

# CONFIDENTIAL

b. (U) CMA continues to be ineffective in providing operational management for the SIMS. The situation is expected to improve since the present RVNAF command structure is being reformed to provide CMA with the necessary authority to carry out its responsibilities as defined by its charter. CMA also suffers from other problems such as lack of experienced engineers, technicians and managers; a high personnel attrition rate; and a lack of control over SIMS project materials.

c. (U) RVNAF cable plants are deteriorating and are expected to continue to deteriorate unless funding constraints ease and material is made available to carry out outside plant improvement projects. Efforts are continuing to make the best use of available in-country assets and ARVN Signal Department has undertaken an ambitious program to identify and eliminate deficiencies.

d. (U) The RVNAF recognize that SIMS performance has been sub-standard and have launched a concerted effort to improve system performance. The initial phase of this project, designated as RVNAF Plan 1-76, has already been implemented. Equipment deficiencies identified in this phase are now being corrected by RVNAF maintenance teams. As part of this effort, a Defense Communications Agency-Thailand team provided assistance in establishing and coordinating communications system test procedures during FY2/75.

e. (C) Operational readiness of tactical installations is declining. Observations of C-4 Division field teams indicate that ineffective supply has adversely affected ability of units to keep equipment at peak operating capability.

f. (U) The RVNAF are not as self-sufficient in CMDE as previously reported. Problems in this area include inadequate supply support and reluctance of using units to turn in equipment for repair and/or calibration. A joint DAO and RVNAF working group to take action on the situation has been established and positive results are expected.

g. (U) Efforts to reduce consumption of BA-4386 continue. If successful, this will result in reduced support requirements for AN/PRC-77 and AN/PRC-25 radios.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 11

### REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) TRAINING

#### 1. (C) OFFSHORE TRAINING.

##### a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1975 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) remain the same as previously reported.

(2) The beginning ARVN FY 2/75 SATP contained 159 students who were scheduled to attend 285 courses at a cost of \$774,560.

(3) During FY 2/75, language disqualification necessitated cancelling five students and 11 spaces from the beginning program. In addition, Department of the Army announced the discontinuance of the two-week Methods of Instruction Course previously available at all US Army service schools after any initial training. This resulted in the cancellation of an additional 64 spaces from the beginning program.

(4) The current ARVN FY 75 SATP, as of the end of FY 2/75, contains 154 students who are scheduled to attend 210 courses at a cost of \$749,370. Special emphasis has been placed on 16 individuals who are scheduled to assume duties at the Ministry of National Defense upon completion of CONUS training. Ten personnel will attend the International Defense Management Course at Monterey, California, and six others will attend the Financial Management Course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

##### b. Vietnam Air Force (VNAF).

(1) The objectives of the VNAF FY 75 SATP remain the same as previously reported.

(2) The beginning VNAF FY 2/75 SATP contained 45 students who were scheduled to attend 107 courses at a cost of \$830,770. The carry-over cost from Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF) to Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) for previous years included 881 students and 1167 training courses at a cost of \$4,321,257 as estimated by Headquarters USAF.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(3) There were six program change notices, including adjusted 13 lines of training and reduced the program by \$71,200.

(4) The current VNAF FY 75 SATP, as of 1 December 1974, contains 42 students and 29 courses at a cost of \$539,977. The carry-over has been re-evaluated following SECDEF DSA instructions and is currently estimated at \$3,850,440. This carry-over figure is expected to decrease slightly because of a reduction in total living allowances paid to cadets as a result of the high pilot training elimination rate since 1 July 1971.

(5) The austere FY 75 program emphasizes technical training. Many of the instructor and management training lines that were deleted from the FY 75 SATP will be placed in the FY 76 and 77 programs if sufficient funds are available. The FY 75 DAV funding limitation has slowed the rate of progress of VNAF towards achieving its training goals. It has also changed VNAF's approach to the achievement of training goals in some specialties: i.e., VNAF now emphasizes in-country training where possible and practical.

## c. Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN).

(1) Objectives of the VNN FY 75 SATP remain the same as previously reported.

(2) The beginning VNN FY 2/75 SATP contained 167 students who were scheduled to attend 249 courses at a cost of \$598,542. During FY 2/75, new rates for living allowances of foreign students were computed by CINCPAC and added to the program, thus increasing the cost of VNN offshore training.

(3) There were 10 program change notices, including adjusted 26 lines of training and reduced the program by \$30,570.

(4) The current VNN FY 75 SATP, as of 1 December 1974, contains 160 students who are scheduled to attend 241 courses at a cost of \$638,220.

(5) Emphasis is being placed on resource management training and instructor upgrading.

## d. Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps (VNMC).

(1) Objectives of the VNMC FY 75 SATP remain the same as previously reported.

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The beginning VNMC FY 2/75 SATP contained 16 students who were scheduled to attend 31 courses at a cost of \$32,700.

(3) During FY 2/75, language disqualification necessitated cancelling two students and six spaces from the program, saving \$4,950.

(4) The current VNMC FY 75 SATP, as of 31 December 1974, has 14 students who are scheduled to attend 25 courses at a cost of \$39,700.

(5) Operational commitments still preclude releasing students for language training, but VNMC is putting special emphasis on amphibious training, particularly from the planning and operations standpoints.

## 2. (C) IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

### a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

#### (1) General.

(a) The number of recruits in training programs at the National Training Centers (NTC) and the Division Training Centers (DTC) decreased. This was due to an inadequate number of ARVN inductees during this quarter.

(b) Anti-Armor training continued to be updated. Operational readiness increased because of the arrival of replacement items from CONUS.

(c) Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) increased their training output during this period and the Mobile Training Teams (MTT) updated their Program of Instruction (POI). They are doing a very good job with their 100 teams throughout the four military regions (MR).

(d) RVNAF Service Schools. Central Training Command (CTC) continued to task service schools to plan, program, and implement curriculum changes to match monetary and instructor personnel reductions.

#### (2) National and Division Training Centers.

(a) Recruit Training. During this reporting period, 41,211 ARVN and RF recruits completed their basic training at the ten NTC,

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

a decrease of 4,846 from FY 1/75. The DTC trained 1,807 ARVN recruits, a drop of 616 from the last reporting period. In CY 74, NTC trained 134,612 ARVN/RF recruits and the DTC trained 27,717 ARVN recruits for a total of 162,329 personnel. The projected output of recruit trainees will short by 41,272 for the entire CY 74. Training in the ten week POI progressed ahead of schedule. There was a shortage of ammunition for M16 and M60 training.

(b) PF Training. PF trained 10,204 recruits. For CY 74, 41,954 PF recruits were programmed and 31,962 were trained, for a decrease of 9,992 personnel.

(c) Unit and Refresher Training. Unit training in the NTC is still lagging because of heavy operational commitments. Where possible, all unit commanders are conducting in-place training using excellent POI.

(d) Peoples Self Defense Forces (PSDF). The PSDF training moved forward with no major problems. Combat and support teams updated their in-place training and the attendance figures for combat leaders attending training at NTC were increased.

(e) Mobile Training Teams (MTT). The MTT updated their POI and increased the deployment of over 100 teams in the four MRs. These teams rendered in-place training to RF and PF. To further this effort, province headquarters in the MRs formed additional five-man MTTs, using approved POI, to assist in-place training.

(3) RVNAF Service School. RVNAF schools ended the year with 15,743 graduates during FY 2/75. By the end of 2/75, 42,250 officers, enlisted men and other personnel had received some type of training in one of the professional, combat arms, technical, or administrative schools. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff's CTC programmed training for 54,180 personnel during CY 74. Austerity restrictions imposed during CY 74 reduced school instructor personnel levels to an adjusted 70% of TOE strength levels. Basic classroom supplies were reduced to 60% of the CY 73 levels. Despite these teaching obstacles, the service schools were still able to graduate 70% of the programmed input of students forecast for training in CY 74.

(a) Professional. During FY 2/75, 140 RVNAF officers of company and field grades were selected by the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense (MOND) to attend a Resource Management course conducted by personnel from the Resource Management Education Center,

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

Monterey, California. The course was given at RVNAF Language School (RVNAFLS). Numerous military planning lectures, discussions, and game plans were used to teach management principles to the class of 45 unit commanders and 95 staff officers during the seven-week program. An assessment of the value of the course cannot be made at this time. RVNAF professional schools averaged 81% of the yearly programmed student input. Professional schools usually have two inputs a year, making a quarterly assessment less than accurate. During the quarter, the VN Military Academy graduated its full complement of 222 officers.

(b) Combat Arms. The Infantry School for Reserve Officers obtained the highest percentage of combat arms graduates for the quarter. The graduated output was 105% of the CY 74 adjusted program input. Armor trailed with 67% student output for the year; 655 graduated in FY 2/75. Artillery School graduates totaled 70% of the number programmed for CY 74. In CY 2/75, 701 officers and enlisted men graduated.

(c) Technical Schools. FY 2/75 student input and output was without a definite trend. In August 1974, TMS recommended that the Dog Training School be closed. In November 1974, the school was closed.

(d) Administrative Schools. A trend was discernible in the administrative schools to enter for clerical or accounting instruction, those officers and enlisted men who previously were not adaptable to technical training. Many of the students had years of military service. The Adjutant General School has been tasked to train twice as many clerical personnel as in previous years. During FY 2/75, 1,200 graduated.

(4) Anti-Armor. Training continued in units and TC. Instructor courses were updated and excellent POI were issued. During this reporting period, a large number of replacement items arrived from CONUS for the Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire Guided (TOW) missile system. Operational readiness for the TOW is now considered to be at 95%.

(5) Air Defense (AD). No marked improvements occurred in the four AD battalions since the last reporting period.

(6) Assessment. The major apparent training problem is again the shortage of recruit and refresher training ammunition. It is

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

virtually impossible to train a new recruit in the use of his basic weapon with the present allocation of ammunition. On the plus side, however, the MTT has had a marked effect on upgrading the RF/PF in the provinces.

## b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

(1) VNAF overall training effort, formal, semiformal, and on-the-job training (OJT) is in a state of flux. This situation had three causes:

(a) Lack of direction from the JCS on a final active aircraft inventory.

(b) Authorized manning ratio to aircraft inventory.

(c) Reduction of contractor training and production assistance.

(2) In order to know the current situation countrywide, DAO personnel visited seven of the nine air bases, Air Training Command (ATC), and Air Technical Logistics Command (ATLC) during December, 1974. The only bases not visited were Phu Cat and Phan Rang. The following comments are based on evidence gathered during these on-site inspections.

(3) VNAF has the capability, in-country, to train in nearly all Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) to any level they desire, using their standards.

(a) The JCS authorized strength for VNAF, as of 30 November 1974, was 64,905. Actual strength was 62,679, 96.6% of authorized. Manpower training adjustments to a final reduced aircraft inventory are still under consideration by JCS and DAO. Continued judicious restraint on the part of VNAF Training Planning and close monitoring by DAO should result in a higher skill level distribution when the anticipated manpower/inventory adjustment occurs.

(b) The inherent lead time required to recruit and train personnel to use equipment properly is not a compressible item. An individual carried as 3-level for statistical purposes may actually be technically qualified at the 5-level.

(c) Under the old VNAF upgrade system, an airman may not have completed the necessary political/military management training and,

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

therefore, was not certified to the next higher level. This was changed, at least through the 5-level. An individual can now be upgraded to the 5-level with 420 hours of certified formal training.

(d) Individuals still must wait for the official order awarding the higher skill level in their AFSC, but the lag time in administrative procedures, which used to run up to six months, shows signs of improvement.

(e) Without final direction from JGS, VNAF cannot determine its training objectives for CY 75. In-house upgrade to the 7- and 9-level is positive and ongoing, but recruiting dropped to a minimum.

(4) VNAF can neither plan nor project its requirements until pilot and aircraft manning and equipment levels are established. Every indication is that the current inventory authorization will be reduced. VNAF has 104% pilot manning versus authorized. The Instructor Pilots (IP) are still available. The first eight T-37 IP completed transition to the A-37 but flew no students. The first 26 F-5F transition pilots completed training.

(a) There is no in-country Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), fixed wing or helicopter (UHT) conducted at present. The CONUS eliminees, who did not fail but were not allowed to complete phase training, returned and are undergoing Basic Military Training, Phase II at ARVN Officer Candidate School, Long Thanh. There are 318 CONUS returnees along with 232 in-country cadets in the ARVN training. CONUS failures/washouts are transferred directly into ARVN and out of VNAF.

(b) To support a current 1312 fixed and rotary wing aircraft inventory, VNAF is authorized 2725 pilots for line and squadron staff and 338 for staff positions at wing, division, and headquarters levels, a total of 3063. The operational pilot manning, as of 30 November 1974, was 3179. The final CONUS training figures will not be available until the last class finishes in March 1975. The above figures do not include 205 pilots on duty not in flying status, 536 pilots in the pipeline, and 28 in refresher training. Pipeline pilots are, by VNAF standards, nonoperationally qualified graduates of in-country and CONUS schools.

(c) Perhaps the most critical shortfall in VNAF flying training is the lack of operational flying hours set aside for initial,

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

recurrent, and refresher instrument flight training. One highly placed, well informed, and experienced VNAF officer cites this shortage of instrument and night flying as the greatest single immediate hazard to the long term viability of VNAF. He rated this training deficiency ahead of the SA-7 missile and anti-aircraft artillery threat.

(d) VNAF has two P3A low speed flight simulators at Tan Son Nhut. They are currently operational and in use by elements of the 5th Air Division. ATC has three jet simulators, one T-37 T-4 at Phan Rang, and two M60 Links at Nha Trang. One additional reciprocating M60 is located at Nha Trang. All trainers are presently inoperative for lack of replacement parts. Some level altitude patterns are being flown in two of the M60's, but the benefit is questionable.

(5) Operational flight simulators are a very real solution to bridge the gap created by unreliable to marginal nav aids and inadequate radar flight following and approach facilities, compounded by reduced training hours and fuel allocation.

(6) The gap created by elimination of virtually all contractor training and halving of production support personnel on 4 October 1974 has been more than filled by VNAF personnel. One measure is the daily operational readiness (OR) rate. After an initial drop of 5% the VNAF has recouped that and even improved on the rate. Operational activity has diminished, allowing more time for maintenance. This is still a noteworthy accomplishment and shows what VNAF can do when the need arises. Contractor training will be discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

(a) On 28 December 1974, ATC graduated 31, 7-level personnel in two AFSCs. There are 175 more 7-level students in 11 AFSCs currently in training and programmed to graduate in CY 1/75. ATC plans to conduct 7-level training in 30 AFSCs to produce 653 more graduates by the end of CY 1/76. This is an ambitious program, but it points out the direction VNAF is taking to fill the gaps created by the departing contractor personnel.

(b) OJT in the various shops is on-going throughout VNAF. For example, the Officer In Charge (OIC) at the jet engine intermediate maintenance shop, 4th Air Division, Binh Thuy, states that the 5-level graduates they are getting from ATC are long on theory and short on mechanical skills gained in actual experience. He also

# CONFIDENTIAL

~~AD-A094 491~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC F/6 15/7  
DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RYNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 2ND QUARTER--ETC(U)  
FEB 75 M D SMITH, M LAMONT, W E LEGRO

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

3 of 3  
AC  
AC 24.191

END  
DATE  
F41 MED  
3-8  
DTIC

# CONFIDENTIAL

claims to have enough qualified senior NCOs to conduct OJT and to continue his program with minimum contractor support.

(c) VNAF is taking some past DAO recommendations and is no longer assigning initial formal school 5-level upgrade personnel directly to the remote hardship two-year tour bases. These are Pleiku, Phu Cat and Phan Rang. Instead, they are drawing from 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th ADs to fill the spaces at the 2d and 6th, rather than conduct extensive OJT. This is realistic and should prove beneficial. There is some OJT being conducted at the hardship bases, but it is minimal by comparison with that at other installations.

(7) Assessment. VNAF can survive with continued support in some of the highly technical areas until they are able to train their personnel in sufficient numbers to fill all the gaps created by the reduction of contractor support. The major questions to be answered are the numbers of personnel to be trained on given equipment, and materiel to provide production potential for the shops and facilities where the OJT will be conducted. Formal classroom training capability is adequate at all locations with substantial upgrade of capacity and substance available at ATC. Future pilot training potential must be maintained. The trained IP are available now, and some plan of selective retention must be implemented soon or a significant amount of time, money and training potential, already spent, will be lost.

## c. Vietnamese Navy (VNN).

(1) Progress continued in training professional naval personnel. Training emphasis was broadened to include underway training, unit training, and civilian apprenticeship programs. The latter are conducted at VNN shipyards and at maintenance and overhaul facilities. Primary emphasis was placed on the training of instructors for in-country activities and fleet units.

(a) The VNN Damage Control (DC) course at Cam Ranh Bay continued full operation with a 22-week program. The curriculum in both the Class A and intermediate courses contains 98 hours of firefighting. A total of 177 students graduated during CY 74. Following school completion and assignment to fleet units, an additional 45 hours of training per man, per month, are programmed. The watertight integrity trainer of the course at the Vietnamese Navy Shipyard (VNNSY), Saigon, was completed ahead of schedule.



# CONFIDENTIAL

Two classes were graduated in this quarter. Plans and funds for the "Buttercup" synthetic floating DC trainer were approved and allocated. Construction will begin as soon as an appropriate site in the Saigon area is selected. On the basis of the number of graduates of the schools at CRB and VNNSY in the past two years, plus the continued output of instructor personnel from the VNNSY and Saigon Training Center Class B, DC course, the VNN should achieve training self-sufficiency in these areas in CY 75. However, VNN and DAO inspection tours of ships continue to identify damage control problems, similar, but of a reduced frequency, to those noted in FY 1/75. These are:

- 1 Shipboard DC equipment inadequate or inoperative.
- 2 A high percentage of cancellations of shipboard training drills.
- 3 DC officers and men lacking in actual DC experience.

(b) An Underway Training Team from the VNN Fleet Training Group (FTG), consisting of three officers and 11 enlisted men received one month of OJT at the USN FTG, San Diego. The OJT at San Diego is designed to upgrade the proficiency of the VNN FTG in its continuing effort to address fleet readiness shortfalls and to improve the general readiness posture of VNN's major combatants.

(c) The training of disbursing clerks and commissarymen at Cat Lai, and the training of storekeepers there and at the Saigon Training Center, continues to improve. Graduate output is still increasing, and the assignment of graduates of the Saigon TC Supply Officer's School as instructors at Cat Lai is improving the quality of the instruction received. Cat Lai is remotely located, and local family housing is squalid by any standard. There are a number of other conditions which are seriously detrimental to both morale and the learning process. The remodeling and repair of classroom buildings was completed, with only a few minor problems yet to be overcome. A drilling program is underway to provide wells for a reliable and local potable water supply.

(d) The training of middle management personnel in Junior Officer Staff School continued at Saigon Training Center, with classes of 100 to 130 officers graduating at 16-week intervals. Supply Officers School and a Supply Officer Refresher Course (two weeks) are also contributing toward the improvement of officer qualifications.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(e) Difficulties with the Senior Officers Staff School continued due to low training facility availability and an inability to secure the release of qualified lieutenant commanders and senior lieutenants from other assigned duties. The heavy combat commitment was partially responsible for the latter.

(2) During FY 2/75, 200 officers, 1074 NCO/EM, and 167 recruits graduated from in-country service schools and training centers. The decrease in recruit training is a seasonal reflection following the surge of recent high school graduate enlistees in FY 1/75. Officer professional training was behind schedule with 651 graduates out of 1056 programmed for CY 74 (61.7%). Refresher training was at 378 of 849 programmed for CY 74 (44.5%). EM training was at 62.8% of the CY projection, and NCO training at 49.2%. Recruit basic training was at 71.8% for CY 74.

(3) Assessment. The training capability of the Vietnamese Navy continued to improve. Several critical personnel changes were made. There was a continuing increase in the assignment of CONUS-trained personnel into instructional billets at training centers, the Naval Academy, and in fleet units and installations. Unit training evaluation was improved. VNN N7 coordinated an individual proficiency testing program with the Inspection Bloc visitation schedule. Training Management Section personnel were invited to accompany the inspection teams. Fund reduction created an untenable situation in River Force units. The heavy combat commitment reduced the time available for unit training exercises, and the fuel shortage precluded the use of the fleet units for anything but combat operations. There are no funds allocated for training aids and materials or for office supplies for training purposes.

## d. Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMCM).

(1) There were only minor changes in the VNMCM training program in FY 2/75. Primary emphasis was placed upon recruit training, with officer and NCO refresher training cancelled as a result of operational commitments. Recruit basic training produced 545 graduates. A total of 403 officers and enlisted men completed RVNAF schools, principally with ARVN Rangers.

(2) Marine training continues to be amphibious assault oriented. The Combat Training Tank at Song Than was completed, and after major construction problems are solved, will be in operation. The main purpose of the trainer is to train Marines in water confidence and

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

survival techniques. The Dry-Net Trainer for disembarking from transports into LCVPs was also in use. Planning in amphibious operations continued, but no unit amphibious training or operations were conducted during FY 2/75. Jungle warfare, jungle survival, and independent small unit operations training with ARVN Ranger training units is being given at Duc My.

(3) The VNMC Training Center exceeded its CY 74 programmed commitments. The anticipated training cut back failed to materialize because of two factors. The first was the need to train recruits for combat casualty, as well as normal attrition loss, replacement. The second factor was the additional VNMC infantry brigade being formed. The first two battalions will be activated effective 1 January 1975, and the third battalion effective 1 April 1975. Personnel for the expansion will come partially from four ARVN Railway Security Battalions which are being deactivated, but final augmentation will come from recruit basic training program output. No instructor cadre augmentation at the Song Than Base Camp is planned. Refresher training for the transfer personnel, as well as recruit basic training, will be accomplished for the existing staff. The quarterly training results for CY 74 are as follows:

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>CY74</u> <u>PROG</u>	<u>CY1/74</u> <u>GRAD</u>	<u>CY2/74</u> <u>GRAD</u>	<u>CY3/74</u> <u>GRAD</u>	<u>CY4/74</u> <u>GRAD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>%</u>
Officer Refresher	200	138	106	0	0	122
NCO Refresher	100	30	0	20	0	50
Team, Leader, Enl	1800	537	420	0	0	53
Squad Leader	200	95	0	0	0	48
Recruit Training	4000	794	1337	1516	545	104.8

(4) Assessment. The training capability of the Vietnamese Marine Corps continued at the high degree of effectiveness that characterized it in the past. Recruit training emphasizes the basics of discipline, loyalty, and familiarization with infantry weapons. Training on position in MR 1 concentrates on the particular skills needed in the current defensive situation.

### 3. (U) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP).

#### a. Intensive ELTP (full time).

(1) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS). This school, designated by the CTC as the primary English language

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

training center for all three services, is now operating at less than 20% of its rated capacity. The student load decreased from 375 to 271 by the end of December. The relatively high instructor level of 151 military and nine civilians resulted in a lower and more optimum student/instructor ratio. Of 207 SATP designated candidates who took the official English comprehension level test, 78% achieved the average qualifying score of 70 for direct entry into CONUS training.

(2) Vietnam Air Force English Language School (VNAFELS), Nha Trang. This school, maintained by the VNAF, also conducts an intensive ELTP geared to qualifying SATP candidates for offshore training. The student load has increased from 41 to 83. With the combined resources of RVNAFLS in Saigon and VNAF-ELS in Nha Trang, the RVNAF has more than amply demonstrated its capability to qualify SATP candidates to the required language proficiency levels for direct entry into U.S. courses. In FY 75, all RVNAF students will proceed directly to their first training course in CONUS with no intermediate language training, a capability that was not projected to occur until FY 79.

b. Nonintensive ELTP (part-time).

(1) The following units of the RVNAF conduct SATP supported ELTPs: Vietnamese National Military Academy and Political Warfare College in Dalat, Vietnamese National Naval Academy in Nha Trang, the junior military academies in Vung Tau and Pleiku, and the naval training centers in Cam Ranh and Saigon.

(2) Technical assistance visits were made by members of the DLI Language Training Detachment to the Junior Military Academy (JMA) in Vung Tau, the Highland Junior Military Academy (HJMA) in Pleiku, and the NTC in Saigon. At the JMA, the staff was advised to requisition more advanced American Language Course materials as supplementary training aids to be used in conjunction with the texts prescribed by the Ministry of Education. At the HJMA, the staff was advised to requisition elementary materials, especially taped lessons, in order to upgrade the oral/aural aspect of their ELTP.

(3) The continuation of nonintensive training in formal English combined with the availability of contractor translated bilingual training and maintenance manuals provided the incentive for much broader English language comprehension. Technical jargon peculiar to certain equipment has no comparable equal in Vietnamese. RVNAF to date has more than met the challenge.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## c. Accomplishments.

(1) A letter was sent to the Chief of Staff, CTC, requesting his assistance in furnishing the Junior Military Academies with supplementary training materials. The use of these materials will considerably improve the effectiveness of the ELTPs at these schools.

(2) CTC was advised that, in view of the limited funds projected for the SATP in current and future years, TMS would adhere to a policy of maximum utilization of in-country training resources and minimum essential offshore training. Furthermore, no provisions were made in the FY 76 RVNAF SATP for any CONUS English language training in order to qualify students for direct entry into technical courses. CTC responded by requesting RVNAFLS to initiate courses in specialized technical terminology.

## 4. (U) CONTRACT TRAINING.

a. As of 1 July 1974 all formal training requirements were deleted from statements of work of all contractors supporting the RVNAF. Formal training is defined as scheduled, classroom training, where accurate attendance and progress records are maintained and reported to DAO.

b. All training being conducted by contractor personnel is OJT. It is monitored for DAO by three divisions, Communications and Electronics, Army Division, and Air Force Division. They are as follows:

(1) Contract Training monitored by Communications and Electronics Division.

(a) During FY 2/75, Eastern Construction Co., International (ECCOI) instructors provided formal and practical training at the ARVN 60th Signal Base Depot and five medium maintenance centers designed to increase proficiency of ARVN maintenance personnel and to assist RVNAF in achieving self-sufficiency at the general support and depot maintenance levels.

(b) ECCOI instructors have completed training of 40 students and are continuing formal and practical training of an additional 305 students in fifth echelon rebuilding of various signal equipment. ECCOI has also provided assistance and informal over-the-shoulder OJT to more than 160 repairmen at depot and field locations.

(c) ECCOI instructors completed formal classroom and practical job training in the repair and maintenance course for Radio

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Receiver R-390/URR and Sound Recorder-Reproducer Set, AN/TNH-4 (U). Thirteen ARVN students from J-7 graduated. In addition, ECCOI provided technical assistance to J-7 on the supply status of repair parts requisitions for J-7 equipment.

(d) Daily technical OJT for ARVN personnel at the Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) continued during this quarter. The over-the-shoulder OJT was provided by Federal Electric Corp (FEC) personnel on an "as required" basis. Site personnel actively perform the necessary repair work and, with FEC assistance, get beneficial training to support the Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS) at 3d, 4th, and 5th echelon levels. Although the ARVN personnel are not yet proficient in repair of the ten thousand-watt troposcatter radio systems in MRs 1 and 2, they achieved self-sufficiency in some areas as evidenced by the continuing increase of ARVN-only teams being dispatched to provide support for SIMS in MRs 3 and 4. Training was accomplished at the AMSF-V and on the SIMS sites in a number of technical areas.

(e) During this quarter a Bunker-Ramo World Wide Service Corp instructor provided OJT to personnel at the Vung Tau Cablehead (CHD). Three ARVN students successfully completed the training, and an additional five students observed. Upon completion of this course, the instructor proceeded to Da Nang CHD, where training for another three students continued. The RVNAF students receive practical training in the following areas:

- Operation and maintenance of a no-break power system (including functional analysis of type SYM-001, electric power plant, 24 volt and 48 volt rectifier, and power boards).
- Practical application utilizing schematic diagrams of a constant current rectifier.
- Operation and maintenance of a TD 1900.2 terminal bay.
- Operation and maintenance of a AN/FCC-17 class multiplex set.
- Practical application in operation and maintenance of remote feeding equipment TF 1900.2 terminal by, AN/FCC-17 multiplex, loop gain test bay and order wire.
- Operations and functional assistance is provided to Communications Management Agency (CMA) by Page Communications Engineers

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(PCE) on a contract which terminates 16 January 1975. The training activities of PCE during this reporting period included preparation of lesson plans and student information guides, conducting classroom and OJT lectures and conferences, and testing the RVNAF students. PCE training at CMA included:

1 Continuation of practical training in operation and maintenance of data processing equipment, including the IBM 407 accounting machine and peripheral equipment, the 548 Interpreter, 514 reproducer, and 087 collator.

2 Continuation of a course in SIMS fixed plant applications engineering for 13 RVNAF signal officers. The dial telephone exchange portion of the inside plant training was completed. Approximately 70% of the transmission engineering training has been completed, including 16 subjects and six tests. The classroom portion of the tandem switching center training covered 22 lessons and 22 tests and is 30% complete. Upon completion of this training, the CMA personnel will have the theoretical background and educational knowledge required to perform their job, but, since the contract is to expire in January 1975, they will not have the advantage of US contractor support for practical applications.

(f) CMA personnel have attained a high degree of self-sufficiency in some areas and limited self-sufficiency in others. They are not considered able to assume full responsibility for proper operation and maintenance of the SIMS unless they receive continued OJT and technical assistance. With austere funding causing contractor drawdowns, the required support must be provided by DAO C-E Division personnel.

(g) With the constant loss of personnel through normal attrition, reassignment or in-country training CMA has been and will continue to be severely affected. Unless CMA is able to exert positive control over personnel that have been trained, an acceptable level of self-sufficiency cannot be attained. The situation has reached the critical stage. Contractor assistance will terminate next month. With the lack of sufficient, fully qualified personnel, the continued operation and maintenance of the SIMS at a level which provides reliable telecommunications is questionable.

(2) Contract Training Monitored by Army Division.

(a) Facilities Engineering.

1 One formal training class in transformer maintenance was started during the quarter. This class is still in session. Five

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

normal training classes were completed during the period. The classes, duration of course, location of each class, number of students attending, and number of students graduating were as follows:

<u>COURSE TITLE</u>	<u>LENGTH OF COURSE (WKS)</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO STU ATTENDING</u>	<u>NO STU GRADUATING</u>
High Voltage Switch- gear Repairman	16	Da Nang	6	3 (Note 1)
Air-Conditioner Compressor Repair- man	12	Da Nang	16	15 (Note 2)
Transformer Main- tenance	12	Da Nang	13	10 (Note 3)
Chiller Plant Maintenance	12	Long Binh	10	9 (Note 4)
Calibration Tech- nician	8	Saigon	7	7

NOTE 1: One student dropped for educational limitations. Two students received Certificates of Attendance only.

NOTE 2: One student received Certificate of Attendance only.

NOTE 3: One student dropped for physical limitations. Two students received Certificates of Attendance only.

NOTE 4: One student dropped--absent without leave.

2 Monitoring and evaluation of RVNAF graduates of formal training classes continued during this period, utilizing revised evaluation procedures designed to measure the proficiency of trainees in specific skills. Contractor training personnel continued preparation, translation, and distribution of bilingual job training standard and OJT evaluation records for use in evaluating RVNAF trainees. During the period, 298 RVNAF trainees were evaluated and assigned a proficiency skill level.

3 Dedicated OJT continued at the large generator and air conditioner support facilities within the medium maintenance centers

11-17

# CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

and at the Cam Ranh Main, Cam Ranh Transmitter, and Newport High Voltage power plants. During the quarter, emphasis was placed on identifying those areas in which trainees require increased technical proficiency.

## (b) Transportation.

1 Graduates of courses conducted by Alaska Barge & Transport Co., Inc. (AB&T) continued to conduct training programs for other ARVN personnel in various facets of transportation management. These training programs are being monitored and evaluated by AB&T.

2 Fifteen officer and NCO graduates of the MILSTAMP training program were assigned to the AB&T offices located at the ports of Danang, Cam Ranh and Newport. These personnel have been assimilated into the AB&T organization and are performing the same duties as other contractor employees. This training will provide the graduates valuable practical experience in the area of MILSTAMP document procedures and port operations.

## (c) Maintenance.

1 During the quarter, the Dynalelectron Corporation continued to provide training for ARVN engineer personnel in the maintenance and repair of Military Construction Authority Lines of Communication (LOC) equipment. Training in first, second, and third echelon maintenance is now 80% complete, and training in fourth echelon maintenance was initiated at Long Binh. Complete self-sufficiency in the maintenance of LOC equipment is expected to be attained prior to July 1975.

2 DAC personnel conducted seminars on maintenance management for 45 ARVN officers during the quarter. Examples and training aids used for the sessions were turned over to the Central Logistics Command for a continuing effort in this direction. Also, contractor personnel provided OJT to ARVN personnel throughout the five Area Logistic Commands. The training consisted primarily of maintenance and repair of material handling equipment, construction equipment, generator sets, TOW missile systems, and combat and tactical vehicles. Training was also provided on engineer-type equipment at depot rebuild level.

## (d) Training.

1 The Army Supply Center continues to hold OJT and in-depth classroom training for all of its divisions/sections designed to

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

promote self-sufficiency in the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System.

2 The Eastern Construction Company Incorporated, under contract DAJB04-74-C-0018, furnished formal classroom and OJT at the 1st and 2d ARVN Associated Depot (AAD). Formal training classes were started in September 1974 at the 2d AAD. Following is a resume of training graduates for October through December 1974:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>1ST AAD</u>	<u>2D AAD</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Quality Assurance	5		5
Care & Preservation		8*	3*
MHE Operator		41*	41*
MHE Maintenance	5		5
Storage Operations	26	9 2*	35 2*
Document Control	27	9 11*	36 11*
Editing & Parts Identification	9		9
Inventory & Location Survey	9		9
Totals	81	18 62*	99 62*

3 The following courses are in progress:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>1ST AAD</u>	<u>2d AAD</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Quality Assurance	5	16	21
MHE Operator	10		10
MHE Maintenance		10	10
Editing & Parts Identification		13	13
Inventory & Location Survey		16	16
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning		5*	6*
Totals	15	55 6*	70 6*

(3) Contract Training Monitored by Air Force Division.

(a) In the past VNAF was the most substantial recipient of US-invited contractor support.

(b) Officially all contractor formal training ended 30 June 1974, and all specialized hands-on OJT ended 4 October 1974. There is no positive formal training line in any contract presently in

\* OJT.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

support of VNAF.

(c) There exists, however, a line definition allowing the administrative contracting officer or government representative to approve requests for assistance in training areas within VNAF on an "as needed" basis. This concept has proven very effective where it has been utilized by VNAF. One such case is the quality assurance 7-level inspector course being conducted at the Air Technical Logistics Center by Lear Siegler, Inc.

(d) The contractor production personnel represent, in addition to LSI, Page Communications Engineers, Pacific Architects and Engineers, Northrop Worldwide Air Services, Inc., and Parsons Rotor Blades of Calif.

(e) Training is being conducted. It is mostly informal, no reports are required, and no records are kept, with the exception of Parsons and Northrop. The rotor blade repair facility at ATLC, Bien Hoa, is operating at maximum production potential with nine U.S. personnel. Once the inspector personnel are signed off in FY 4/75 the unit should be self-sufficient to the same degree as the jet engine intermediate maintenance shop, helicopter power-train/transmission facility, and communications-electronics repair shop.

(f) The key word is supply. PA&E has more than 400 local National (LN) employees country-wide under two Americans. The lack of cooperation on the part of M&S Wing and Group Commanders with the PA&E LN site managers is evidenced by the high turnover and attrition rate among these same LN managers. (Four at Phan Rang AB since October.)

(g) VNAF accepted UNIVAC's offer to train 30 teletypewriter technicians at the computer center, ATLC. VNAF still plans to install Equipment Order Quantity (EOQ) remote units at the nine air bases. All training in EOQ procedures was suspended 1 July 1974.

(h) When the remotes are installed there will be no qualified VNAF operators and minimal maintenance personnel at each location, except for the PA&E LN personnel. This has been pointed out to VNAF higher authority on several occasions. To provide equipment without operators or maintenance support, available, trained, and in place, would seem to be folly of the highest order.

(i) PA&E personnel state it will take at least two months to complete training on the system, if the original 167 partially

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

trained VNAF supply personnel are still available. New personnel will require at least four months training. The PA&E LN instructor personnel are still available. VNAF has indicated no plans to start up the operator training program at the present time.

(4) Contract Training Monitored by Navy Division. There was no contract training monitored by Navy Division in FY 2/75.

(5) Communications-Electronics (C-E) Training.

(a) Based on recommendations of DAO Training management personnel, the Defense Attache requested the RVNAF Joint General Staff to direct a survey of all C-E schools for the purpose of identifying training common to Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese Air Force and the Vietnamese Navy. The survey, which began in December 1974, should result in course consolidation at the RVNAF Signal School, Vung Tau.

(b) The validity of the C-E school consolidation is as follows:


	<u>CY 74 PROG</u>	<u>CY 74 GRAD</u>
ARVN	3511	3347 (95.3%)
VNN	1450	926 (63.8%)
VNAF	430	360 (83.7%)

The ARVN Signal School, Vung Tau, is best able to fulfill programmed requirements and achieve maximum effective use of personnel and equipment.

(Figures 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4 and 11-5)

# CONFIDENTIAL

LONG BINH:  
LOG MGT SCHOOL  
C&GSC



11-23

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

## VNN AND VNMC TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-2

11-25

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## VNAF

### TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-3

11-27

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## ARVN TRAINING CENTERS




Figure 11-4

11-29

# UNCLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

## RECRUIT TRAINING OUTPUT AT NTC's AND DTC's

(1 Jan thru 31 Dec 74)

UNIT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Dong Da NTC	319	217	415	408	375	338	368	496	775	478	100	425	4714
Lam Son	1627	1611	372	1089	1070	1159	1199	594	1304	966	946	808	12745
Hoa Cam	92	295	1657	373	1755	2085	788	545	457	1552	1615	1195	12409
Phu Cat	660	744	656	103	1055	922	516	1094	820	904	836	441	8751
Pleiku	817	343	325	485	465	551	350	815	679	446	403	347	6026
Duc My	0	183	400	800	600	1901	1800	1600	1200	1200	1267	1000	11951
Quang Trung	0	0	1448	2453	3280	3969	3590	3391	2845	4822	4488	2626	32912
Van Kiep	0	0	390	174	232	627	142	675	453	479	968	294	4434
Chi Lang	0	0	0	1665	2302	3823	3351	3703	6881	2305	4501	3097	31628
Cao Lanh	0	0	0	567	1424	920	453	1527	1449	727	1772	203	9042
Total	3515	3393	5663	8117	12558	16295	12557	14440	16863	13879	16896	10436	134612
1st DTC	236	329	125	287	317	303	402	183	160	252	153	141	2888
2nd	187	165	144	176	200	155	0	160	351	189	192	0	1919
3rd	0	0	0	130	513	0	91	0	185	247	125	73	1364
22nd	215	142	119	134	346	162	175	157	169	257	167	163	2206
23rd	131	121	0	82	347	100	102	234	110	96	0	97	1420
5th	182	197	152	177	191	385	326	151	153	154	332	171	2573
18th	0	0	0	0	238	680	359	711	370	461	444	759	4024
25th	0	0	0	0	0	376	184	401	203	349	171	336	2020
7th	112	200	0	176	300	298	189	267	179	319	331	0	2367
9th	150	92	150	120	280	517	405	514	283	556	829	421	4317
21st	118	110	121	200	195	206	93	218	284	532	285	205	2619
Total	1331	1356	811	1482	1927	3182	2323	3051	2447	3412	3029	2366	27717
Grand Total	4846	4749	6474	9599	15485	19477	14880	17491	19310	17291	19925	12802	162329

Note. Strengths for NTCs Denotes Regular and Regional Forces  
Strengths for DTC Denotes Regular Forces

Figure 11-5

11-31

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 12

### RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Chapter 12 contains topics concerning all services to include:

- a. Lines of Communication (LOC).
- b. Military Construction (MILCON).
- c. RVNAF Retirement Plan CY 74.
- d. RVNAF Morale.
- e. RVNAF Medical Evacuation.
- f. Chieu Hoi Program.
- g. Terrorism.
- h. Refugee Program.

2. (U) LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

a. Railways:

(1) During the 2nd Quarter FY 75, only 6,171 metric tons of RVNAF-sponsored cargo were transported by rail due to discontinuance of the railway operations in the Danang-Hue area caused by enemy interdictions and minings of the railroad. Tonnage moved by rail this quarter was 5,649 metric tons less than that of the 1st quarter.

(2) Cargo hauled was primarily between Newport-Go Vap, Saigon-Long Binh-PDO, Saigon Island, and a limited amount between Qui Nhon Phu Cat.

(3) No RVNAF passenger or RVNAF-sponsored passenger movements were reported during the 2nd Quarter FY 75.

(4) During the 2nd Quarter FY 75, the following enemy actions took place causing disruption of traffic flow by rail in the Danang and Hue area:

(a) October - One mining of a train within Danang City.

(b) November - Two minings of railway bridges, two minings of trackage and two mortar shellings of repair sites. Damage as a result of the above was one eight meter steel bridge destroyed, one

# CONFIDENTIAL

heavily damaged, 22 railings, 20 wood ties, and 10 steel ties with fastenings damaged.

(c) December - One mining of a 120-meter steel railway bridge near Qui Nhon which resulted in two rails and 40 wood ties damaged.

## b. Highways:

(1) During the 2nd Quarter FY 75, RVNAF moved 586,958 metric tons of cargo by military equipment and 21,064 metric tons by commercial contract vehicles.

(2) RVNAF sponsored passenger movements by military equipment during the 2nd Quarter FY 75 amounted to 716,294 with 212 by commercial contract vehicles. These passengers were troops, dependents and employees of RVNAF.

## c. Waterways:

(1) During the 2nd Quarter FY 75, 13,665 metric tons of RVNAF cargo moved by VNN brown-water craft and 8,351 metric tons by commercial hire watercraft.

(2) Passenger movement by RVNAF brown-water craft amounted to 6,671. No passenger movements were made by commercial hire watercraft during the 2nd Quarter FY 75.

d. Ocean vessels (LSTs and LSMs) transported 15,513 metric tons of RVNAF cargo during the 2nd Quarter FY 75. No passengers were transported.

## e. Airways:

(1) VNAF aircraft transported 3,537 metric tons of RVNAF cargo and 82,520 passengers during the 2nd Quarter FY 75.

(2) Air Vietnam (commercial air) transported 1,182 RVNAF passengers during the 2nd Quarter FY 75.

f. The above data represent inter and intra-Area Logistics Command (ALC) movements for the 2nd Quarter FY 75.

## 3. (U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

a. The Military Construction Program in Vietnam was drastically reduced because of funding restraints in the Defense Assistance for Vietnam (DAV). The construction programmed for Vietnam was originally \$4.0 million; however, higher priority

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

projects have reduced this program to \$2.6 million.

b. Most of the minor construction projects under contract since 1 July 1974 are in the final stages of being completed by the local Vietnamese contractors. The three major construction projects (industrial pier, 450-bed hospital and arsenal upgrade-phase II) are scheduled to be completed by March 1976. The distribution of active construction contracts is:

	<u>No</u>	<u>* \$ Value</u>
Utilities, Road etc	23	1,715
Operations/Training	28	4,640
Dependent Shelters	1	55
Air Field	3	345
Port	1	894

\* Thousands of Dollars

c. The Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon, with the concurrence of the construction agent (Director of Construction), forwarded a letter to CINCPAC requesting the approval and concurrence of the "transfer of DAV/MAP funds to GVN for professional engineering services and construction contract execution." This proposal was approved by CINCPAC and forwarded for SECDEF concurrence. In summary, the proposal requested:

(1) Authority for the Defense Attache, Saigon, to transfer DAV/MAP funds to the Government of Vietnam for contract administration by the ARVN Corps of Engineers.

(2) Authority for the Defense Attache, Saigon, to approve authorized projects for contract execution by the ARVN Corps of Engineers.

(3) Concurrence in monitoring procedures on those projects to be executed under ARVN Corps of Engineers contracts.

#### 4. (U) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN CY 74.

a. The previous assessment reported 28,515 personnel were demobilized during the first three quarters of CY 74. The number of personnel demobilized during the fourth quarter CY 74 is shown at Figure 12-1. Personnel demobilized during CY 74 totaled 40,142, while the plan for CY 74 was 40,035. The CY 75 demobilization plan is shown at Figure 12-2.

b. There has been no change in the military pension regulations or responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## UNCLASSIFIED

## RVNAF DEMOBILIZATION DURING FOURTH QUARTER CY 1974

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Over-Age Personnel				
Regular Forces	227	630	76	933
RF	35	124	317	476
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	262	754	408	1424
B. WAC Contract Expiration & Retirement				
C. Category # 2 Physically Unfit				
Regular Forces	186	393	1254	1833
RF	9	120	888	1017
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>525</u>	<u>525</u>
Total	195	513	2667	3375
D. Category # 3 Disabled				
Regular Forces	259	828	3489	4576
RF	41	161	1095	1297
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>881</u>	<u>921</u>
Total	300	1029	5465	6794
E. Grand Total of all Categories				
Regular Forces	672	1851	4819	7342
RF	85	405	2300	2790
PF	0	40	1421	1461
WAC	<u>3</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>34</u>
Total	760	2314	8553	11627

Figure 12-1

## UNCLASSIFIED

## RVNAF DEMOBILIZATION PLAN FOR CY 1975

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Over-Age Personnel				
Regular Forces	1411	2692	6584	10687
RF	720	878	2817	4415
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>572</u>	<u>612</u>
Total	2131	3610	9973	15714
B. WAC Contract Expiration & Retirement	4	82	84	170
C. Category # 2 Physically Unfit				
Regular Forces	482	1364	6116	7962
RF	90	763	4724	5577
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>2323</u>	<u>2371</u>
Total	572	2175	13163	15910
D. Category # 3 Disabled				
Regular Forces	464	890	4116	5470
RF	74	513	1147	1734
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>2021</u>
Total	538	1471	7216	9225
E. Grand Total of all Categories				
Regular Forces	2357	4946	16816	24119
RF	884	2154	8688	11726
PF	0	156	4848	5004
WAC	<u>4</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	3245	7338	30436	41019

Figure 12-2

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. Morale has declined in RVNAF. ARVN commanders cite the ammunition reduction and close air support restriction as the most significantly detrimental factors. Additionally, the economic situation has its adverse effects and a serious drop in the soldier's will to fight is imminent if not already a fact. The VNN, in MR 4, reports morale to be high; morale among VNAF pilots is good for those that are flying. Insufficient salaries in all services continue to burden the military man in his constant battle to feed himself and his family.

b. RVNAF desertions for September, October and November:

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>DESERTIONS</u>
ARVN	26,234
VNAF	381
VNN	219
VNMC	487
RF	18,882
PF	7,636
Ranger	5,308
Airborne	715

c. Desertion rates for the past three quarters:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Mar-May 74</u>	<u>Jun-Aug 74</u>	<u>Sep-Nov 74</u>
ARVN	*2.11	2.28	2.24
VNAF	.31	.23	.21
VNN	.21	.21	.18
VNMC	1.58	1.31	1.10
RF	1.90	2.17	2.17
PF	1.03	1.26	1.32
Ranger	5.17	5.11	6.23
Airborne	1.39	1.63	1.83

\*Numbers represent percentage of assigned strength.

d. Desertion trends are shown in Figure 12-3.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

# DESERTION RATES




Figure 12-3

12-9

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

6. (C) RVNAF MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC). Overall statistics for helicopter sorties, hours flown and personnel carried:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
JAN	3771	1775	2552
FEB	3606	1636	2540
MAR	3796	1894	3631
APR	2990	1703	2588
MAY	3452	1706	3461
JUN	4029	1942	2885
JUL	3862	1760	4489
AUG	4328	1884	4364
SEP	4239	1563	3790
OCT	3206	1311	3231
NOV	3820	1485	2633
DEC	3470	1501	3044

7. (C) CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. Figure 12-4 depicts the trend in communist defectors/ralliers for the year 1974.

(Figure 12-4)

8. (C) TERRORISM. The increase in communist activity during December caused casualties among the populace to rise markedly. National police, government officials, cadre and People's Self Defense Force losses were the highest since April 1972.

(Figure 12-5)

9. (C) REFUGEE PROGRAM. The refugee program remains stalled as communist efforts at disruption continue. Military Regions 3 and 4 report increased refugees with the siege of Phuoc Long Province (MR-3) and increases in activity throughout the Delta.

(Figures 12-6 and 12-7)

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 12-4

12-11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure 12-5

12-13

CONFIDENTIAL

# REFUGEE HISTORY




Figure 12-6

12-15

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

# CURRENT REFUGEE STATUS




Figure 12-7

12-17

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 13

### JCS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (C) CHAIN OF COMMAND. The Defense Attache Office has, in the past, shown the interrelationships between the Joint General Staff (JGS) and various staff elements within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). In previous quarters the chain of command from the President, as Supreme Commander in Chief, down to the Military Regions/Corps (MRs/Corps) has been outlined: The actual chain of command from the President, Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense and the Chief/JGS, down to the Military Region Commanders is close held, personal in nature, tightly knit and somewhat inflexible. Mission type orders are given to the MR Commanders and they are given command and control of the total resources determined sufficient to accomplish their mission. All but certain intelligence, technical, logistic staff actions and communications flow upward to the Chief/JGS, and the Chief of Staff, JGS. Conversely, there is a severely limited flow downward to the MRs. The staff sections of the JGS are generally internally oriented to assisting the Chief/JGS with his command and control responsibilities. Nothing substantial has altered that relationship and structure of command. This assessment outlines the organization and functions of the Military Regions/Corps, Provinces/Sectors, Districts/Subsectors and Villages/Sub-Subsectors.

2. (C) THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY REGION/CORPS COMMANDER. The MR/Corps Commanders have dual responsibilities, that of territorial security and civil government. The MR/Corps concept is basically a mechanism which has been established to provide intermediary levels of administration and support between the national government and the general population; it is also the organization through which command and control is exercised over RVNAF and territorial forces (National and Popular Forces - RF/PF).

a. The MR/Corps Commanders have actual command and control over the units assigned from major combat branches of RVNAF and the JGS. This authority is generally exercised through the Deputy Commander for Corps and the Chief of Staff. Figure 13-1 depicts the corps regular military organization. As commanders of the MRs they also exercise command and control over territorial forces, through the Deputy Commander for Territorial Forces, down through the Sector, Subsector, and Sub-Subsector Commanders. Figure 13-2 depicts this organization. Figure 13-3 depicts the relationship between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and territorial forces under the JGS and the MR/Corps Commanders.

# CONFIDENTIAL








UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCES (REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES-RF/PF)



- Command and Control  
 --- Coordinates and monitors implementation of territorial security program; prepares plans, directives, TO & E's and logistic support requirements.
- NOTE : (a) Chief/JGS concurrently Commander, ARVN.  
 (b) RF/PF is an integral part of ARVN Infantry Branch.  
 (c) RF/PF commanded by Sector Commander. RF primarily OPCON to Sector Tactical Cmnnd. Post or Sub-Sector, or Temp. to ARVN/Div. for Opns; PF asgd to village/hamlet chiefs and OPCON to Sub-Sector Commanders.  
 (d) Recently created to strengthen military territorial security at village/hamlet level.

Figure 13-3

UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. (C) THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF MRS, PROVINCES/SECTORS, DISTRICTS/SUBSECTORS AND VILLAGE/SUB-SUBSECTORS. The basic distinction between Corps and MR is that the MRs and their subordinate sectors are primarily concerned with civil government. Therefore, an underlying organization has been created to provide guidance and coordination for the Government of Vietnam (GVN) security and development programs. To facilitate their administration, Security and Development Councils, or Committees (SDCs), have been formed at all levels of government.

a. At the national level the Prime Minister is the Chairman of the Central SDC; correspondingly, the MR/Corps Commander is the chairman of the SDC at regional level, the Province Chief/Sector Commander at province level, the District Chief/Subsector Commander at district level and the Village Chief/Sub-Subsector Commander at village level. An important aspect of this organization is that at all levels of administration a coordinating center has been established as an adjunct to the SDCs. The Chief of the Coordinating Center, concurrently Secretary General for the SDC, is responsible to the Chairman for the administration, implementation and monitoring of the security and development programs. Figure 13-4 depicts the relationship of the SDCs, coordinating centers and ministries under the respective levels of authority. (It should be noted that all positions mentioned, with the exception of civil ministries, are occupied by either active duty or detached ARVN officers.)

b. Although there is an MR SDC and Coordinating Center, the recent changes in the GVN national administration, during November, 1974, resulted in a more limited authority by MR/Corps Commanders over the civil functions and programs in the provinces. For example, the regional SDC does not pass on the provincial plans. Rather, they are submitted to the appropriate ministry and the Central SDC. Province chiefs are appointed by and directly responsible to the Prime Minister in this regard. (This degree of provincial autonomy should not obscure the fact that the MR/Corps Commander still maintains considerable control over the province chiefs and direct command through the sector concept.) Figure 13-5 depicts the organization of government within province.

c. The organization of government within district and village, which is similar in varying degrees to that of province, is depicted in Figure 13-6 and 13-7, respectively. The province chief maintains absolute authority and responsibility for all activities, regarding security and development, within the province.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED

# RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS (SDCS) AND COORDINATING CENTER UNDER VARIOUS LEVELS OF AUTHORITY.




Figure 13-4

13-9

UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**



The organizational chart of the Provincial Government of Nepal is structured as follows:

- Province Chief** (Solid box)
  - Court** (Solid box) - Connected via a dashed line.
  - Ministerial Services Offices** (Dashed box) - Connected via a dashed line.
  - Province National Police HQ** (Dashed box) - Connected via a dashed line.
  - District Chief** (Solid box)
    - Coordination Committee Military/Cadre Assembly** (Dashed box)
    - Mobile Cadre Group** (Dashed box)
    - Subsector HQ** (Solid box)
    - Deputy District Chief** (Solid box)
      - Coordination Center** (Solid box)
      - District NP HQ** (Solid box)
- Technical and Specialized Liaison System** (Dashed line)
  - Open Arms, Returned Information Section** (Solid box)
  - Public Health Section** (Solid box)
  - PSDF Section** (Solid box)
  - Ethnic Minority Development Section** (Solid box)
  - Social Welfare Section** (Solid box)
  - Public Service Section** (Solid box)
  - Finance Economic & Taxation Section** (Solid box)
  - Telecom. Section** (Solid box)
- Coordination System** (Dotted line)
  - Public Works Section** (Solid box)
  - Culture, Education & Youth Section** (Solid box)
  - Agriculture Section** (Solid box)
  - Autonomous Agencies** (Solid box)
  - Admin Section** (Solid box)
  - Judicial Interior Affairs Section** (Solid box)

**Legend:**

- Solid line:** DIRECT COMMAND SYSTEM
- Dashed line:** TECHNICAL AND SPECIALIZED LIAISON SYSTEM
- Dotted line:** COORDINATION SYSTEM

13-13

**UNCLASSIFIED**

13-15

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 14  
DAO DISTINGUISHED VISITOR1. OCTOBER 1974:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-2 Oct 74	Honorable William P. Clements, Jr.	Deputy Secretary of Defense
	Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
	Major General Winant Sidle	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
	Mr. Robert J. Martens	Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Department of State
	Rear Admiral W.R. McClendon	Director for Plans, Commander in Chief, Pacific
	Brigadier General John G. Jones	Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense
	Mr. Joseph E. Zaice	Assistant to Secretary of Defense
	Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Groups
2-3 Oct 74	Colonel Douglas K. Logan	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Support Activities Group

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
2-4 Oct 74	Colonel A.E. Lowy	Chief, Political/Military Division, Strategy and Security Assistance Director- ate, Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Department of the Army.
3-5 Oct 74	Honorable Terence A. Mollary	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
	Mr. Erich F. Von Marboe	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
	Colonel Leo M. Brandt	Staff Member
	Mr. Raymond F. DeBois, Jr.	Staff Member
6-12 Oct 74	Captain O.A. Porter, United States Navy	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Review Team
	Captain J.C. McArthur, United States Navy	Staff Member
7-11 Oct 74	Colonel James E. Daniel, Jr.	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group
7 Oct-20 Nov 74	Mr. M.A. Melling	Chief, Pacific Audit Division, Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit)

14-2

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
9-12 Oct 74	Mr. A.A. Willner	Head Protection Systems Branch, Naval Ship Research and Development Center
10-12 Oct 74	Captain Chong Sum Fong, United States Navy	Commander, Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific
15-17 Oct 74	Vice Admiral George P. Steele	Commander, Seventh Fleet
15-20 Oct 74	Mr. Edward F. Ducey, Jr.	United States Department of Labor Deputy Commissioner, Office Work Compensation Programs
16-18 Oct 74	Colonel Benjamin F. Ingram, Jr.	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group
20 Oct 74	Mr. J. Meyer	Assistant to Commander, Thai Regional Exchange
	Mr. R. Sheriff	Director, Merchandising Division, Thai Regional Exchange
21-25 Oct 74	Colonel Lee R. Wasmund	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
22-24 Oct 74	Major General John R. Guthrie	Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific
	Colonel John D. Thornton, Jr.	Staff Member
	Colonel Richard E. Van Ness, Jr.	Staff Member
22-29 Oct 74	Brigadier General Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
23-26 Oct 74	Brigadier General Joseph E. Burns, III	Director, International Logistics, Army Materiel Command
24-25 Oct 74	Major General John A. Hoefling	Director, International Logistics Department of the Army
24 Oct 74	Lieutenant General John J. Burns	Commander, United States Support Activities Group/ Seventh Air Force
	Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
25 Oct 74	Mr. Robert H. Miller	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Economic Affairs

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
29-31 Oct 74	Colonel Eugene Hollis	Deputy Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
29 Oct- 1 Nov 74	Colonel N.H. Howell	Director, Security Assistance Affairs, Pacific Air Force
	Colonel Milton C. Stahmer	Pacific Air Force
	Colonel C.W. Boyd, Jr.	J53, Commander in Chief, Pacific
	Captain R.L. Davis, United States Navy	J52, Commander in Chief, Pacific
30 Oct- 1 Nov 74	Colonel Benjamin Hamilton	Deputy for Operations, 500th Military Intelligence Group
	Colonel William Wolf	Commander, United States Army Intelligence Agency
30 Oct- 3 Nov 74	Mr. Richard T. Russ	Director, Military Assistance and Overseas Audits, Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit)
31 Oct 74	Honorable J. William Middendorf	Secretary of the Navy
	Vice Admiral William Houser	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
	Rear Admiral William Thompson	Chief of Information

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
	Brigadier General Ernest R. Reid, Jr.	Commandant, Marine Corps, Representative
	Colonel Henry R. Vitali	Staff Member
 <u>2. NOVEMBER 1974:</u>		
3-5 Nov 74	Colonel George L. Miller	Deputy Director for Logistics, Commander in Chief, Pacific
6-8 Nov 74	Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
6-9 Nov 74	Colonel Robert A. Stephanik	J2, United States Support Activities Groups
7 Nov 74	Mr. Walter L. Shepherd	Regional Executive, Thai Regional Exchange
7 Nov 74	Mr. E.E. Weismiller	Director, Personnel Division, Headquarters, Army-Air Force Exchange System
7-10 Nov 74	Colonel N.H. Howell	Director, Security Assistance Affairs, Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
	Colonel R.P. Knoebel, Jr.	Staff Member

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
	Colonel Ronald M. Clements	Staff Member
7-15 Nov 74	Colonel Lawrence L. Ropka, Jr.	Office, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
9-29 Nov 74	Professor John Cooper	Defense Resources Management Education Center Faculty Member
12-14 Nov 74	Colonel Glenn Cox	Office of Strategic Investigation, Bangkok
12-23 Nov 74	Colonel William W. Tombaugh	Senior Research Fellow and Faculty Member, National War College
15 Nov 74	Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
17-19 Nov 74	Colonel William R. Adams	Telecommunications Director, Department of Defense Special Unit #1
17 Nov- 7 Dec 74	Professor S.W. Blandin	Defense Resources Management Education Center Faculty Member

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
18-20 Nov 74	Mr. Samuel Pinn, Jr.	Legal Counsel, Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
18-21 Nov 74	Colonel Robert A. Hamblin	Chief, Logistics, Military Assistance Command, Thai
20-22 Nov 74	Colonel William A. Meikle	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group
20-27 Nov 74	Brigadier General Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
20-28 Nov 74	Mr. Charles L. Desaulniers	Southeast Asia Estimator, Directorate for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency
	Mr. B.E. Layton	Assistant National Intelligence Officer, Southeast Asia
21-28 Nov 74	Mr. Erich F. Von Marbod	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
	Mr. R.F. DuBois	Staff Member
21 Nov- 5 Dec 74	Lieutenant General William G. Moore	Chief of Staff, Commander in- Chief, Pacific
	Colonel C.W. Boyd	Staff Member

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
	Colonel N.G. Howell	Staff Member
	Colonel J.R. Pilk	Staff Member
	Colonel J.D. Thornton	Staff Member
25 Nov 74	General Louis L. Wilson, Jr.	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
	Brigadier General Jack W. Waters	Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Pacific Air Force
30 Nov- 8 Dec 74	Dr. H. Paul Ecker	Executive Director, Defense Resources Management Education Center
<u>3. DECEMBER 1974:</u>		
4 Dec 74	Brigadier General Daniel Burkett	Deputy Commander, Army-Air Force Exchange Service
	Brigadier General Donald A. Gaylord	Commander, Pacific Exchange System
4-6 Dec 74	Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
5-8 Dec 74	Honorable Arthur I. Mendolia	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
	Vice Admiral T. R. Weschler	Director for Logistics, Office, Joint Chief of Staff

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
	Mr. P.J. Fliakas	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), Installations and Housing
	Mr. D.S. Cuffe	Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), Director, International Program
	Major General T. Antonelli	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
	Major General J. L. Blank	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics
	Major General F. W. Vaught	Director, Plans Program and Management
	Brigadier General C.D. Youree	Assistant Deputy Director for Political/Military Affairs, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff J5
	Rear Admiral John S. Kern	Director of Logistics, Plans Division
	Rear Admiral H. A. Benton	Director for Logistics, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
	Colonel R.R. Burritt	Far East/Southeast Asia Division, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5
	Colonel W.L. Wubben	Deputy Director, East Asia and Pacific, Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
	Captain E.J. Vaughan, Jr., United States Navy	Military Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
9-13 Dec 74	Colonel James E. Daniel	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group
10-13 Dec 74	Mr. John P. Constandy	Deputy Inspector General of Foreign Assistance
10-13 Dec 74	Mr. Fred Joest	Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters
26-31 Dec 74	Representative Leo Ryan	Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs
28-31 Dec 74	Mr. George Ingram	Committee Staffer
29 Dec 74- 14 Jan 75	Brigadier General James M. Thompson	Deputy Director for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency

# UNCLASSIFIED

MED  
8